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Executive Summary
Project Background
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291. This order required that 
significant federal regulations undergo cost-benefit analysis before approval by the Office of 
Management and Budget. Every President since Ronald Reagan has continued to follow this 
policy. This research is primarily motivated by two important questions regarding the estimation 
of benefits associated with public goods for use in cost-benefit analysis.
First, in evaluating the benefits of providing public goods, many studies, especially those 
based on contingent valuation, have shown substantial evidence of altruistic values. Thus, 
individuals indicate that they are willing to pay not only for the benefits to themselves from a 
particular public good, but also are willing to pay for the benefits that others receive from the 
public good. Considerable debate has ensued concerning the legitimacy of including such 
altruistic values in cost-benefit analysis. This debate has focused on two forms of altruism, non­
paternalistic or pure altruism, and paternalistic or impure altruism. Pure altruism can be 
characterized by the statement: “What I want for you is whatever makes you happy.”
Paternalistic altruism can be characterized by the statement: “I want for you whatever I think is 
good for you, whether you like it or not.” Pure altruism leads people to pay for others what 
others would pay for themselves and is generally viewed as leading to the double counting of 
benefits. In contrast, impure altruism motivates people to pay in addition to what others 
themselves would pay for a public good and is not viewed as double counting. Unfortunately, 
determining whether or not values for use in cost-benefit analysis incorporate altruism and what 
type of altruism is present is not easily accomplished. We address the empirical measurement of 
these forms of altruism in the first two papers of this report by developing and exploring the 
demand revelation characteristics of a new incentive compatible public goods elicitation 
mechanism we term the Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM) or the Voting Becker- 
DeGroot-Marshack (BDM) Mechanism.
The second issue we address is criterion validity in contingent valuation. In addition to 
providing a platform for examining the empirical components of altruism, the RPVM developed 
in this research offers a simulated market baseline for evaluating hypothetical bias in stated 
preference methods. The policy need for improved research in this area was highlighted by the 
Blue Ribbon Contingent Valuation Panel convened by National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the consequent Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990.
Summary o f Paper 1
The first paper develops and tests a new public goods value elicitation mechanism, 
referred to as the Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM or the Voting Becker-DeGroot- 
Marshack (BDM) Mechanism), in a series of laboratory economics experiments. The hope is that 
this mechanism will allow exploration of the nature of altruistic values as well as provide a tool 
for calibrating hypothetical value questions obtained through surveys (contingent values). Note 
that many experiments have been utilized to calibrate hypothetical values for private goods since 
several demand-revealing private good mechanisms exist but few studies have been conducted 
for public goods. The reason for this discrepancy is that all of the demand-revealing mechanisms 
available for public goods are cumbersome or confusing at best (these include the Smith Auction 
and the Groves-Ledyard Mechanism). Moreover, these mechanisms require multiple rounds and
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group interaction, and hence are not amenable to single-shot survey setting characterizing 
contingent valuation.
The experiments described use actual monetary payoffs and demonstrate that the RPVM 
is, in fact, demand revealing for both private and public goods. The data from these experiments 
further demonstrate that people do show non-paternalistic or pure altruism in voting on payoffs 
specified to each member of a voting group. In particular, voters with high payoffs from a 
program show concern for the cost/tax that voters with low payoffs will have to pay if the 
majority imposes a tax above the payoff for low payoff voters. Similarly, low payoff voters will 
vote for taxes above their payoffs so that high payoff voters will be better off. This behavior is 
consistent with pure altruism. Note that for public good settings in which voters all have identical 
payoffs, the voters tended to only vote yes if the payoff was greater than the cost. As such, for 
these baseline, homogeneous payoff cases, the mechanism is demand revealing.
Given that the RPVM is demand revealing and that it can reveal altruism in an induced 
value experimental setting, the second paper explores the possibility of paternalistic altruism in a 
risky environment. Such an extension is necessary because it is not possible to test for 
paternalistic altruism using certain monetary payoffs. Rather, it is possible that people will have 
paternalistic preferences with respect to the financial risks that others face. The third paper uses 
the mechanism to calibrate hypothetical values collected using contingent valuation techniques.
Summary o f Paper 2
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to determine what types of 
altruism might be present in values obtained for cost-benefit analysis. The research utilizes the 
RPVM described in Paper 1. The methodology is tested for provision of group insurance to avoid 
a financial loss using laboratory economics experiments, more closely mimicking what is 
referred to in the experimental economics and contingent valuation literature as home grown 
values (as opposed to an induced value setting utilized in the first paper). Yet, the methods used 
here can be employed either in the laboratory or field for other commodities more likely to yield 
paternalistic altruism. The type of altruism present in values is important since non-paternalistic 
or purely altruistic values should usually be excluded from cost-benefit analysis of the provision 
of public goods, but paternalistic altruism generally should be incorporated. The possibility of 
paternalistic altruism can be examined because participants in a voting group who prefer that 
others in their group do not accept a risk of loss, but do not care about their overall payoff, will 
always value insurance for their group (public good) above the value of insurance against the 
same risk for themselves alone (private good). Thus, in the case of homogeneous risks, where all 
members of a voting group face the same probability of loss and financial loss, paternalistic 
altruists will value group insurance more than insurance for themselves alone. In contrast, pure 
altruists will value group insurance the same as insurance for themselves alone.
No evidence for paternalistic altruism is found in this study. The pattern of values when 
different group members face different risks is, however, consistent with non-paternalistic or 
pure altruism as shown for certain payoffs in Paper 1. It should not be concluded from this single 
study that paternalistic altruism does not exist. Rather, the purpose of this study is to develop 
methods that can be used to determine whether paternalistic altruism exists in a particular setting. 
This method could be extended in future experiments that utilize other commodities to see if 
convincing evidence for paternalistic altruism can be found.
A second finding of this paper is that non-paternalistic altruism can lead some people to 
be willing to pay less for public insurance than they would pay for private insurance. This under­
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reporting for public goods challenges the maintained assumption often asserted in valuation 
research that altruism leads to artificial inflation in reported benefits.
Summary o f Paper 3
This paper presents an analysis of hypothetical values for both private and public 
insurance obtained under identical circumstances to those described for Paper 2. WTP values are 
again using the RPVM. The focus of this research is to test three separate contingent valuation 
elicitation methods for the degree of hypothetical bias in comparison with the actual values. 
Parallel hypothetical data is elicited for both private and public insurance policies using two 
forms of the Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice (MBDC) method described by Welsh and Poe 
(1998), and using the standard PC method (Rowe et al. 1996). In the standard PC format (Rowe 
et al. 1996), subjects circle a value corresponding with their decision from a table of values. A 
second sample received an alternative Dichotomous Choice Payment Card (DC-PC), 
corresponding to that suggested in Boyle (2004) and employed by Bateman et al. (2005) amongst 
others. For the DC-PC, respondents indicate a vote of “Yes” or “No” to paying specified dollar 
amounts. As such, this elicitation method has similarities to the standard PC, but differs 
fundamentally in that respondents are asked to register a decision for each dollar value (rather 
than simply circling one value from a table). A third sample faced a MBDC version requiring 
respondents to indicate a level of certainty of WTP for each of a series of values. Certainty 
response options in the MBDC format are “Definitely Yes” (DY), “Probably Yes” (PY), 
“Unsure” (UN), “Probably No” (PN), and “Definitely No” (DN). Past research (Vossler et al. 
2004) indicates that the multiple bounded “Probably Yes” (PY) model best predicts actual 
behavior in contribution settings. To the best of our knowledge, such comparisons have not been 
provided for DC-PC and PC formats.
Results suggest in this case that the PC and MBDC-PY are significantly different in both 
the private and public goods settings. We also find that the PC and DC-PC estimates 
significantly differ. However in all cases, the DC-PC and MBDC-PY estimates are nearly 
identical to the actual values. Nonparametric analysis shows that both the DC-PC elicitation 
format and the MBDC method, using a certainly level of Probably Yes, provide statistically 
similar estimates of WTP.
This finding indicates that calibration is possible to obtain accurate estimates of value 
using hypothetical questions in both private and public settings. A further implication of this 
research is that a simple DC-PC format may be preferred to the MBDC format in terms of 
predicting actual WTP, as well as being less cognitively taxing on the respondent. This 
experimental economics laboratory research lays a foundation for extending such research to the 
field.
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Abstract
This report introduces a new “Voting-BDM” mechanism, which combines the Becker-DeGroot 
Marschak (BDM) mechanism for private goods with a majority voting rule. We use the Voting- 
BDM mechanism in an induced value framework to test the effect of pure altruism on the 
provision of public goods in coercive willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) settings for both gains and losses. Laboratory experiments indicate that with 
homogeneous induced values, the Voting-BDM mechanism is demand-revealing in both WTP 
and WTA settings. Consistent with our theoretical model, however, non-paternalistic altruism or 
fairness concerns appear to influence behavior when induced values are heterogeneous. With 
induced gains, better-off subjects under-report their WTP and WTA and worse-off subjects 
over-report their WTP and WTA. The opposite holds true for induced losses.
The research in this paper was funded by National Science Foundation Grant (SES-0108667), 
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“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
Adam Smith, Section I, Chapter. I,
The Theory o f Moral Sentiments
1. Introduction
The experimental economics literature has provided increasing evidence that other- 
regarding behavior is a significant factor in individual contributions and deviations from the 
dominant, Nash equilibrium strategy of no contributions in voluntary public goods settings (see 
for instance Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997; Goeree, Holt and Laury 1999; and 
Ferraro, Rondeau and Poe, 2003). This is problematic from the perspective of social decision 
making because it has long been recognized that, at the margin, the optimal provision of public 
goods should be based solely on selfish preferences (Bergstrom, 1982; Jones-Lee, 1991, 1992; 
Milgrom, 1993; Johansson, 1994). Hence, some types of other-regarding behavior, such as pure 
(or non-paternalistic) altruism and impure altruism (i.e., the warm glow of giving - Andreoni, 
1990) should not be included in social benefit-cost analyses for small projects evaluated close to 
a social welfare optimum. One implication for the valuation of public goods is that individual, 
and therefore aggregate, willingness to pay (WTP) should be conditional on everybody else 
paying so as to remain at their initial level of utility (Johansson, 1994).
However, public projects are rarely, if ever, financed under such conditions: most 
typically the funding for specific public projects imposes coercive costs that result in utility gains 
and losses. Moreover, projects evaluated tend to be discrete, and the initial allocation of public 
goods is inefficient. Under these conditions the extrapolation of Bergstrom’s result for marginal 
changes at the optimum do not carry over to the “more modest problem [of benefit-cost
analysis], determining whether a specific project can lead to a Pareto improvement” (Flores, 
2002, p. 304; see also Johansson, 1993 and Johannesson, Johansson and O’Conor, 1996). 
Motives do matter.
Despite the fact that majority voting rules are increasingly used in ballot initiatives 
(referenda) to determine the provision of public programs that impose disproportionate costs and 
benefits on individuals, the effects of other-regarding behavior in involuntary, coercive settings 
are largely unexplored. To the extent that individuals exhibit other-regarding behavior, voting 
decisions are likely to be influenced by the perceived or actual impact on others (Deacon and 
Shapiro, 1975; Holmes, 1990). Understanding the motivation(s) and behavior of individuals who 
make personal choices affecting the public provision of public goods is therefore critical to 
benefit-cost analyses and the evaluation of the efficiency of referenda with coercive taxes.
To gain insights into individual behavior in coercive situations, we introduce a new 
public goods funding mechanism that combines the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) 
mechanism for private goods with a majority voting rule. This we refer to as the Voting-BDM. 
For private goods, the BDM is theoretically incentive-compatible. Further, experimental 
evidence suggests that the BDM is a transparent mechanism with demand revealing properties 
(Boyce et al., 1992; Irwin et al., 1998). Laboratory experiments have further demonstrated the 
incentive compatibility and transparency of majority voting (see, for example, Plott and Levine 
1978).
Whereas the BDM mechanism in a WTP setting has the subject purchase the good at a 
randomly determined cost whenever her maximum WTP is greater than or equal to the cost, the 
Voting-BDM implements the public good whenever a majority of subjects indicate a maximum 
WTP greater than or equal to a randomly selected cost, and where all subjects, regardless of their
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personal WTP, must pay this cost. In regards to a typical majority voting situation, note that the 
subject’s bid is an indication of the highest price at which they would still vote yes. In a WTA 
setting, subjects indicate their minimum WTA to forego the public good and if the majority of 
offers are less than or equal to the randomly selected compensation, then all subjects, regardless 
of their personal WTA, must accept this amount.
There are several reasons to study the Voting-BDM in an induced value, continuous 
response setting. First, contrary to actual, “real-world” majority voting settings whereby a 
subject’s yes or no vote implies a WTP or WTA interval, the Voting-BDM elicits a welfare point 
estimate1. Second, the Voting-BDM is less complex than incentive compatible public goods 
funding mechanisms such as the Smith (1980) Auction and the Groves-Ledyard (1977) 
mechanism, with the single round and the transparent nature facilitating the examination of 
treatment effects. Third, providing only monetary incentives in a laboratory setting excludes the 
possible influence of paternalistic altruism, in which the donor’s utility is a function of particular 
consumption patterns of the beneficiary. Fourth, comparing Voting-BDM bids with induced 
values allows a direct test of warm glow. If no warm glow is evident in induced value monetary 
settings, any evidence of other-regarding behavior must be attributable to pure altruism.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section presents a 
theoretical model and derives testable hypotheses of the effects of pure altruism on the behavior 
of subjects in a coercive tax setting. Section 3 discusses the experimental design, which includes 
various treatments under WTP and WTA settings for both induced gains and induced losses. 
Results appear in Sections 4 and 5. We conclude with a discussion of trends that are evident in
1 The submission of a bid is also more informative than a dichotomous “yes” or “no” response to a posted price 
which simply indicates that a subject’s value is above or below the specified cutoff. Hence the use of a continuous 
response function offers a more efficient means of investigating anomalous behavior in voting settings. In ongoing 
NSF-funded research (Schulze et al., 2004) we demonstrate that the results reported here are also found in 
dichotomous choice referendum settings.
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these experiments and suggest areas for future research with the Voting-BDM mechanism. In 
concluding this report, we note that some of the suggestions made herein are being pursued in a 
NSF project that builds upon the present research (Schulze et al., 2004).
2._____A Theory of the Voting-BDM Mechanism and Testable Hypotheses
This section presents a theory of the Voting-BDM mechanism. For both clarity and 
brevity, we formulate this theory in the context of a “WTP-Gains” setting where individuals have 
a positive WTP for a public good. As we discuss below, the arguments in this setting are readily 
extendable to the other three possible welfare cases: willingness to pay to avoid a loss (WTP- 
Loss); willingness to accept compensation in lieu of a gain (WTA-Gain); and willingness to 
accept compensation to experience a loss (WTA-Loss). In the willingness-to-pay settings the 
reported values are referred to as “bids”. We refer to willingness-to-accept values as “offers”.
Consider a situation where n individuals are asked to express the maximum amount of 
money they would be prepared to pay for a particular program. A program is heretofore defined 
as a known vector of values n  = {nx,n2, . . ,n n) ,containing the payoff, n i , for individual i, and
payoffs, TTj, that all other individuals in the voting group stand to receive if a majority of
subjects express a WTP equal or above a per-person (or average) cost C. The ith individual’s 
revealed WTP amount or his bid is denoted Bt . The per person cost C is drawn from a uniform 
distribution in the interval [0,Cmax] . If a majority of bids are greater than or equal to C, individual 
i receives a monetary payoff Y + ni - C (which could be smaller than the subject’s initial 
endowment Y if ni < C ).
Subjects are also postulated to have “social welfare” preferences consistent with the 
definition of Charness and Rabin (2002), according to which an individuals’ utility is increasing
5
(decreasing) in the gains (losses) of others. Thus, we posit that the total utility of individual i is
given by Ui = u Y + ni -  C + ^  (  • (nJ -  C)) I ,where a i > 0 is a parameter indicating the
J ^
intensity with which individual i is affected by the gains and losses of others. This, in effect, 
adapts and extends the social welfare analysis of Charness and Rabin in three important 
dimensions. First, where Charness and Rabin are concerned with the case of two players, we 
allow for n players. Second, we do not restrict the analysis to linear utility functions. Third, and 
most importantly, since C is a stochastic variable, the game is one of incomplete information and 
the relevant framework of analysis will be expected utility with a Bayesian equilibrium concept. 
The term in the summation allows for the fact that subjects may have positive preferences for the 
benefits that others receive from the implementation of the program. The parameter a  defines
the extent to which the utility of individual i is affected by the potential gains (or losses) of 
others resulting from the implementation of the program. This formulation allows for 
heterogeneity across subjects, including the purely self-interested case where a i = 0, Vi ^ j . Note 
further that a i is symmetric -  implying that gains and losses are treated equally. The a i is also
not recipient specific. Gains and losses of all j  other individuals receive equal weight in i’s 
utility function.2
To compute the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bid of individual i, it is useful to rank order 
the bids of all n-1 other individuals. Define Bm as the bid that ranks as the Integer ((n + 1)/2) th 
largest of those bids (for n=3 this is the smallest of the other two bids). It is also useful to define 
Bk as the Round((n -1) / 2)th largest bid (for n=3, this identifies the largest of the other two bids). 
The interval [Bm , Bk ] defines the range over which a bid by voter i makes this individual have a
2 The relaxation of these symmetries and individual independent assumptions is being pursued in current NSF- 
funded research on anomalous behavior in coercive public goods setting (Schulze et al., 2004).
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marginal influence over the outcome of the game (in a probabilistic sense, it makes him the 
median voter).
To see this, consider the expected utility of individual i, where B., are the bids from all 
other individuals in the voting group:
m | I
EU ,  ( ,  B_ t )= |  p(C )U Y + n -  C + £ ( ■  (n  -  C)) I )C
0 V J
B i I  I
+ J p ( c )U y +n - c + £ ( ■ ( * , - c ) ) Id c
Bm  V ! * '  J
B k  C max
+ J  p(C)U (Y)dC + J  p(C)U (Y)dC
(1)
The first term denotes the expected utility conditional on the randomly drawn cost being 
below Bm, with p(C) representing the probability that a certain cost is drawn. In this case, i’s bid 
is completely irrelevant since there are a sufficient number of other voters who are willing to pay 
at least the drawn cost C to implement the program. The second and third terms represent the 
interval over which the bid of individual i will have a marginal effect. Here, Bt becomes the 
median bid. By increasing the bid amount individual i increases the probability that the program 
will be funded by increasing the range of costs that a plurality of voters is prepared to pay 
(second term), and decreasing the range over which the project is not implemented (third term). 
The last term is the interval of drawn costs for which, the program will not be implemented 
regardless of individual i’s bid, as too few individuals are prepared to pay the random cost and 
the project is not implemented.
Exploring the family of affine strategies, individual i conjectures that individuals m and k 
choose bids of the form
(  \  (  \
II n m + Y d O n n ] and B k =  Yk n k + Y d a k n i
V  j *m J V  j *k J
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Where yk and ym are positive constants, the exact value of which is defined by the equilibrium
solution below. Substituting these expressions in Equation 1 and maximizing by choosing Bi 
yields the first order condition:
P( B,) \ -U  (Y)+U Y + n -  B ,+ L {a ,-  (n, -  B ,)) )  0
J
This equation has a degenerate solution p  (B,) = 0 (where Bi is set equal to the lower
support of the cost distribution). Assuming concavity of the utility function, there is also an 
interior maximum whereby individual chooses his bid so as to equate the utility under the two 
alternative states of the world (the program is funded or it is not). This optimal bid is given by:
n + L a  nj
B* =-----^ -------  (2)
1 + (n -  1)a
This optimal strategy has the same form as the prior of individual i regarding the bidding 
strategy of individuals k and m if one sets yt = 1/(1 + (n -  1)a ) . Therefore, a symmetric Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium exists if all players adopt this linear strategy (including k and m of course). 
Note that an individual’s optimal bid only depends on his own parameters and knowledge of the 
payoff vector.
The individually rational bid prediction for the standard BDM is nested in (2). In the 
absence of other players, the summation term vanishes and n -1 = 0, yielding the well-known 
incentive compatibility result, B* = n . The model also predicts that if the payoffs are identical 
across subjects (nj=ni for all j), the optimal strategy is for the individual to bid an amount equal 
to his payoff(B* = n ) . In this case, the subjects sensibly recognize that if all individuals were to 
bid above the common value, the resulting increase in the probability that the program will be
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funded is, in equilibrium, simply increasing the possibility that the program will be implemented 
at a cost above value, which will result in a net loss for all subjects, making bids above value 
irrational. Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that bidding below the common value is also 
sub-optimal individually and collectively.
From (2), we can also predict how the optimal bid changes when payoffs are 
heterogeneous across subjects. This is best accomplished by considering a departure from the 
equal payoff situation (n i = nj = n ), for which we have already established that B* = n  for all
players. Note that from (2) any changes in the payoffs of others that leave the sum of payoffs 
unchanged (any change that preserves the mean of the payoffs of others) should have no impact 
on B*. Further inspection of (2) reveals that increasing (decreasing) the sum of other’s payoffs
increases (decreases) the optimal bid. This yields the additional prediction that individual i will 
increase his bid from his value when, from a situation of equal payoffs, all payoffs but his are 
increased (his remains constant). Similarly, going from equal payoffs to a vector where all but i’s 
payoffs are decreased decreases the optimal bid of individual i from his payoff.
The theory is easily extendable to a “WTA-Gains” situation where individuals have 
positive value for the public good and are asked to express the minimum amount of money they 
would be willing to accept to not implement the program. Let C now represent the randomly 
determined compensation to forego the good and let Oi denote individual i’s offer or revealed 
WTA amount. If a majority of offers are less than or equal to C, the program is not implemented 
and each receives compensation such that monetary payoff is Y + C ; otherwise, the program is 
implemented and payoff for individual i is equal to Y + ni . For this reinterpretation of model
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parameters and trivial modification of the implementation rule, it can be shown that Equation 2 
analogously determines optimal offer strategies for the WTA-Gains setting.3
A number of testable hypotheses emerge for the WTP-Gains and WTA-Gains settings.
For the case where n=1, the Voting-BDM operates just like the traditional BDM mechanism. In 
this situation, the null hypothesis is for the individual to submit a bid or offer equal to their 
payoff:
HO : Bt (orOi) = n i if n=1. (3)
H f  : B% (orOi)
When we move from the private or individual case to a homogenous public voting setting with 
n>1 and all individuals having equal payoffs, our theoretical framework predicts that an 
individual bids (or offers) an amount equal to his value regardless of other-regarding 
preferences:
HO : Bt (or Oi) = n i if n>1 and ni = nj , Vj (4)
h 2A : B, (orO,)
Note further that according to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, a subject’s WTP (WTA) in a 
private good setting should be the same as a subject’s WTP (WTA) in a public good setting with 
homogeneous values, as both should equal the payoff amount. This finding would be strikingly 
different than behavior predicted and observed in other public good mechanisms, where subjects 
consistently report lower values in public good settings (Davis and Holt, 1993; Rondeau, Poe and 
Schulze, 2005). Because we do not formulate directional expectations, the null hypotheses are 
examined statistically using two sided significance tests.
3 The only difference in the WTP-Gains and WTA-Gains implementation rule is that a bid (offer) equal to C is 
considered as a yes vote in the WTP-Gains setting only. This does not change any of the theoretical results.
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In the general case where n>1 and values are heterogeneous, Equation 2 suggests that 
strategies are a function of the relationship between individual i’s payoff and the average payoff 
over all j  individuals. If individual z’s payoff is equal to the average payoff of other individuals, 
he should submit a bid (offer) equal to his value regardless of other-regarding preferences. That 
is,
I n
H I : B} (or O, ) = n  if n>1 and j —  = x 1 (5)
n -1
H 3 : B, (orO ,)
We refer to such an individual as a “mean-value” subject. Two other logical cases arise when 
individual i’s payoff is either greater than or less than the average of the voting group. We refer 
to individuals in the two cases as being “better-off’ and “worse-off’, respectively. For the purely 
self-interested individual (i.e., a, = 0), theory predicts that the individual bids (offers) his value in 
either case. In the presence of other-regarding preferences, however, our theoretical model 
predicts that the better-off subjects will bid (offer) below value and that worse-off subjects will 
bid (offer) above value. Given the assumptions of our model, behavioral predictions for better- 
off and worse-off subjects, under the null of no other-regarding preferences, are summarized 
below as hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively:
I v
H 40 : Bi (or O,) = n i if n>1 and —---- < ni
n -1
H 4 : B i (orO i) < n
and
Z n
H 05 : Bi (or O, ) = if n>1 and 22----> n
5 i i i n -1 i
(6)
(7)
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H  /  : B i (orOi ) > n
Since behavioral predictions for these two situations in the presence of other-regarding behavior 
are unidirectional, this implies one-tailed hypothesis tests.
When payoffs are negative (losses), subjects can be construed as expressing their 
maximum WTP to avoid losing this amount or minimum WTA to accept this loss. It is thus 
appropriate to compare the bid with the absolute value of the (negative) payoff via Equation 2. In 
absolute value terms, this leads to the same set of hypotheses for both gains and losses. Note 
however, that in absolute terms better-off subjects are those with lower than average payoffs and 
worse-off subjects are those with higher than average payoffs. To emphasize this distinction, we 
rewrite hypotheses 4 and 5 for the case of better-off and worse-off subjects, respectively, for 
losses:
S K I
H 0 : B i 'o
'
_P II if n>1 and J L^~ r  > Wn -1 (8)
HA : B i (orO i ) > n
and
S K I
H 0  : Bt (orO i ) = n if n>1 and J  ^  .  1 ^  1< nn -1 (9)
HA : Bt (orO i ) < n
where the alternative hypotheses imply one-tailed statistical tests. In the sections that follow we 
discuss an experimental design and the results of implementation of this design.
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3.____ Experimental Design:
All experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Decision-Making Research at Cornell University. One hundred and eighty-six subjects 
volunteered for the experiments and were recruited from a variety of undergraduate economics 
courses. Each session consisted of either two WTP experiments: WTP-Gains and WTP-Losses 
(n=93) or two WTA experiments: WTA-Gains and WTA-Losses (n=93), thereby representing 
all four welfare settings.
All experiments use induced values (in absolute terms) of $2, $5 and $8, and each 
experiment consists of two parts. In the first part, subjects gain experience with the traditional 
BDM by engaging in 10 rounds with low financial incentives. The induced values vary randomly 
across rounds. In the second part, subjects go through one round each of nine different treatments 
with high financial incentives. Three treatments involve a group size of 1, which we refer to as 
the “private treatments”: (1) n=1, |n | = $2; (2) n=1, |n | = $5; and (3) n=1, |n | = $8. Three 
conditions involve a group size of 3 with homogeneous values, which we refer to as the 
“homogeneous treatments”: (4) n=3, |n | = |n j = $2 V j ; (5) n=3, |n | = |n; | = $5 V j ; and (6) n=3,
|n  | = |n  | = $8 V j . The remaining three treatments involve a group size of 3 where the set of
induced values for the group are $2, $5 and $8, and which we refer to as the “heterogeneous 
treatments”: (7) n=3, |n | = $2, |n | ^ \n\ V j ; (8) n=3, |n | = $5, |n | ^ \n\ V j ; and (9) n=3,
|n| = $8, |n | ^ V j . We provide subjects with complete information about the payoff amounts
of the other subjects in Voting-BDM rounds.
An example WTP session is as follows:
Part A: WTP-Losses, 10 low-incentive BDM rounds where the cost is determined
and payoffs calculated at the end of each round.
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Part B: WTP-Losses, nine high-incentive Voting-BDM rounds where the
treatment and cost which result in earnings is determined at the end of the 
experiment.
Part C: WTP-Gains, 10 low-incentive BDM rounds where the cost is determined
and payoffs calculated at the end of each round.
Part D: WTP-Gains, nine high-incentive Voting-BDM rounds where the treatment
and cost which result in earnings is determined at the end of the 
experiment.
To control for potential order effects, the experiment order (gains or losses) varies across 
sessions. Further, Part B and Part D vary the order of the nine treatments across subjects. To 
prevent deterioration of other-regarding behavior that can occur in voluntary public good 
mechanisms (Davis and Holt 1993), subjects submit bids for the nine Voting-BDM treatments 
without feedback. At the end of the experiment, one of the nine Voting-BDM programs is 
implemented (and payoffs calculated) by having the subjects draw from a bag of marked poker 
chips. The exchange rate for the low-incentive BDM rounds is fifteen experimental dollars for 
one US dollar, while the exchange rate for the implemented Voting-BDM rounds is one 
experimental dollar for one US dollar. The experiment lasted approximately two hours and the 
average payoff was $35.
Subjects receive written instructions (Appendix A and B). As part of the verbal protocol, 
they are permitted to ask questions at the beginning of each part of the experiment. The 
instructions use language parallel to that found in surveys for referendum voting settings (Carson 
et al., 2000). The WTP instructions direct each subject to vote whether to fund  a program by 
submitting a bid that represents the “highest amount that you would pay and still vote for the 
program.” The WTA instructions direct each subject to vote whether to implement a program by 
submitting an offer that represents the “lowest amount of compensation that you would accept
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and still vote against the program.” Each subject was seated at an individual computer and an 
Excel spreadsheet was used to record bids and to calculate payoffs. Written voting sheets are 
collected after each round to determine the outcomes and to prevent subjects from revising their 
decisions.
Subjects are assigned to voting groups of varying size of either one or three. Obviously 
voting group of one corresponds to the private good situation where the single individual 
constitutes the median voter and the majority. For the groups of three, the administrators 
announced the groups and asked each group member to raise their hand so that they could be 
identified by other members of their group. This ensured that subjects were aware of who was in 
their voting group for all treatments. However, subjects did not know which of the other 
members of the group received which payoff in the heterogeneous cases. As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that the ai’s are not recipient specific. No communication was allowed and 
subjects in the same group size of three were not seated next to each other.
The cost amount (for WTP experiments) or compensation amount (for WTA 
experiments) is determined by using a random numbers table with values from zero to nine. The 
first random number from the table represented the dollars amount, the second number the dimes 
amount, and the third number the pennies amount. For example, if the first random number was a 
four, the second was a nine, and the third a two, the determined cost (compensation) would have 
been $4.92. Consequently, the cost (compensation) is uniformly distributed between $0.00 and 
$9.99 with discrete intervals of $0.01.
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A. WTP-Gains Experiment
In each round, subjects start with an initial balance of $10 and are assigned an induced 
value of $2, $5 or $8. For n=3 public treatments with heterogeneous values, an individual with 
an induced value of $2 is “worse-off’, a subject with $5 has “mean-value”, and an individual 
with a value of $8 is “better-off’. Subjects submit bids, ranging from zero to the entire initial 
balance, equal to the maximum amount for which they would still vote for the program. After the 
subjects submit their bids, the experiment administrator determines the random cost for the 
program. If the majority of the bids are greater than or equal to the randomly determined cost, 
then the program is funded. In this case, all of the subjects in the voting group receive their 
personal payoff amount in addition to the initial balance, but also have to pay the determined 
cost. If the majority of bids are less than the randomly determined cost, then the program is not 
funded. In this case, all of the subjects in the voting group neither receive their personal payoff 
amount nor pay the cost, and thus, the subjects receive only their initial balance.
B. WTA-Gains Experiment
In each round, subjects start with an initial balance of $5 and are assigned an induced 
value of $2, $5 or $8. This lower initial balance makes the expected earnings in the WTA setting 
equivalent to the WTP setting, thus allowing us to avoid possible income effects. For n=3 public 
treatments with heterogeneous values, an individual with an induced value of $2 is “worse-off’, 
a subject with $5 has “mean-value”, and an individual with a value of $8 is “better-off’. Subjects 
submit offers, ranging from zero to $10, which reflects their minimum WTA compensation to 
forego the public good. After the subjects submit their offers, the experiment administrator 
determines the randomly determined compensation for the program. If the majority of the offers
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are less than or equal to the random compensation, then the program is not implemented and all 
group members receive the compensation in addition to their initial balance. If the majority of 
offers are greater than the random compensation, the program is implemented and group 
members receive their induced value in addition to their initial balance.
C. WTP-Losses Experiment
In each round, subjects start with an initial balance of $10 and are assigned an induced 
value of -$2, -$5 or -$8 such that the program is a public bad. For n=3 public treatments with 
heterogeneous values, an individual facing a loss of $2 is “better-off’, a subject facing a loss of 
$5 has “mean-value”, and an individual facing a loss of $8 is “worse-off’. Subjects submit bids, 
ranging from zero to the entire initial balance, equal to their maximum WTP to fund a program 
to forego the public bad. After subjects submit their bids, the experiment administrator 
determines the random cost for the program. If the majority of bids are greater than or equal to 
the determined cost, the program is funded, and all group members pay the cost from their initial 
balance of $10 but do not experience the public bad. If a majority of the bids is less than the 
random cost, the program is not funded. Consequently, all group members receive their initial 
balance plus the value of the public bad.
D. WTA-Losses Experiment
In each round, subjects start with an initial balance of $5 and are assigned an induced 
value of -$2, -$5 or -$8. For n=3 public treatments with heterogeneous values, an individual with 
an induced value of -$2 is “better-off’, a subject with -$5 has “mean-value”, and an individual 
with a value of -$8 is “worse-off’. Subjects submit an offer, ranging from zero to $10, which
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reflects their minimum WTA compensation to accept the public bad. After the subjects submit 
their offers, the experiment administrator determines the randomly determined compensation for 
the program. If the majority of the offers are less than or equal to the random compensation, then 
the program is not implemented and all group members receive the compensation, their induced 
value and their initial balance. If the majority of offers are greater than the random 
compensation, the program is implemented and group members receive their initial balance only.
4. Results
A. Practice Rounds with Low Incentives
Similar to other studies using the BDM mechanism (Boyce et al., 1992; Irwin et al.,
1998), the goal of the low-incentive rounds is to give subjects an opportunity to gain experience 
with the mechanism before introducing additional complexities to the decision environment. 
Repeated low-incentive BDM rounds provide subjects an opportunity to receive feedback on 
how their bids and offers affect payoffs. Over ten practice rounds, subjects bids/offers improved 
on average by 70% from $0.69 above induced value in the first round to only $0.21 above 
induced value in the tenth round (Figure 1). For the WTP practice rounds, the average bid 
decreased from $0.67 to $0.25 above induced value (an improvement of 63%). For the WTA 
practice rounds, the average bid decreased from $0.72 to $0.17 above induced value (an 
improvement of 76%). Overall, while learning was obviously taking place during practice 
rounds, by the last practice round subjects were submitting bids that are statistically 
indistinguishable from their induced values at the a=0.10 in all four welfare settings.
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Figure 1. Low-Incentive Practice Rounds: Difference from Induced Value.
— WTP-Gains 
WTP-Losses 
WTA-Gains 
WTA-Losses 
----- Linear (All)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Round
B. Voting-BDM
The broad results from the four sets of voting BDM experiments can be most easily 
understood in the context of Figure 2 below. This figure provides aggregated willingness-to-pay 
and willingness-to-accept values for private and heterogeneous gains and losses as a function of 
induced values. Absolute values are used to enable pooling of losses and gains. The 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values for public homogenous voting settings are 
not provided in the figure as they are virtually indistinguishable from those for the private 
valuation settings4.
4 The averaged private, public homogeneous, and public heterogeneous for induced values of $2, $5 and $8 are: 
$2.09, $5.02, and $8.04; $2.09, $4.99 and $8.02; and $2.58, $5.08 and $7.59 respectively.
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Figure 2: Aggregated Private and Heterogeneous Public Good Values Across Gains,
Losses, WTP, WTA
- 45 Degree
•  Private
—* — Heterogenous Voting
The close correspondence of private bid and offers with the 45 degree line equating the 
vertical and horizontal axis measures is evident in Figure 2. In contrast, average heterogeneous 
values intersect the 45 degree line from above. That is: at induced values of $2, the reported 
values exceed $2; at $5, induced and reported values are proximate; and at $8; reported values 
fall below induced values. These general trends are consistent with the other-regarding behavior 
hypotheses expressed above.
This general, intuitive presentation is reflected in the results of individual hypothesis 
tests. Our specific analyses of each of the voting-BDM hypotheses makes use of graphical 
presentations as well as formal econometric analyses. The graphical presentations provide the
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basis for a more intuitive understanding of the nature of the shifts in valuation functions that 
occur across treatments. For the econometric analysis, we treat the set of decisions from each 
individual across high-incentive rounds as a panel data set and analyze the data using a two- 
factor fixed effects model. Indicator variables capture the differences across the (i=1,.. .,93) 
individuals, Di, as well as the (t=1,.. .,9) treatment conditions, It. The individual fixed effects 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, such as differences in altruism. 
Specifically, for each of the four experiments we estimate the model:
Bit(or Oit) -  n  = C + Di + I t + (10)
where the dependent variable is the difference between individual i 's bid and his induced value 
for treatment t; Z is an overall constant term; the Di and It are estimable fixed-effects parameters; 
and sit is a mean-zero random error term. Note that we do not have to worry about subject- 
specific autocorrelation here, as subjects do not receive any feedback until the end of the 
experiment (i.e., there are no learning effects). Also, no ordering effects are present since the 
sequence of treatments was randomized across individuals. The model is obtained by the 
inclusion of a full set of individual and treatment-specific indicator variables. The problem of 
perfect collinearity -  the treatment and individual indicator variables both sum to one -  is 
avoided by imposing the restrictions that the set of individual and treatment fixed effects 
independently sum to zero via a restricted least squares estimator.
We use the estimated models to test the hypothesized relationships between bids and 
induced values under the different treatment conditions and welfare settings as described in the 
Experimental Design section. The results of the hypothesis tests for the WTP-Gains, WTA- 
Gains, WTP-Losses, and WTP-Losses, respectively, are presented in Tables 1 through 4. The 
reported values correspond to specific treatment conditions: different induced values (in absolute
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terms) ($2, $5, and $8), different voting group sizes (one or three) and the distribution of induced 
values (homogeneous or heterogeneous). For brevity we omit the estimated equations in the text, 
providing the regression output in Appendix D. For all statistical tests below we employ a 5% 
significance level.
Hypothesis 1: Private Treatments. As demonstrated in Figure 3 and conjectured in the theoretical 
section, the distributions of bids and offers for the Voting-BDM with n=1 (which is equivalent to 
the conventional, private BDM) closely track induced values. The percent of optimal bids, 
defined as $4.99-$5.00 for the WTP treatments, ranged from 47% (WTP-Losses, $2) to 69% 
(WTP-Losses, $5). Similarly the range of optimal offers, defined as $5.00-$5.01 for the WTA 
treatments, ranged from 52% (WTA-Gains, $2) to 75% (WTA-Gains, $5). If each of these 
optimal ranges was increased to include induced value +/- 0.01 (e.g., $1.99-$2.01, $4.99-5.01, 
and $7.99-8.01), over 59% of the values would be deemed optimal in each of the treatments.
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Table 1. WTP-Gains
Group Size = 1 Group Size = 3
Private P-value Homogeneous P-value Heterogeneous P-value
Low Value Mean $2.10 $2.06 $2.64 t
$2 Median $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
(Worst-off)
Difference from Induced Value $0.10 0.463 $0.06 0.694 $0.64 0.000
Middle Value Mean $5.09 $5.11 $5.19
$5 Median $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Difference from Induced Value $0.09 0.506 $0.11 0.427 $0.19 0.179
High Value Mean $8.11 $8.14 $7.78 t
$8 Median $8.00 $8.00 $8.00
(Best-off)
Difference from Induced Value $0.11 0.435 $0.14 0.314 -$0.22 0.061
n=93
t one-tailed test
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Table 2. WTA-Gains
Group Size = 1 Group Size = 3
Private P-value Homogeneous P-value Heterogeneous P-value
Low Value Mean $1.96 $2.06 $2.47 t
$2 Median $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
(Worst-off)
Difference from Induced Value -$0.04 0.764 $0.06 0.646 $0.47 0.000
Middle Value Mean $5.12 $5.03 $5.06
$5 Median $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Difference from Induced Value $0.12 0.392 $0.03 0.806 $0.06 0.657
High Value Mean $8.15 $8.18 $7.59 t
$8 Median $8.00 $8.00 $8.00
(Best-off)
Difference from Induced Value $0.15 0.293 $0.18 0.180 -$0.41 0.002
Difference from Private, N=1 $0.04 0.839 -$0.55 0.002
Difference from Homogeneous, N=3 -$0.59 0.001
n=93
t one-tailed test
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Table 3. WTP-Losses
Group Size = 1 Group Size = 3
Private P-value Homogeneous P-value Heterogeneous P-value
Low Value Mean $2.23 $2.14 $2.67 t
-$2 Median $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
(Best-off)
Difference from Induced Value $0.23 0.143 $0.14 0.368 $0.67 0.000
Middle Value Mean $5.19 $5.00 $5.38
-$5 Median $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Difference from Induced Value $0.19 0.241 $0.00 0.992 $0.38 0.017
High Value Mean $7.99 $7.80 $7.68 t
-$8 Median $8.00 $8.00 $8.00
(Worst-off
Difference from Induced Value -$0.01 0.928 -$0.20 0.201 -$0.32 0.020
n=93
t one-tailed test
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Table 4. WTA-Losses
Group Size = 1 Group Size = 3
Private P-value Homogeneous P-value Heterogeneous P-value
Low Value Mean $2.06 $2.11 $2.54 t
-$2 Median $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
(Best-off)
Difference from Induced Value $0.06 0.695 $0.11 0.495 $0.54 0.000
Middle Value Mean $4.68 $4.82 $4.70
-$5 Median $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Difference from Induced Value -$0.32 0.039 -$0.18 0.246 -$0.30 0.056
High Value Mean $7.91 $7.94 $7.29 t
-$8 Median $8.00 $8.00 $8.00
(Worst-off)
Difference from Induced Value -$0.09 0.579 -$0.06 0.705 -$0.71 0.000
n=93
one-tailed test
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Figure 3: Distribution of Private Bids and Offers for Each Induced Value
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Such results are consistent with Irwin et. al (1998), who report that 62% and 67% of bids 
and offers, respectively, fell in the optimal range in a private BDM setting. These modal 
responses in the optimum range are reflected in measures of central tendency. In each of 
the private good cases, the median value equals the induced value (indeed, this result 
holds for all the treatments). Of the 12 private treatment scenarios (i.e., 3 treatments by 4 
experiments), the null hypothesis is never rejected.
In all, although the presentation of the private BDM has changed by the addition 
of voting terminology in the instructions, the results from the voting-BDM, n=1 
experiments are consistent with previous research demonstrating positive results for 
demand revelation characteristics of willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values 
in private BDMs.
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Hypothesis 2: Homogeneous Treatments. As might be expected from the aggregated 
mean WTP bids across treatments reported in Footnote 6 and presented in Figure 2, 
homogeneous WTP and WTA distributions closely correspond with the respective 
distributions of private bids and offers as well as of induced values. As a representative 
example, we provide the private and homogenous distributions for WTP-Gains for 
induced values of $2, $5 and $8 in Figure 4. The correspondence between the private 
distributions for other treatment/induced values can be gleaned from Figures 5-9. These 
graphical impressions are reflected in the econometric analysis. In public treatments with 
homogeneous values, average voting-BDM bids or options are not statistically different 
from induced values, such that we fail to reject Hypothesis 2 in all treatments in all 
experiments. These results are summarized in Tables 1 -  4 and porivde in detail in 
Appendix D.
Figure 4: Private and Homogenous WTP-Gains Bids
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The statistical similarity between induced and reported values in the homogeneous voting 
setting contrasts with other popular single-shot public goods mechanisms, such as the 
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism or Provision Point Mechanism, where subjects with 
homogeneous values systematically bid below value for induced gains in the range of 
values studied here. Note that if warm-glow were a significant factor here then we would 
expect significant deviations from induced value, namely positive deviations in the WTP 
experiments (Rondeau, Poe and Schulze, 2005). Since this is clearly not the case, it 
appears that impure altruism/warm glow does not contaminate the results from the public 
heterogeneous treatments. Hence, any differences from induced values in the 
heterogeneous settings may be attributable to pure altruism in this study. We turn to this 
issue now.
Hypothesis 3: Heterogeneous Treatments - Mean-value Subjects. The behavior of mean- 
value subjects in public heterogeneous treatments does not follow a consistent pattern 
relative to the private and public homogenous distributions, and may vary depending 
upon the framing of the situation. This lack of pattern is evident in Figure 5, which 
compares the private, public homogenous and public heterogeneous distributions of bids 
and offers for the $5 induced values in each of the four treatments. Indeterminacy in 
directional effects carries over to the econometric estimates, with some of the mean 
differences between reported and induced values being positive and others being 
negative. Nevertheless, although there appear to be some movement in distributions, 
these effects are not significant in the econometric model for any of the treatments.
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Hence, Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected, lending some tentative support to the conclusion 
that gains and losses across other individuals are judged symmetrically.
Figure 5: Private, Public Homogeneous, and Public Heterogeneous Bid 
Distributions: Mean Value Subjects $5, -$5
a. WTP-Gains
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d. WTA-Losses
Hypothesis 4: Heterogeneous Treatments - Better-Off Subjects, Gains. In contrast to the 
mean-value subjects, there is a notable directional effect of heterogeneity on the 
distribution of bid and offer values (Figure 6). For gains, the distribution functions of bid 
values for the better off subjects ($8) shifts leftwards, with notable movement in the 
lower part of the distribution, suggesting that some subjects demonstrate other-regarding 
behavior by reducing their bids or offers (votes) downward. In these treatments, subjects 
submit bids or offers that are an average of $0.22 below (WTP-Gains, Table 1) and $0.41 
below (WTA-Gains, Table 2) their induced value, respectively. While this altruism effect 
is significant in the WTA setting, the p value in the WTP treatment is 0.061 and thus not 
significant at the 5% level used in this analysis. For statistical comparisons associated
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with hypotheses 4 -  7, this marginal rejection is the only failure to reject the null 
hypotheses using a 5% significance level.
Hypothesis 5: Heterogeneous Treatments - Worse-Off Subjects, Gains. In contrast, as 
predicted by our theoretical framework, the bids and offers for worse-off subjects submit 
increase in heterogeneous settings, with notable shifts in the upper parts of the 
distributions (see Figure 7). On average, subjects report bids of $0.64 above their 
induced value in WTP-Gains (Table 1). In WTA-Gains, the worse-off subjects report 
offers that are statistically higher then their induced value by an average of $0.47 (Table 
2). In both settings, the differences are significant, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis.
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous Treatments, Bid and Offer Distributions 
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a. WTP Gains - $2
Figure 7: Heterogeneous Treatments, Bid and Offer Distributions
Worse-Off Subjects -  Gains
Bid A m ount
b. WTA Gains - $2
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Hypothesis 6: Heterogeneous Treatments -  Better-Off Subjects, Losses. In heterogeneous 
treatments with induced losses, behavior from the better-off subjects shows evidence of 
significant other-regarding behavior. As discussed earlier, with induced losses the better- 
off subjects in the public heterogeneous treatments inur induced losses of -$2.00. 
Therefore, our economic-theoretic construct predicts that best-off subjects will over­
report their WTP and WTA. Indeed, best-off subjects submitted average bids of $2.67 
and $2.54 (Table 3 and Table 4, respectively), which are significantly above their induced 
value, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis. These average results are reflected in the 
distributional shifts presented in Figure 8.
Hypothesis 7: Heterogeneous Treatments - Worse-Off Subjects, Losses. With losses, the 
worst-off subjects had induced losses of -$8.00 and our theoretical framework predicts 
that they would under-report their WTP and WTA. Consistent with this prediction, the 
worse-off subjects submitted bids that were $0.32 below the induced value in WTP- 
Losses and $0.71 below in WTA-Losses (Table 3 and Table 4, respectively). These 
distributional shifts are significant, and, as depicted in Figure 9, mirror those of the 
previously discussed with the greatest shifts occurring a the lower end of the distribution.
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Figure 8: Heterogeneous Treatments, Bid and Offer Distributions
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a. WTP-Losses - $8
Figure 8: Heterogeneous Treatments, Bid and Offer Distributions
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5. Conclusion
The empirical evidence presented in this report demonstrates that the public good 
version of the incentive compatible BDM mechanism, when combined with voting in a 
coercive tax setting, is demand revealing. This is demonstrated by the failure to reject the 
null hypotheses that bids and offers equal induced values in private and homogeneous 
settings. Because there is no overbidding in the homogeneous settings, warm glow or 
impure altruism does not appear to carry over to this mechanism. In addition, the use of 
monetary incentives excludes the possibility of paternalistic altruism and both WTP and 
WTA approximate induced values (and hence approximate each other). However, 
concerns about equity arise with this mechanism. That is, subjects with high induced 
gains tend to understate their WTP and WTA in a public good coercive tax setting with a 
heterogeneous distribution of induced values. This pattern is mirrored in the induced loss 
treatments where the subjects with low induced losses demonstrate other-regarding 
concern by overstating their WTP.
The results of these experiments indicate that other-regarding behavior in a 
coercive tax setting is quite different that found in voluntary contribution settings. The 
experiments presented in the paper represent a potential starting point from which these 
issues can be examined further, and assumptions in our theoretical framework can be 
relaxed. Promising extensions of this include changes in voting group size when values 
are heterogeneously distributed and changes in the distributions of the heterogeneous 
treatments. Given our positive results using induced values, we maintain that this 
mechanism is ready to be applied to “real commodities” commodities, and the demand
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revealing characteristics of this mechanism offers a means for exploring various 
behavioral anomalies in the context of public settings.
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Appendix A. Experimental Instructions
WTP Instructions -  Version Gains First 
Instructions -  (Part A)
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this 
experiment is yours to keep. It is therefore important that you read these instructions 
carefully. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you 
would pay and still vote for different programs. In this experiment, a program is simply 
a distribution of money. As you will see, the amount that you indicate as the highest 
amount that you would pay for the program will become a vote in favor or against the 
program, and will determine whether or not the program is funded. It is therefore 
important that you consider all of the information given to you about the different 
programs and that you make judicious decisions. The procedures that will be followed 
are the same for all programs. However, each program and vote is independent from the 
other. Therefore, the decisions you make and the result of a vote for one program will 
not affect the results for other programs.
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
First, you will receive an initial balance of $10.00.
You will then be informed of your “personal payoff amount” for this program. Your 
personal payoff amount is the amount of money that you will receive if the program is 
funded. Your personal payoff amount will vary during the course of the experiment.
The possible amounts are $2.00, $5.00, and $8.00.
You will then be asked to write down the highest amount that you would pay and still 
vote for this program; we will call this your “bid”. For each program, you can bid any 
amount between $0.00 and your initial balance of $10.00. Once you have decided your 
bid, you will write it on a Voting Sheet and enter it into the computer spreadsheet. We 
will then collect the Voting Sheets and determine the cost of the program.
The cost of the program will be determined by reading off three numbers from a random 
number table. The starting number will be determined by dropping a pen onto the 
random number table. (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest 
to the upper-left corner will be used.) The numbers will be read from left to right on the 
table. The first number will represent the dollar amount. The second number will 
represent the dime amount. The third number will represent the penny amount.
Together, the three numbers will form a cost between $0.00 and $9.99. Note: since these 
numbers have been generated by a random number table each cost between $0.00 and 
$9.99 is equally likely. Once the cost has been determined, you will be asked to enter it 
into the spreadsheet on your computer.
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Whether or not the program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and the cost of 
the program. There are two possible outcomes:
The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if your bid is le ss  than  
the cost determined from the random number table. In this case, you will not receive 
your personal payoff amount and you will not have to pay the cost. Therefore, your 
earnings for this portion of the experiment would simply be your initial balance of 
$10.00.
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if your bid is eq u a l to  o r  g rea te r  
th an  the cost determined from the random number table. In this case, you will 
receive your personal payoff amount in addition to your initial balance. However, you 
will also have to pay the determined cost. Therefore, your cash earnings for this portion 
of the experiment would be your initial balance ($10.00), plus your personal payoff 
amount, minus the cost.
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the program. With your bid, you 
are writing down the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program. 
Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if you are prepared to pay an 
amount equal to or greater than the randomly determined cost. On the other hand, your 
bid is like a vote against the program if your bid turns out to be less than the cost. Since 
you are the only voter, your bid will determine whether the program is funded or not.
While your bid helps determine whether the program is funded or not, your earnings for a 
particular program are based on your initial balance, your personal payoff amount and the 
determined cost. For example, if a program was not funded and your personal payoff was 
$5.00 and the determined cost was $9.00, your earnings would be $10.00. However, if 
the program was funded with the same personal payoff and cost, your earnings would be 
$6.00 ($10 + $5 - $9). Consider another example where your personal payoff was $5.00 
and the determined cost was $2.00. In this example if the program was not funded your 
earnings would again be $10.00, while if the program was funded, your earnings would 
be $13.00 ($10 + $5 - $2).
Calculation of Your Earnings
Once you enter the cost of the program determined from the random number table, the 
computer will automatically determine whether the program was funded and calculate 
your earnings. The computer will add your experimental earnings for all of the programs, 
and convert this amount to US dollars by applying an exchange rate of one US dollar for 
fifteen experimental dollars. For example, if you earn $230.45 experimental dollars, your 
monetary payoff from this part of the experiment would be $15.50. At the end of the 
experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand i f  you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
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Instructions -  (Part B)
You will now be asked to indicate how much you would pay for each of 9 separate 
programs. The procedures are similar to the ones used in Part A of the experiment, 
except for three important differences.
1) For each of the programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment), but you may also be part of a group of 3 voters. For programs where the 
group size is 3, the payoff amounts that the other voters in your group would receive 
if the program is funded are indicated on your Voting Sheet.
2) Only one of the 9 programs will actually be implemented and result in cash earnings. 
Therefore, all votes will be made prior to determination of any costs. At the 
conclusion of the experiment, we will randomly determine which of the programs 
will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing 9 chips lettered A 
through I which correspond to each of the programs.
3) For the program that generates cash earnings, the exchange rate will be one US dollar 
for one experimental dollar. For example, if you earn $12.25 experimental dollars in 
the second part of the experiment, your monetary payoff would be $12.25.
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
You and every other member of your group will receive an initial balance of $10.00.
For the nine programs, your personal payoff amount may be $2.00, $5.00, or $8.00.
Other participants will also receive one of these three payoff amounts and you will be 
informed of these amounts.
For each program, you will be asked to write your bid on the Voting Sheet provided and 
enter the same amount into the second spreadsheet on the computer. You can bid any 
amount between $0.00 and your initial balance of $10.00.
Once everyone has written down his/her bid and entered the bid into the computer, we 
will collect the Voting Sheets and distribute the new Voting Sheets for the next program.
While we will not implement the program until the end of the experiment, please note 
that the cost for the program will be determined in the same manner as in Part A using a 
new random number table. However, the cost will now be a cost that each person in your 
group will have to pay if the program is funded.
Whether or not the programs are funded depends on the bids by members of your group 
and the cost of the particular program. There are two possible outcomes:
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The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if a majority of bids 
from your group are less th an  the cost determined from the random number table.
In this case, neither you nor any other member of your group will receive a personal 
payoff amount and no one will pay the cost. Therefore, your cash earnings for this part 
of the experiment would simply be your initial balance of $10.00.
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if a majority of bids from your 
group are e q u a l to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the cost determined from the random number 
table. In this case, you will receive your personal payoff amount in addition to your 
initial balance. However, you will also have to pay the randomly determined cost. Every 
other member of your group will also receive their personal payoff amount and they will 
also have to pay the determined cost. Therefore, your cash earnings would be your initial 
balance ($10.00), plus your personal payoff amount, minus the cost.
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the programs you 
experienced in the first part of the experiment. Therefore, the program is not funded if 
your bid is less than the cost determined from the random number table, and program is 
funded if your bid is equal to or greater than the determined cost.
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the program. With 
your bid, you are writing down the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the 
program. Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if you are prepared to 
pay an amount equal to or greater than the randomly determined cost. On the other hand, 
your bid is like a vote against the program if it turns out to be less than the cost. When a 
majority of bids are equal to or greater than the determined cost, this translates into a 
majority vote in favor of the program. Similarly, a majority of bids below the cost 
translates into a majority vote against the program at that cost.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
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Instructions -  (Part C)
Similar to Part A, you will again be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you 
would pay and still vote for different programs. However, in this part you will be 
informed of your “personal loss amount” instead of your “personal payoff amount”. Your 
personal loss amount is the amount of money that you will lose if the program is not 
funded. Your personal loss amount will vary during the course of the experiment. The 
possible loss amounts are minus $2.00, minus $5.00, and minus $8.00.
There two possible outcomes are as follows:
The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if your bid is le ss  than  
the cost determined from the random number table. In this case, you will not pay the
cost, but you will pay your personal loss amount. Therefore, your earnings would be 
initial balance of $10.00 minus the loss amount.
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if your bid is eq u a l to  o r  g rea te r  
th an  the cost determined from the random number table. In this case, you pay the
determined cost, but do not pay your personal loss amount. Therefore, your earnings 
would be initial balance of $10.00 minus the determined cost.
For example, if a program was not funded and your personal loss amount was minus 
$5.00 and the determined cost was $9.00, your earnings would be $5.00 ($10 - $5). 
However, if the program was funded with the same personal loss amount and determined 
cost, your earnings would be $1.00 ($10 - $9). Consider another example where your 
personal loss amount was minus $5.00 and the determined cost was $2.00. In this 
example if the program was not funded your earnings would be $5.00 ($10 - $5), while if 
the program was funded, your earnings would be $8.00 ($10 - $2).
Calculation of Your Earnings
Similar to part A, the computer will automatically determine your earnings and the 
exchange rate will again be one US dollar for fifteen experimental dollars.
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Instructions -  (Part D)
Similar to Part B, you again will now be asked to indicate how much you would pay for 
each of 9 separate programs. Again the exchange rate is one experimental dollar 
equaling one US dollar and all other procedures are identical to those of Part B, except 
that now you will have personal loss amounts of minus $2.00, minus $5.00, and minus 
$8.00. For these programs, other participants will also receive one of these three loss 
amounts.
After all of the Voting Sheets have been collected, a program from Part D will be 
selected for implementation by drawing from a bag containing 9 chips lettered J through 
R, which correspond to each of the programs. At that time we will also implement and 
produce cash earnings for Part B.
For Part D, there are two possible outcomes:
The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if a majority of bids 
from your group are less th an  the cost determined from the random number table.
In this case, neither you nor any other member of your group will pay the cost, but 
everyone pays his/her personal loss amount. Therefore, your earnings would be your 
initial balance of $10.00 minus the loss amount.
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if a majority of bids from your 
group are e q u a l to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the cost determined from the random number
table. In this case, you and every other member of your group will pay the determined 
cost, but no one pays his/her personal loss amount. Therefore, your earnings would be 
your initial balance of $10.00 minus the determined cost.
Calculation of Final Earnings
To calculate your earnings from Part D and Part B, you will be asked to enter into the 
spreadsheet the cost for the implemented programs and whether these programs were 
funded. Your computer will then calculate your earnings for Part D and Part B, add them 
to your earnings from Part A and Part C, and award you an additional $5 show up fee.
We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy.
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WTA Instructions -  Version Gains First
Instructions -  (Part A)
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the 
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this 
experiment is yours to keep. It is therefore important that you read these instructions 
carefully. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the lowest amount of money you 
would accept as compensation and still vote against different programs. In this 
experiment, a program is simply a distribution of monetary gain. As you will see, the 
amount that you indicate as the lowest amount of compensation that you would accept for 
the program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine 
whether or not the program is implemented. It is therefore important that you consider all 
of the information given to you about the different programs and that you make judicious 
decisions. The procedures that will be followed are the same for all programs. However, 
each program and vote is independent from the other. Therefore, the decisions you make 
and the result of a vote for one program will not affect the results for other programs.
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
First, you will receive an initial balance of $5.00.
You will then be informed of your “personal payment amount” for this program. Your 
personal payoff amount is the amount of money that you will receive if the program is 
implemented. Your personal payoff amount will vary during the course of the 
experiment. The possible payoff amounts are $2.00, $5.00, and $8.00.
You will then be asked to write down the lowest amount that you would accept as 
compensation and still vote against this program; we will call this your “offer”. For each 
program, you can offer any amount between $0.00 and $10.00. Once you have decided 
your offer, you will write it on a Voting Sheet and enter it into the computer spreadsheet. 
We will then collect the Voting Sheets and determine the compensation for the program.
The compensation for the program will be determined by reading off three numbers 
from a random number table. The starting number will be determined by dropping a pen 
onto the random number table. (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the 
one closest to the upper-left corner will be used.) The numbers will be read from left to 
right on the table. The first number will represent the dollar amount. The second number 
will represent the dime amount. The third number will represent the penny amount. 
Together, the three numbers will form a compensation amount between $0.00 and $9.99. 
Note: since these numbers have been generated by a random number table each 
compensation amount between $0.00 and $9.99 is equally likely. Once the compensation 
has been determined, you will be asked to enter it into the spreadsheet on your computer.
Whether or not the program is implemented depends on the amount of your offer and the 
compensation for the program. There are two possible outcomes:
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The program is NOT IMPLEMENTED: The program is not implemented if your 
offer is e q u a l to  o r  less th an  the compensation determined from the random number 
table. In this case, you will not receive your personal payoff amount, but you do receive 
the compensation. Therefore, your earnings for this portion of the experiment would be 
your initial balance of $5.00 plus the compensation.
The program is IMPLEMENTED: The program is implemented if your offer is 
g re a te r  th an  the compensation determined from the random number table. In this 
case, you will receive your personal payoff amount in addition to your initial balance. 
Therefore, your cash earnings for this portion of the experiment would be your initial 
balance ($5.00) plus your personal payoff amount.
Note how your offer is like a vote for or against implementing the program. With your 
offer, you are writing down the lowest amount of compensation you would accept to vote 
against the program. Therefore, your offer is like a vote against the program if your offer 
turns out to be equal to or less than the randomly determined compensation. On the other 
hand, your offer is like a vote in favor of the program if your offer turns out to be more 
than the compensation. Since you are the only voter, your offer will determine whether 
the program is implemented or not.
While your offer helps determine whether the program is implemented or not, your 
earnings for a particular program are based on your initial balance, your personal payoff 
amount and the determined compensation. For example, if a program was not 
implemented and your personal payoff was $5.00 and the determined compensation was 
$9.00, your earnings would be $14.00 ($5 + $9). However, if the program was 
implemented with the same personal payoff and compensation, your earnings would be 
$10.00 ($5 + $5). Consider another example where your personal payoff was $5.00 and 
the determined compensation was $2.00. In this example if the program was not 
implemented your earnings would again be $7.00 ($5 + $2), while if the program was 
implemented, your earnings would be $10.00 ($5 + $5).
Calculation of Your Earnings
Once you enter the compensation of the program determined from the random number 
table, the computer will automatically determine whether the program was implemented 
and calculate your earnings. The computer will add your experimental earnings for all of 
the programs, and convert this amount to US dollars by applying an exchange rate of one 
US dollar for fifteen experimental dollars. For example, if you earn $230.45 
experimental dollars, your monetary payoff from this part of the experiment would be 
$15.50. At the end of the experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to ensure 
accuracy.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
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Instructions -  (Part B)
You will now be asked to indicate the lowest amount of compensation you would accept 
for each of 9 separate programs. The procedures are similar to the ones used in Part A of 
the experiment, except for three important differences.
1) For each of the programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment), but you may also be part of a group of 3 voters. For programs where the 
group size is 3, the personal payoff amounts that the other voters in your group would 
receive if the program is not implemented are indicated on your Voting Sheet.
2) Only one of the 9 programs will actually be selected and result in cash earnings. 
Therefore, all votes will be made prior to determination of any of the compensations. 
At the conclusion of the experiment, we will randomly determine which of the 
programs will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing 9 chips 
lettered A through I which correspond to each of the programs.
3) For the program that generates cash earnings, the exchange rate will be one US dollar 
for one experimental dollar. For example, if you earn $12.25 experimental dollars in 
the second part of the experiment, your monetary payoff would be $12.25.
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
You and every other member of your group will receive an initial balance of $5.00.
For the nine programs, your personal payoff amount may be $2.00, $5.00, or $8.00.
Other participants will also receive one of these three payoff amounts and you will be 
informed of these amounts.
For each program, you will be asked to write your offer on the Voting Sheet provided and 
enter the same amount into the second spreadsheet (Sheet B) on the computer. You can 
offer any amount between $0.00 and $10.00.
Once everyone has written down his/her offer and entered the offer into the computer, we 
will collect the Voting Sheets and distribute the new Voting Sheets for the next program.
While we will not select the program until the end of the experiment, please note that the 
compensation for the program will be determined in the same manner as in Part A using a 
new random number table. However, the compensation will now be received by each 
person in your group if the program is not implemented.
Whether or not the programs are implemented depends on the offers by members of your 
group and the compensation of the particular program. There are two possible outcomes:
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The program is NOT IMPLEMENTED: The program is not implemented if a 
majority of offers from your group are e q u a l to  o r  less th an  the compensation 
determined from the random number table. In this case, neither you nor any other 
member of your group will receive a personal payoff amount, but everyone does receive 
the compensation. Therefore, your cash earnings for this part of the experiment would be 
your initial balance of $5.00 plus the compensation.
The program is IMPLEMENTED: The program is implemented if a majority of 
offers from your group are g rea te r  th an  the compensation determined from the 
random number table. In this case, you and everyone else in your group will receive 
their personal payoff amount in addition to the initial balance. Therefore, your cash 
earnings would be your initial balance ($5.00) plus your personal payoff amount.
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the programs you 
experienced in the first part of the experiment. Therefore, the program is implemented if 
your offer is greater than the compensation determined from the random number table, 
and the program is not implemented if your offer is equal to or less than the determined 
compensation.
Note once again how your offer is like a vote for or against implementing the program. 
With your offer, you are writing down the lowest amount of compensation you would 
accept and still vote against the program. Therefore, your offer is like a vote against the 
program if your offer is equal to or less than the randomly determined compensation. On 
the other hand, your offer is like a vote in favor of the program if the randomly 
determined compensation turns out to be more than your offer. When a majority of offers 
are equal to or less than the determined compensation, this translates into a majority vote 
against the program. Similarly, a majority of offers greater than the compensation 
translates into a majority vote in favor of the program for that compensation.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
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Instructions -  (Part C)
Similar to Part A, you will again be asked to indicate the lowest amount of compensation 
you would accept in different programs. However, in this part, your offer is the lowest 
amount of compensation you would accept to vote in favor of the program. In addition, 
you will be informed of your “personal loss amount” instead of your “personal payment 
amount”. Your personal loss amount is the amount of money that you will lose if the 
program is implemented. Your personal loss amount will vary during the course of the 
experiment. The possible loss amounts are minus $2.00, minus $5.00, and minus $8.00.
There two possible outcomes are as follows:
The program is IMPLEMENTED: The program is implemented if your offer is less  
th an  o r  e q u a l to  the compensation determined from the random number table. In
this case, you will receive the determined compensation in addition to your initial 
balance. However, you will also have to pay your personal loss amount. Therefore, your 
earnings for this portion of the experiment would be your initial balance ($5.00), plus the 
compensation, minus your personal loss amount.
The program is NOT IMPLEMENTED: The program is not implemented if your 
offer is g re a te r  th an  the compensation determined from the random number table.
In this case, you do not receive the random compensation or pay your personal loss 
amount. Therefore, your earnings for this portion of the experiment would simply be 
your initial balance of $5.00.
For example, if a program was not implemented and your personal loss amount was 
minus $5.00 and the determined compensation was $9.00, your earnings would be $5.00 
(your initial balance). However, if the program was implemented with the same personal 
loss amount and determined compensation, your earnings would be $9.00 ($5 + $9 - $5). 
Consider another example where your personal loss amount was minus $5.00 and the 
determined compensation was $2.00. In this example if the program was not 
implemented your earnings would be again be $5.00, while if the program was 
implemented, your earnings would be $2.00 ($5 + $2 - $5).
Calculation of Your Earnings
Similar to part A, the computer will automatically determine your earnings and the 
exchange rate will again be one US dollar for fifteen experimental dollars.
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Instructions -  (Part D)
Similar to Part C, you again will now be asked to indicate the lowest amount of 
compensation you would accept for each of 9 separate programs. Again the exchange 
rate is one experimental dollar equaling one US dollar and all other procedures are 
identical to those of Part B, except that now you will have personal loss amounts of 
minus $2.00, minus $5.00, and minus $8.00. For these programs, other participants will 
also receive one of these three loss amounts.
After all of the Voting Sheets have been collected, a program from Part D will be 
selected by drawing from a bag containing 9 chips lettered J through R, which correspond 
to each of the programs. At that time we will also select and produce cash earnings for 
Part B.
For Part D, there are two possible outcomes:
The program is IMPLEMENTED: The program is implemented if a majority of 
offers from your group are less th an  o r  e q u a l to  the compensation determined from 
the random number table. In this case, you and every other member of your group will 
receive the determined compensation in addition to your initial balance. However, 
everyone will also have to pay their personal loss amount. Therefore, your earnings for 
this portion of the experiment would be your initial balance ($5.00), plus the 
compensation, minus your personal loss amount.
The program is NOT IMPLEMENTED: The program is not implemented if the 
majority of the offers from your group are g re a te r  th an  the compensation 
determined from the random number table. In this case, neither you nor any member 
of your group will receive the random compensation nor pay your personal loss amount. 
Therefore, your earnings for this portion of the experiment would simply be your initial 
balance of $5.00.
Calculation of Final Earnings
To calculate your earnings from Part D and Part B, you will be asked to enter into the 
spreadsheet the compensation for the implemented programs and whether these programs 
were implemented. Your computer will then calculate your earnings for Part D and Part 
B, add them to your earnings from Part A and Part C, and award you an additional $5 
show up fee. We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy.
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Appendix B: WTP and WTA Data and Coding: 
WTP Demographic Data:
Obs # Exp Session
Sub# within 
Session age gender year major ecncours
1 1 1 32 0 9 99 3
2 1 2 19 0 3 1 3
3 1 3 19 1 2 8 1
4 1 4 20 0 2 1 2
5 1 5 19 1 3 33 4
6 1 6 20 1 4 32 0
7 1 7 22 1 4 26 2
8 1 8 19 0 3 17 5
9 1 9 22 1 4 10 1
10 1 10 21 0 3 34 2
11 1 11 21 0 9 35 2
12 1 12 23 0 9 1 6
13 1 13 22 0 4 1 3
14 1 14 23 1 4 1 1
15 1 15 20 1 4 28 1
16 2 1 24 0 9 1 3
17 2 2 44 0 9 1 99
18 2 3 24 1 4 1 7
19 2 4 18 1 9 8 2
20 2 5 21 1 4 15 4
21 2 6 18 0 2 1 2
22 2 7 20 1 2 10 2
23 2 8 27 0 9 1 10
24 2 9 19 0 2 36 2
25 2 10 19 0 3 35 1
26 2 11 20 0 3 37 1
27 2 12 28 1 9 38 99
28 2 13 19 0 3 1 6
29 2 14 22 0 9 10 3
30 2 15 21 0 4 17 8
31 2 16 46 1 9 1 2
32 2 17 19 1 1 17 99
33 2 18 21 0 4 17 9
34 3 1 20 1 3 1 4
35 3 2 22 0 9 1 5
36 3 3 19 0 2 35 2
37 3 4 19 1 3 1 2
38 3 5 21 0 4 1 2
39 3 6 22 1 4 4 5
40 3 7 21 1 9 39 0
41 3 9 25 0 9 35 0
42 3 10 22 0 4 10 5
43 3 11 19 1 3 22 0
44 3 12 28 1 9 5 0
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45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
1
2
2
0
2
7
1
5
99
2
0
2
3
1
4
8
1
1
1
1
0
3
1
3
3
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
0
2
2
1
1
3
1
3
1
3
0
99
2
3 13 25 1 9 14
3 14 18 1 2 1
3 15 20 1 3 37
3 16 23 1 9 40
3 17 19 0 2 1
4 1 19 0 3 17
4 2 19 1 3 10
4 3 21 0 4 4
4 5 29 0 9 17
4 7 18 1 2 26
4 8 20 0 3 29
4 9 18 1 2 6
4 10 20 1 3 23
4 11 18 0 3 35
4 12 21 0 3 1
4 13 24 1 9 1
4 14 20 1 3 6
4 15 18 0 9 30
4 16 18 0 4 30
4 18 20 1 3 41
5 1 20 1 3 25
5 2 19 0 3 25
5 3 21 0 4 1
5 4 19 0 2 1
5 5 20 1 3 2
5 6 21 0 3 19
5 7 19 1 2 3
5 8 20 1 4 24
5 9 22 1 4 2
5 10 21 0 4 2
5 11 19 0 2 1
5 12 19 1 2 1
5 13 19 0 2 25
5 14 20 0 3 1
5 15 18 0 1 1
6 1 19 1 2 1
6 2 19 0 3 25
6 3 20 1 3 8
6 4 19 1 2 25
6 5 22 1 3 21
6 6 22 0 4 16
6 7 19 1 2 17
6 8 19 0 3 1
6 9 20 0 3 8
6 10 20 0 3 6
6 11 20 0 3 1
6 12 21 1 4 25
6 13 99 99 9 99
6 15 19 0 2 1
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WTP Gains:
Private
Obs # $2 Homo $2
Hetero
$2
Private
$5 Homo $5
Hetero
$5
Private
$8 Homo $8
Hetero
$8
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
3 0.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
4 0.20 0.25 0.50 1.00 5.00 1.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
5 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
6 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
7 9.00 3.00 10.00 6.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 5.00
8 1.50 0.67 0.50 1.00 1.25 0.35 9.68 9.50 9.00
9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 1.91 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
12 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
13 1.00 1.00 1.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 9.99 9.99 9.99
14 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 7.00
15 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
16 2.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.50 8.00 8.00 8.50
17 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
18 1.00 1.50 5.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 2.00
19 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00
20 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
21 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
22 6.50 6.66 5.03 7.32 4.99 6.03 7.63 7.77 7.14
23 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
24 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
25 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
26 1.00 1.50 1.50 8.00 5.00 5.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
27 3.00 2.00 3.90 6.00 6.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 8.00
28 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
29 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
30 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
31 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
32 0.00 0.00 10.00 5.00 6.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
33 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
34 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
35 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
36 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
37 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
38 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
39 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 10.00
40 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
41 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 6.50 8.00 8.00 6.50
42 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
43 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
44 2.01 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 8.00
59
45 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
46 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
47 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
48 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
49 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
50 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
51 0.25 0.50 0.01 1.75 4.00 3.00 9.50 9.99 9.99
52 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
53 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
54 7.85 6.00 6.66 9.99 8.99 7.92 9.99 9.99 9.99
55 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
56 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 8.00 8.00 2.00
57 1.99 1.99 0.01 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 9.99
58 1.75 0.25 2.50 8.75 7.50 7.25 9.95 9.50 9.99
59 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
60 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
61 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
62 2.50 2.10 1.50 5.25 4.50 4.50 6.50 7.20 7.50
63 1.90 1.98 4.00 4.40 5.60 6.00 8.90 8.70 9.95
64 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
65 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
66 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 0.00
67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.00
68 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
69 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
70 1.78 3.15 1.45 4.19 4.90 6.25 8.58 8.77 7.29
71 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
72 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
73 0.01 0.20 9.99 4.00 4.89 7.50 9.99 9.99 9.99
74 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
75 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
76 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
77 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
78 6.75 6.00 8.70 8.50 7.00 9.00 8.90 7.50 9.50
79 1.99 1.99 2.35 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
80 3.79 3.79 3.79 8.22 4.20 8.22 8.88 8.88 8.88
81 1.70 1.89 4.00 4.80 4.90 6.00 9.00 10.00 7.80
82 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 6.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
83 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.00
84 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
85 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
86 1.98 1.98 0.34 3.90 6.80 3.90 9.99 10.00 9.95
87 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
88 1.05 0.08 2.31 3.13 8.62 2.85 4.32 4.52 3.21
89 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
90 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
91 2.28 2.75 2.02 5.62 5.37 5.45 8.53 8.00 8.63
92 0.00 6.00 4.00 7.50 7.50 5.00 9.00 3.00 4.00
93 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 9.99
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WTP Losses:
Private -
Obs # $2
Homo - 
$2
Hetero -
$2
Private -
$5
Homo -
$5
Hetero -
$5
Private -
$8
Homo -
$8 Hetero -$8
1 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
2 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
3 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
4 1.00 1.50 0.20 2.00 1.00 9.00 0.50 1.00 0.50
5 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
6 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
7 9.00 3.00 4.50 7.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 6.00 8.00
8 1.99 1.80 1.99 8.50 2.50 1.99 4.50 5.00 7.00
9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 1.94 2.00 2.03 5.00 5.00 5.01 8.00 8.00 4.74
12 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
13 1.50 1.50 2.50 4.50 5.00 4.50 6.50 7.00 6.00
14 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 7.00 7.00
15 10.00 10.00 9.75 7.99 8.00 10.00 8.00 4.00 5.00
16 2.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.80 8.00 8.00 8.00
17 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
18 1.50 2.00 1.50 6.00 5.00 8.00 9.99 8.00 8.00
19 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00
20 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
21 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
22 2.00 4.53 0.50 6.63 5.98 4.93 8.00 8.33 8.30
23 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
24 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
25 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
26 10.00 10.00 8.50 7.50 3.50 5.00 0.05 0.03 0.01
27 1.80 2.00 4.00 4.80 5.10 6.00 8.50 8.00 10.00
28 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
29 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
30 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
31 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
32 0.00 0.00 9.00 1.00 0.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
33 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
34 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
35 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
36 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
37 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
38 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
39 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
40 2.00 2.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
41 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
42 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
43 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 6.00
44 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
45 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
46 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
61
47 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.00 10.00 8.00
48 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.99 4.99 5.00 7.99 8.00 8.00
49 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
50 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
51 0.75 0.50 0.25 6.50 4.00 7.00 9.50 9.75 10.00
52 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
53 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
54 4.83 5.00 3.82 6.29 8.69 6.15 7.50 3.99 9.76
55 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
56 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
57 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
58 2.75 0.50 0.50 7.50 5.75 8.00 9.75 9.75 9.85
59 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
60 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
61 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
62 3.00 3.75 2.50 4.50 6.90 6.75 8.50 9.15 8.90
63 1.99 1.50 1.99 4.80 6.00 3.50 8.50 8.40 8.80
64 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
65 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
66 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
67 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.75 3.50 3.00 5.00 5.00 6.50
68 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
69 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
70 0.40 0.20 0.55 3.37 4.00 6.95 6.55 3.80 6.40
71 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
72 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
73 0.01 0.10 0.20 9.99 3.00 3.89 9.99 9.99 9.99
74 8.00 8.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
75 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
76 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
77 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
78 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
79 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
80 3.79 3.79 3.79 8.22 8.22 8.22 8.88 8.88 8.88
81 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
82 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 5.00 8.00
83 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
84 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
85 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
86 4.82 1.98 3.06 5.10 4.68 5.00 10.00 9.99 7.80
87 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 4.00
88 0.68 1.68 0.28 3.92 3.43 6.66 4.58 0.25 2.50
89 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
90 1.99 1.99 5.00 4.99 4.99 5.50 8.00 8.00 8.00
91 4.87 6.00 5.37 8.50 8.00 7.50 9.99 9.99 9.99
92 4.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.50 7.50 10.00 10.00 4.00
93 0.00 0.00 9.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
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WTA Demographic Data:
Obs # Exp Session
Sub# within 
Session age gender year major ecncours
1 1 1 21 0 3 50 4
2 1 2 19 0 2 1 4
3 1 3 19 0 2 1 3
4 1 4 19 0 2 1 3
5 1 5 21 1 4 8 3
6 1 6 20 1 2 1 3
7 1 7 20 1 2 1 3
8 1 8 27 1 9 99 4
9 1 9 22 0 4 1 3
10 1 10 19 1 2 1 3
11 1 11 19 0 2 1 3
12 1 12 19 1 1 5 1
13 1 13 23 0 4 1 3
14 1 14 19 1 2 1 3
15 1 15 19 0 2 1 3
16 1 16 22 1 4 17 8
17 1 17 20 0 3 1 4
18 1 18 22 0 4 10 2
19 2 1 20 0 3 1 4
20 2 2 22 0 4 52 1
21 2 3 23 1 9 1 25
22 2 4 23 0 9 15 1
23 2 5 22 1 4 45 0
24 2 7 26 1 9 1 5
25 2 8 24 0 9 1 14
26 2 9 21 0 4 15 2
27 2 10 20 1 2 1 2
28 2 11 22 0 3 17 8
29 2 12 21 1 4 24 1
30 2 14 20 0 2 41 2
31 2 15 18 0 1 30 2
32 2 16 20 0 3 1 5
33 2 17 19 0 2 15 0
34 2 18 21 0 4 15 2
35 3 1 20 1 3 1 4
36 3 2 20 0 2 17 3
37 3 3 22 0 4 19 3
38 3 4 19 1 2 27 2
39 3 5 22 1 4 51 0
40 3 7 19 1 2 1 3
41 3 8 20 0 2 1 3
42 3 9 20 1 2 5 1
43 3 10 21 0 3 1 6
44 3 11 19 1 2 5 1
45 3 12 99 9 9 99 99
46 3 13 20 1 2 30 2
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47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
3
3
3
3
5
2
3
8
5
3
3
20
3
2
0
2
2
10
4
3
2
1
2
2
8
1
2
3
1
5
2
4
3
18
2
0
15
7
8
2
16
0
12
2
0
2
0
3 14 19 1 2 1
3 15 20 1 3 1
4 1 20 0 2 1
4 2 19 0 2 1
4 3 19 1 2 4
4 4 19 0 2 1
4 5 20 0 2 52
4 6 19 1 2 1
4 7 19 0 3 4
4 8 21 0 4 15
4 9 21 0 4 1
4 10 24 1 9 53
4 11 18 1 1 1
4 12 25 1 9 54
4 13 23 0 4 55
4 14 22 1 3 27
4 15 19 0 2 4
4 16 23 0 4 17
4 17 22 0 4 8
4 18 18 1 1 1
5 1 18 0 1 3
5 2 20 0 2 10
5 3 20 1 2 4
5 4 22 0 4 1
5 5 22 1 4 5
5 6 19 0 1 6
5 7 18 1 1 1
5 8 19 0 2 1
5 9 19 0 2 7
5 10 18 1 2 2
5 11 22 1 4 8
5 12 21 1 4 1
5 13 21 1 4 1
5 14 34 1 5 1
5 15 21 1 4 9
6 1 21 1 3 11
6 2 26 0 5 2
6 3 37 0 1 2
6 4 44 1 99 2
6 5 20 0 3 12
6 6 23 1 5 2
6 7 21 1 4 13
6 8 27 1 5 1
6 9 20 0 2 14
6 10 22 0 3 14
6 11 22 1 2 14
6 12 20 1 2 15
WTA Gains:
Private
Obs # $2 Homo $2
Hetero
$2
Private
$5 Homo $5
Hetero
$5
Private
$8 Homo $8
Hetero
$8
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
4 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 9.00 3.00 9.00 9.50 9.50
6 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 1.00
7 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
8 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
12 1.95 1.75 1.00 4.75 4.00 3.00 6.77 6.50 5.00
13 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
14 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
15 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
16 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
17 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 10.00
18 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
19 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
20 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
21 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
22 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
23 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
24 0.00 2.00 0.00 7.50 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
25 2.20 2.10 3.20 5.10 5.10 5.10 8.10 8.05 8.02
26 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
27 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
28 2.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 9.50 8.00 5.00
29 2.25 2.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 9.00 9.99 6.00
30 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
31 0.99 0.99 0.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 9.99 9.99
32 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
33 0.01 0.01 0.01 4.84 4.84 4.84 10.00 10.00 10.00
34 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
35 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
36 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.99
37 4.60 5.50 3.25 6.10 5.25 6.50 8.80 9.00 8.25
38 2.02 2.01 2.01 5.02 5.02 5.25 8.02 8.02 9.00
39 2.00 2.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
40 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.01 8.01 8.10
41 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
42 5.00 4.00 5.00 6.25 6.00 6.25 9.00 9.00 8.60
43 1.99 9.99 9.99 5.01 4.99 4.99 2.00 2.00 9.50
44 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 4.99 4.99 10.00 10.00 10.00
45 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 10.00 10.00 0.01
46 2.01 1.00 1.00 5.01 6.00 6.00 8.01 8.01 9.00
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47 1.99 1.99 2.80 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.01 8.01 8.01
48 0.05 0.05 0.10 5.00 3.00 9.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
49 2.02 2.02 2.00 5.02 5.02 5.00 8.02 8.00 8.00
50 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
51 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
52 0.01 0.01 0.01 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
53 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
54 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
55 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
56 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 10.00 10.00 6.00
57 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
58 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
59 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
60 1.25 1.00 4.50 6.50 6.00 2.50 9.50 9.80 9.00
61 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44 6.00 7.00 5.00
62 1.84 1.64 7.45 9.52 6.50 5.55 9.98 9.01 6.25
63 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
64 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.00
65 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.50 7.00 9.00 9.78 9.00
66 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
67 1.99 1.99 1.99 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
68 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
69 2.50 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
70 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
71 1.50 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
72 9.50 0.15 0.15 9.99 9.50 9.50 9.99 9.99 9.75
73 6.00 0.25 1.50 3.00 3.00 7.00 9.00 9.50 9.00
74 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 10.00
75 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
76 0.10 1.50 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
77 1.99 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.50 8.00
78 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
79 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
80 5.82 4.44 5.55 3.33 5.55 5.25 4.25 7.77 2.22
81 5.00 1.00 1.50 5.00 8.00 3.50 9.99 9.99 5.00
82 7.43 6.23 8.00 4.70 7.20 6.50 9.00 8.00 8.50
83 5.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
84 5.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 0.00
85 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
86 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
87 5.50 4.00 6.00 9.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 4.50 9.00
88 5.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
89 2.00 2.00 1.50 5.00 5.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 8.50
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.01 8.01 8.01
91 4.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 8.00 6.00
92 0.01 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
93 0.85 1.50 1.00 4.07 3.41 4.20 7.47 8.19 3.64
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WTA Losses:
Private Homo - Hetero Private Homo - Hetero - Private - Homo - Hetero
Obs # -$2 $2 -$2 -$5 $5 $5 $8 $8 -$8
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
4 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.50
5 9.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 9.00 9.00 1.50
6 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
7 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
8 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
9 2.00 0.20 0.50 5.00 4.75 5.05 9.70 9.75 9.75
10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
12 3.00 4.00 1.50 3.50 7.00 4.00 8.00 6.00 8.00
13 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 5.50 6.00 8.01 8.01 8.50
14 2.00 1.00 1.50 5.50 5.00 3.50 8.50 8.50 7.00
15 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
16 2.00 2.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.01
17 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 10.00
18 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 0.01 8.00 8.00 9.99
19 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
20 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
21 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
22 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
23 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
24 1.00 0.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
25 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
26 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.83 4.83 4.83 10.00 10.00 10.00
27 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
28 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
29 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 9.50 9.50 6.00
30 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
31 0.99 0.99 0.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
32 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
33 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 10.00 10.00 10.00
34 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
35 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
36 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
37 2.00 2.50 1.75 4.75 5.00 5.25 8.50 8.00 9.00
38 2.01 2.01 2.05 5.01 5.01 5.50 8.01 8.01 8.25
39 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 8.00 8.00 2.00
40 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.01 8.01 8.01
41 2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01 8.01 8.01
42 4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.75 8.50 8.50
43 2.01 9.99 9.99 0.01 0.01 9.50 0.01 0.01 3.33
44 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
45 0.01 0.01 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 0.01
46 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.50 5.00 7.00 9.80 1.00
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47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 7.99
0.10 0.10 0.10 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.99
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.02 5.02 4.22 8.02
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.50 2.50 4.00 5.01 5.01 4.00 7.50
0.01 0.01 0.01 4.99 4.99 4.99 9.99
2.01 2.01 8.00 5.01 5.01 8.00 8.01
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01
0.00 0.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.50 10.00
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
4.75 6.00 4.25 4.00 4.75 4.50 3.50
4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.00 4.44 6.00
6.26 6.85 2.80 8.14 8.50 4.45 9.98
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01
2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
1.00 0.75 0.50 5.00 4.50 3.00 8.50
3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.01 1.99 2.01 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 9.99 0.50 9.99
0.10 0.10 8.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.00
2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
0.10 0.10 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.01 2.01 2.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 8.01
2.22 2.22 2.22 1.11 1.11 1.11 3.33
0.01 0.01 0.15 5.00 6.00 4.00 9.99
3.71 5.00 4.50 4.71 4.24 3.21 4.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.50 2.60 3.00 5.10 5.20 8.00 8.01
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.90 5.00 8.00
7.00 7.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 8.00
2.10 4.71 5.10 3.20 3.02 6.02 5.70
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.01
2.22 2.67 3.13 1.48 1.19 3.23 4.37
7.99
9.99 
8.02
8.00
7.50
9.99
8.01
8.00
8.01
10.00
8.01
8.00
8.00
7.50
4.00 
9.97
8.01
8.00
9.00
8.00
7.99
8.00
8.00
8.01
8.00
9.99
9.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.01 
3.33
9.99
5.20
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00 
8.05
8.00
8.00
8.00 
4.60
3.01
4.20
Coding Summary
Participant #: Number in combined data set
W/in Experiment #: In each experiment session of 15, the participant number which
corresponds with the source data.
Experiment #:
Age: Minimum of 18 years old
Gender 0 = Male
Year: 1 = Freshman
Major:
5 = Graduate
1. AEM
2. Biology/Biological 
Sciences
3. Communications
4. ILR
5. Natural Resources
6. ..
7. Molecular and Cell 
Biology
8. PAM
9. Africana Studies
10. ABEN/BEE
11. Neurobiology & 
Behavior
12. Physics
13. Biometry
14. City & Regional 
Planning
15. ORIE
16. Computer Science
17. Economics
18. American Studies
19. History
20. General Studies
21. Education
22. Sociology
1 = Female
2 = Soph. 3 
9 = Missing
23. CEE
24. Animal Science
25. Rural Sociology
26. Hotel
27. Government
28. TXA
29. HBHS
30. Undecided
31. Electrical Eng.
32. Biology & Society
33. Econ and 
Government
34. ..
35. Mechanical Eng.
36. Mathematics
37. HD and DEA
38. Hospitality
39. English
40. Theoretical &
Applied
Mathematics
41. Nutritional 
Sciences
42. Horticulture
99 = Missing 
9 = Missing 
Junior 4 = Senior
43. Engineering and 
Econ
44. Public Affairs
45. Meteorology
46. SES and 
Oceanography
47. Chemistry
48. Psychology
49. Science and 
Technology Studies
50. Civil Engineering
51. Biological 
Engineering
52. French Area 
Studies
53. Finance
54. Food Science
55. Comparative 
Literature
56. Engineering
57. Material Science
58. Plant Science
59. CRP
99. Missing
# of Econ. Courses: 99 Missing
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Appendix C: Sorted Bids and Offers by Experiment (Optimal Responses in Bold)
Sorted Bid Values - WTP Gains
Private Homog. Hetero. Private Homog. Hetero. Private Homog. Hetero.
$2 $2 $2 $5 $5 $5 $8 $8 $8
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 2.00 2.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.25 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.52 2.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 4.32 5.00 3.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.75 2.00 2.85 5.00 6.00 3.21
0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 4.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.20 3.00 6.50 7.20 5.00
0.00 0.08 0.01 3.00 4.50 3.00 7.63 7.50 5.00
0.01 0.20 0.01 3.13 4.50 3.90 7.99 7.77 5.00
0.20 0.25 0.34 3.90 4.89 4.00 7.99 7.99 5.00
0.25 0.25 0.50 4.00 4.90 4.50 7.99 7.99 5.00
1.00 0.50 0.50 4.19 4.90 4.50 7.99 7.99 6.00
1.00 0.67 1.00 4.40 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 6.50
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.50 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.80 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.14
1.05 1.50 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.29
1.50 1.50 1.45 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.50
1.70 1.89 1.50 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 7.99 7.80
1.75 1.98 1.50 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.78 1.98 1.50 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.90 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.91 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.98 1.99 1.99 4.99 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.02
2.00 2.00 2.31
2.00 2.00 2.35
2.00 2.00 2.50
2.00 2.00 3.00
2.00 2.00 3.00
2.00 2.00 3.79
2.00 2.00 3.90
2.00 2.00 4.00
2.00 2.00 4.00
2.00 2.00 4.00
2.00 2.00 4.00
2.00 2.00 5.00
2.01 2.10 5.00
2.28 2.75 5.00
2.50 3.00 5.00
3.00 3.00 5.03
3.79 3.15 6.66
4.00 3.79 8.70
5.00 5.00 9.99
6.50 6.00 10.00
6.75 6.00 10.00
7.85 6.00 10.00
9.00 6.66 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.45
5.00 5.00 5.50
5.25 5.00 6.00
5.62 5.00 6.00
6.00 5.37 6.00
6.00 5.60 6.03
6.00 6.00 6.25
6.00 6.00 6.50
7.32 6.00 7.25
7.50 6.00 7.50
8.00 6.80 7.92
8.22 7.00 8.00
8.50 7.50 8.00
8.75 7.50 8.22
9.99 8.62 9.00
10.00 8.99 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.53 8.00 8.00
8.58 8.00 8.00
8.88 8.70 8.50
8.90 8.77 8.63
8.90 8.88 8.88
9.00 9.00 9.00
9.00 9.50 9.50
9.50 9.50 9.95
9.68 9.99 9.95
9.95 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 10.00 9.99
9.99 10.00 9.99
10.00 10.00 9.99
10.00 10.00 9.99
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
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Sorted Bid Values - WTP Losses
private2 homog2 heterog2 private5 homog5 heterog5 private8 homog8 heterog8
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.99 0.05 0.03 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 0.25 0.50
0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.50 1.00 2.50
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 4.58 3.80 4.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.99 4.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.37 3.00 3.50 5.00 4.00 4.74
0.00 0.00 0.20 3.75 3.00 3.89 5.00 5.00 5.00
0.00 0.00 0.20 3.92 3.43 4.50 6.00 5.00 5.00
0.00 0.00 0.25 4.00 3.50 4.50 6.50 5.00 5.00
0.01 0.10 0.28 4.50 3.50 4.93 6.55 6.00 5.00
0.40 0.20 0.50 4.50 4.00 4.99 7.50 6.00 5.00
0.68 0.50 0.50 4.80 4.00 4.99 7.99 6.00 5.00
0.75 0.50 0.55 4.80 4.68 4.99 7.99 7.00 6.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.00 6.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 6.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 6.40
1.50 1.50 1.50 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 6.50
1.50 1.50 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.00
1.80 1.50 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.00
1.94 1.68 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 7.99 7.99 7.80
1.99 1.80 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 7.99 7.99 7.99
1.99 1.98 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 8.00 7.99 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 8.00 7.99 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.03 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 3.06 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 3.79 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.50 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 3.82 5.00 5.00 5.01 8.50 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.50 8.50 8.33 8.00
2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.80 8.88 8.40 8.30
2.00 2.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 6.00 9.00 8.88 8.80
2.00 2.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 6.00 9.00 9.00 8.88
2.00 2.00 5.00 5.10 5.00 6.00 9.50 9.15 8.90
2.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.15 9.75 9.75 9.00
2.75 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.66 9.99 9.75 9.76
3.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.10 6.75 9.99 9.99 9.85
3.79 3.00 5.00 6.29 5.75 6.95 9.99 9.99 9.99
4.00 3.75 5.00 6.50 5.98 7.00 9.99 9.99 9.99
4.00 3.79 5.00 6.63 6.00 7.50 10.00 9.99 9.99
4.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00
4.82 4.00 5.00 7.50 6.50 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
4.83 4.53 5.37 7.50 6.90 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
4.87 5.00 8.00 7.99 7.50 8.22 10.00 10.00 10.00
5.00 5.00 8.50 8.22 8.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
8.00 6.00 9.00 8.50 8.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
9.00 8.00 9.75 8.50 8.22 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 9.99 9.99 8.69 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
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Sorted Offer Values - WTA Gains
private2 homog2 heterog2 private5 homog5 heterog5 private8 homog8 heterog8
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.01 0.01 4.25 4.50 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 3.00 2.50 5.00 5.00 1.00
0.00 0.01 0.00 4.07 3.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 2.22
0.01 0.01 0.00 4.44 3.41 3.00 6.00 6.50 3.64
0.01 0.01 0.01 4.50 4.00 3.50 6.00 7.00 5.00
0.01 0.05 0.01 4.70 4.00 4.20 6.77 7.77 5.00
0.01 0.15 0.01 4.75 4.44 4.44 7.47 7.99 5.00
0.05 0.25 0.10 4.84 4.50 4.50 7.99 7.99 5.00
0.10 0.99 0.15 4.99 4.84 4.50 7.99 8.00 5.00
0.85 1.00 0.99 4.99 4.99 4.84 8.00 8.00 5.00
0.99 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 5.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 4.99 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 5.00
1.25 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.00
1.50 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.00
1.50 1.50 1.00 5.00 4.99 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.00
1.84 1.50 1.50 5.00 5.00 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.00
1.95 1.64 1.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.00
1.99 1.75 1.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.25
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
1.99 1.99 1.99 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
1.99 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.80
2.01 2.01 3.00
2.02 2.01 3.00
2.02 2.01 3.20
2.20 2.01 3.25
2.25 2.01 4.44
2.50 2.01 4.50
4.00 2.01 4.99
4.44 2.01 5.00
4.60 2.01 5.00
5.00 2.02 5.00
5.00 2.10 5.00
5.00 2.25 5.00
5.00 4.00 5.00
5.00 4.00 5.00
5.00 4.44 5.25
5.00 4.44 5.55
5.50 5.00 6.00
5.82 5.00 7.45
6.00 5.50 8.00
7.43 6.23 8.00
9.50 9.99 9.99
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.02 5.10
5.01 5.02 5.25
5.01 5.10 5.25
5.02 5.25 5.25
5.02 5.25 5.55
5.10 5.55 6.00
5.25 6.00 6.00
6.00 6.00 6.25
6.00 6.00 6.50
6.10 6.00 6.50
6.25 6.50 7.00
6.50 6.50 7.00
7.50 7.20 8.00
9.00 8.00 8.00
9.52 9.00 9.00
9.99 9.50 9.50
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.01 8.00 8.00
8.01 8.00 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.02 8.01 8.01
8.02 8.01 8.02
8.10 8.02 8.10
8.80 8.05 8.25
9.00 8.19 8.50
9.00 8.50 8.50
9.00 9.00 8.60
9.00 9.00 9.00
9.00 9.01 9.00
9.00 9.50 9.00
9.00 9.50 9.00
9.50 9.78 9.00
9.50 9.80 9.00
9.98 9.99 9.50
9.99 9.99 9.50
9.99 9.99 9.75
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
10.00 9.99 9.99
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
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Sorted Offer Values - WTA Losses
private2 homog2 heterog2 private5 homog5 heterog5 private8 homog8 heterog8
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.01 3.01 1.00
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.33 3.33 1.00
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.50 1.11 0.01 3.50 4.00 1.50
0.01 0.01 0.01 1.11 1.19 0.50 4.00 4.20 2.00
0.01 0.01 0.01 1.48 2.00 1.11 4.37 4.60 2.80
0.01 0.01 0.10 3.00 3.02 2.00 5.70 5.20 3.01
0.10 0.01 0.15 3.20 4.00 3.00 6.00 6.00 3.33
0.10 0.01 0.50 3.50 4.00 3.21 7.00 7.50 3.33
0.10 0.10 0.50 4.00 4.24 3.23 7.50 7.50 3.75
0.50 0.10 0.50 4.00 4.50 3.50 7.99 7.99 4.00
0.99 0.10 0.99 4.44 4.75 4.00 7.99 7.99 4.62
1.00 0.20 1.00 4.71 4.75 4.00 8.00 8.00 4.82
1.00 0.50 1.50 4.75 4.83 4.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
1.00 0.75 1.50 4.83 4.90 4.22 8.00 8.00 5.00
2.00 0.99 1.75 4.99 4.99 4.25 8.00 8.00 5.00
2.00 1.00 2.00 4.99 4.99 4.44 8.00 8.00 5.00
2.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.45 8.00 8.00 5.01
2.00 1.99 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.83 8.00 8.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.99 8.00 8.00 6.50
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 7.99
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.00 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.01
2.01 2.01 2.05
2.01 2.01 2.22
2.01 2.01 2.80
2.01 2.01 3.00
2.01 2.01 3.00
2.01 2.01 3.13
2.01 2.01 4.00
2.01 2.01 4.00
2.01 2.01 4.25
2.01 2.01 4.44
2.01 2.22 4.50
2.10 2.50 4.50
2.22 2.50 5.00
2.22 2.60 5.00
2.50 2.67 5.00
2.50 3.00 5.00
3.00 4.00 5.00
3.00 4.44 5.00
3.71 4.50 5.00
4.00 4.71 5.00
4.00 5.00 5.01
4.44 5.00 5.10
4.75 6.00 8.00
6.26 6.85 8.00
7.00 7.00 8.00
9.00 9.99 9.99
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.00 5.00
5.00 5.01 5.00
5.00 5.01 5.00
5.00 5.01 5.00
5.00 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.01 5.01
5.01 5.02 5.05
5.01 5.20 5.25
5.01 5.50 5.50
5.01 5.50 6.00
5.02 6.00 6.00
5.10 6.00 6.02
5.50 6.00 8.00
5.50 7.00 8.00
6.00 8.50 8.00
8.14 9.99 9.50
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.00 8.00 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.00
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.01 8.01
8.01 8.02 8.02
8.02 8.05 8.25
8.50 8.50 8.50
8.50 8.50 8.50
8.50 9.00 9.00
8.75 9.00 9.00
9.00 9.00 9.00
9.00 9.50 9.00
9.50 9.75 9.75
9.70 9.80 9.99
9.98 9.97 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 9.99
9.99 9.99 10.00
9.99 9.99 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
10.00 10.00 10.00
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Appendix C: Econometric Output (LIMDEP) by Experiment (See Eq. 10 in text)
WTP Gains - Pooled Model (n=93)
+.............................................................. +
| Linearly restricted regression |
| Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none |
| Dep. var. = ACT_IND Mean= .1362962963 , S.D.= 1.671220838 |
| Model size: Observations = 837, Parameters = 101, Deg.Fr.= 736 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 1356.973161 , Std.Dev.= 1.35783 |
| Fit: R-squared= .418838, Adjusted R-squared = .33988 |
| (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1] |
| Model test: F[100, 736] = 5.30, Prob value = .00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1389.8657, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -1616.9963 |
| LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= .726, Akaike Info. Crt.= 3.562 |
| Note, when restrictions are imposed, R-squared can be less than zero. |
| F[ 2, 734] for the restrictions = .0000, Prob = 1.0000 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.73390, Rho = .13305 |
+----------------------------------------------- +
+---------- +---------+---------- +-----+------+------ +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X|
Individual (93) Fixed Effect Dummy Variables Suppressed 
(WTPGPRIV2 - $2) -.3296296296E-01 .13274831 -.248 .8039 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO2 - $2) -.8091995221E-01 .13274831 -.610 .5421 .11111111
(WTPGHET2 - $2) .5032735962 .13274831 3.791 .0001 .11111111
(WTPGPRIV5 - $5) -.4253285544E-01 .13274831 -.320 .7487 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO5 - $5) -.2436081243E-01 .13274831 -.184 .8544 .11111111
(WTPGHET5 - $5) .5316606930E-01 .13274831 .401 .6888 .11111111
(WTPGPRIV8 - $8) -.2640382318E-01 .13274831 -.199 .8423 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO8 - $8) .5531660693E-02 .13274831 .042 .9668 .11111111
(WTPGHET8 - $8) -.3547909200 .13274831 -2.673 .0075 .11111111
Constant .1362962963 .46933614E-01 2.904 .0037
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
Derived coefficients for Table 1.
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
Const. + (WTPGPRIV2 - $2) .1033333333 .14080084 .734 .4630
Const. + (WTPGHOMO2 - $2) .5537634409E-01 .14080084 .393 .6941
Const. + (WTPGHET2 - $2) .6395698925 .14080084 4.542 .0000
Const. + (WTPGPRIV5 - $5) .9376344086E-01 .14080084 .666 .5055
Const. + (WTPGHOMO5 - $5) .1119354839 .14080084 .795 .4266
Const. + (WTPGHET5 - $5) .1894623656 .14080084 1.346 .1784
Const. + (WTPGPRIV8 - $8) .1098924731 .14080084 .780 .4351
Const. + (WTPGHOMO8 - $8) .1418279570 .14080084 1.007 .3138
Const. + (WTPGHET8 - $8) -.2184946237 .14080084 -1.552 .1207
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
WTP Losses - Pooled Model (n=93)
+----------------------------------------------- +
| Linearly restricted regression |
| Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none |
| Dep. var. = ACT_IND Mean= .1186021505 , S.D.= 1.719323704 |
| Model size: Observations = 837, Parameters = 101, Deg.Fr.= 736 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 1706.961663 , Std.Dev.= 1.52291 |
| Fit: R-squared= .309280, Adjusted R-squared = .21543 |
| (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1] |
| Model test: F[100, 736] = 3.30, Prob value = .00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1485.8940, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -1640.7475 |
| LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= .955, Akaike Info. Crt.= 3.792 |
| Note, when restrictions are imposed, R-squared can be less than zero. |
| F[ 2, 734] for the restrictions = .0000, Prob = 1.0000 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.36256, Rho = .31872 |
+----------------------------------------------- +
+---------- +---------+---------- +-----+------+------ +
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|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X|
+............. +............+..............+.......+........+........ +
Individual (93) Fixed Effect Dummy Variables Suppressed 
(WTPGPRIV2 - $2) .1127956989 .14888647 .758 .4487 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO2 - $2) .2365591398E-01 .14888647 .159 .8738 .11111111
(WTPGHET2 - $2) .5500000000 .14888647 3.694 .0002 .11111111
(WTPGPRIV5 - $5) .6688172043E-01 .14888647 .449 .6533 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO5 - $5) -.1170967742 .14888647 -.786 .4316 .11111111
(WTPGHET5 - $5) .2605376344 .14888647 1.750 .0801 .11111111
(WTPGPRIV8 - $8) -.1329032258 .14888647 -.893 .3720 .11111111
(WTPGHOMO8 - $8) -.3207526882 .14888647 -2.154 .0312 .11111111
(WTPGHET5 - $5) -.4431182796 .14888647 -2.976 .0029 .11111111
Constant .1186021505 .52639317E-01 2.253 .0243
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
Derived coefficients for Table 2.
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
Const. + (WTPGPRIV2 - $2) .2313978495 .15791795 1.465 .1428
Const. + (WTPGHOMO2 - $2) .1422580645 .15791795 .901 .3677
Const. + (WTPGHET2 - $2) .6686021505 .15791795 4.234 .0000
Const. + (WTPGPRIV2 - $2) .1854838710 .15791795 1.175 .2402
Const. + (WTPGHOMO2 - $2) .1505376344E-02 .15791795 .010 .9924
Const. + (WTPGHET2 - $2) .3791397849 .15791795 2.401 .0164
Const. + (WTPGPRIV2 - $2)-.1430107527E-01 .15791795 -.091 .9278
Const. + (WTPGHOMO2 - $2) -.2021505376 .15791795 -1.280 .2005
Const. + (WTPGHET2 - $2) -.3245161290 .15791795 -2.055 .0399
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
WTA Gains - Pooled Model (n=93)
+----------------------------------------------- +
| Linearly restricted regression |
| Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none |
| Dep. var. = ACT_IND Mean= .6905615293E-01, S.D.= 1.403042641 |
| Model size: Observations = 837, Parameters = 101, Deg.Fr.= 736 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 1301.841669 , Std.Dev.= 1.32996 |
| Fit: R-squared= .208939, Adjusted R-squared = .10146 |
| (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1] |
| Model test: F[100, 736] = 1.94, Prob value = .00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1372.5077, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -1470.5956 |
| LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= .684, Akaike Info. Crt.= 3.521 |
| Note, when restrictions are imposed, R-squared can be less than zero. |
| F[ 2, 734] for the restrictions = .0000, Prob = 1.0000 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.50787, Rho = .24607 |
+----------------------------------------------- +
+----------+--------- +---------- +-----+------+------ +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X|
+----------+--------- +---------- +-----+------+------ +
Individual (93) Fixed Effect Dummy Variables Suppressed 
(WTAGPRIV2 - $2) -.1105615293 .13002368 -.850 .3951 .11111111
(WTAGHOMO2 - $2) -.5615292712E-02 .13002368 -.043 .9656 .11111111
(WTAGHET2 - $2) .3963201912 .13002368 3.048 .0023 .11111111
(WTAGPRIV5 - $5) .4911589008E-01 .13002368 .378 .7056 .11111111
(WTAGHOMO5 - $5) -.3518518519E-01 .13002368 -.271 .7867 .11111111
(WTAGHET5 - $5) -.7765830346E-02 .13002368 -.060 .9524 .11111111
(WTAGPRIV8 - $8) .7621266428E-01 .13002368 .586 .5578 .11111111
(WTAGHOMO8 - $8) .1158900836 .13002368 .891 .3728 .11111111
(WTAGHET8 - $8) -.4784109916 .13002368 -3.679 .0002 .11111111
Constant .6905615293E-01 .45970312E-01 1.502 .1330
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
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Derived coefficients for Table 3.
+...................... +............+............. +.......+....... +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+...................... +............+............. +.......+....... +
Const. + (WTAGPRIV2 - $2) -.4150537634E-01 .13791093 -.301 .7634
Const. + (WTAGHOMO2 - $2) .6344086022E-01 .13791093 .460 .6455
Const. + (WTAGHET2 - $2) .4653763441 .13791093 3.374 .0007
Const. + (WTAGPRIV5 - $5) .1181720430 .13791093 .857 .3915
Const. + (WTAGHOMO5 - $5) .3387096774E-01 .13791093 .246 .8060
Const. + (WTAGHET5 - $5) .6129032258E-01 .13791093 .444 .6567
Const. + (WTAGPRIV8 - $8) .1452688172 .13791093 1.053 .2922
Const. + (WTAGHOMO8 - $8) .1849462366 .13791093 1.341 .1799
Const. + (WTAGHET8 - $8) -.4093548387 .13791093 -2.968 .0030
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
WTA Losses - Pooled Model (n=93)
+----------------------------------------------- +
| Linearly restricted regression |
| Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none |
| Dep. var. = ACT_IND Mean= -.1055077658 , S.D.= 1.617985009 |
| Model size: Observations = 837, Parameters = 101, Deg.Fr.= 736 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 1666.230768 , Std.Dev.= 1.50463 |
| Fit: R-squared= .238658, Adjusted R-squared = .13521 |
| (Note: Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1] |
| Model test: F[100, 736] = 2.31, Prob value = .00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1475.7868, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -1589.9002 |
| LogAmemiyaPrCrt.= .931, Akaike Info. Crt.= 3.768 |
| Note, when restrictions are imposed, R-squared can be less than zero. |
| F[ 2, 734] for the restrictions = .0000, Prob = 1.0000 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.70224, Rho = .14888 |
+----------------------------------------------- +
+----------+--------- +---------- +-----+------+------ +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X|
+----------+--------- +---------- +-----+------+------ +
Individual (93) Fixed Effect Dummy Variables Suppressed 
(WTALPRIV2 - $2) .1667980884 .14709941 1.134 .2568 .11111111
(WTALHOMO2 - $2) .2119593787 .14709941 1.441 .1496 .11111111
(WTALHET2 - $2) .6499163680 .14709941 4.418 .0000 .11111111
(WTALPRIV5 - $5) -.2178255675 .14709941 -1.481 .1387 .11111111
(WTALHOMO5 - $5)-.7567502987E-01 .14709941 -.514 .6069 .11111111
(WTALHET5 - $5) -.1936320191 .14709941 -1.316 .1881 .11111111
(WTALPRIV8 - $8) .1894862605E-01 .14709941 .129 .8975 .11111111
(WTALHOMO8 - $8) .4647550777E-01 .14709941 .316 .7520 .11111111
(WTALHET5 - $5) -.6069653524 .14709941 -4.126 .0000 .11111111
Constant -.1055077658 .52007495E-01 -2.029 .0425 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
Derived coefficients for Table 3.
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------------- +---------+---------- +-----+----- +
Const. + (WTALPRIV2 - $2) .6129032258E-01 .15602249 .393 .6944
Const. + (WTALHOMO2 - $2) .1064516129 .15602249 .682 .4951
Const. + (WTAGHET2 - $2) .5444086022 .15602249 3.489 .0005
Const. + (WTALPRIV5 - $5) -.3233333333 .15602249 -2.072 .0382
Const. + (WTALHOMO5 - $5) -.1811827957 .15602249 -1.161 .2455
Const. + (WTALHET5 - $5) -.2991397849 .15602249 -1.917 .0552
Const. + (WTALPRIV8 - $8) -.8655913978E-01 .15602249 -.555 .5790
Const. + (WTALHOMO8 - $8) -.5903225806E-01 .15602249 -.378 .7052
Const. + (WTAGHET8 - $8) -.7124731183 .15602249 -4.566 .0000
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
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reject the notion of paternalistic preferences for safety and argue, based on preliminary evidence, 
that consumers are “pure altruists.” These pure altruists consider the cost of a program that might 
be imposed on other voters in their decision on whether to vote yes or no for public safety 
programs. They conclude that further empirical research is warranted. This paper presents a set 
of laboratory economics experiments designed to test the Johannesson e t  al. conjecture under 
controlled conditions where participants face an actual risk of financial loss rather than a 
hypothetical risk of loss of life. The results presented here support those of Johannesson e t al. in 
that we do not find evidence in support of paternalistic altruism for risk but do find evidence for 
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1. Introduction
In 1996 Johannesson e t  al. published a paper in the Jou rnal o f  R isk  a n d  U ncertainty  entitled 
"The Value of Private Safety Versus the Value of Public Safety." Using hypothetical survey 
questions about voting for improvements in public safety or purchases of private safety, they do 
not find support for the notion of paternalistic preferences for safety. Paternalistic preferences 
imply that voters will bias their voting in favor of public safety programs compared to their own 
selfish interests. Rather they argue, based on preliminary evidence, that consumers are “pure 
altruists.” These pure altruists consider the costs of a program that might be imposed on other 
voters in their decision on whether to vote yes or no for public safety programs. Thus, they find 
that voters take into account the distribution of net benefits to others in their votes, but further 
note that further empirical research is warranted. This paper presents a set of laboratory 
economics experiments designed to test the Johannesson e t al. conjecture under controlled 
conditions where participants face an actual risk of financial loss rather than a hypothetical risk 
of loss of life.
It is important to distinguish the types of altruism that might be present because benefit- 
cost analysis should not generally (with some exceptions) incorporate pure altruism in benefit 
measures (Bergstrom, 1982, 2004; Johansson, 1992,; Milgrom, 1993; Flores, 2002,1 but should 
generally incorporate paternalistic altruism from a welfare theoretic perspective (Jones Lee,
1 Bergstrom (1982) provides a neoclassical economic rationale for not accounting for altruism in Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare tests, leading Johannesson (1994) to argue that for the appropriate aggregate valuation of public goods, 
individual, and therefore aggregate WTP should be conditional on everybody else paying so as to remain at their 
initial level of utility. However, public projects are rarely, if ever, financed under such conditions: most typically the 
funding for specific public projects imposes coercive costs that result in utility gains and losses. Moreover, projects 
evaluated tend to be discrete, and the initial allocation of public goods is inefficient. Under these conditions Flores 
(2002) argues that the extrapolation of Bergstrom’s results for marginal changes at the optimum do not carry over to 
the “more modest problem [of benefit-cost analysis], determining whether a specific project can lead to a Pareto 
improvement”. Under these more realistic conditions, Flores further argues that pure altruism should be accounted 
for in applied welfare analyses. Bergstrom disagrees and his analysis is presented in Bergstrom, 2004.
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1991, 1992, Quiggin, 1998). Note that paternalistic altruism is present when one individual cares 
only about the level of consumption of a particular commodity by another person, but not about 
the other person’s utility or overall well-being. Quiggin, 1998, sums up the situation for public 
goods as follows: “If individuals display paternalistic altruism towards each other, and are 
concerned only with consumption of the public good, household WTP will be equal to the sum 
of household members’ individual WTP. If individuals have well-defined personal utility 
functions but display non-paternalistic altruism towards each other, it is possible to define a 
measure of private WTP which will be less than the [sum of] individual WTP." (p 58)
Most field research on voter behavior with respect to risk has been directed toward 
situations in which altruism is expected to increase  the proportion of affirmative votes above 
what would be anticipated for self-interested preferences, consistent with paternalistic altruism as 
well as pure altruism. This reflects the prevalent view frequently articulated in the value of 
statistical life literature that accounting for concern about the well-being of others would increase 
the aggregated benefits in public benefit-cost analyses (e.g., Jones-Lee, 1991, 1992). Empirical 
testing of this hypothesis with respect to risk improvements has been inconclusive, however, as 
some studies of ballot initiatives find voting patterns consistent with self-interest, narrowly 
defined (e.g., Deacon and Shapiro, 1975) while other research provides evidence of “public 
regardingness” in voting behavior (e.g. Holmes, 1990, Shabman and Stephenson, 1994). To 
some extent, these mixed empirical findings might be anticipated by inherent incompatibilities of 
using aggregate voting data as a measure of underlying, but not directly observable, preferences. 
Thus, by necessity, aggregate modeling approaches rely on indirect proxies for costs (e.g. 
income, Deacon and Shapiro), expected risk reduction (e.g. location, Shabman and Stephenson), 
and/or altruistic concerns (e.g. political affiliation, Holmes).
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Yet, as conjectured by Johannesson e ta l .  (1996), the coercive nature of voting and
taxation also raises another possibility that some people who are pure altruists will vote “no” on
a project that would provide them private net benefits for risk reduction, narrowly defined,
because they desire not to impose costs on others for whom costs exceed the benefits.
Let us assume that [an individual] is willing to pay $t for a ceteris paribus 
increase in his own safety. His total WTP for a uniform public risk reduction of 
the same magnitude will fall short of $t if he believes that others are willing to 
pay less than $t but will still be forced to pay that amount ($t) for the project.
This is because other individuals, for whom he cares will experience a lower 
utility if the program is implemented. In turn, this decrease in the utility of others 
reduces the pure altruist’s WTP for the public safety project. (p. 264)
In other words, purely altruistic behavior may in some instances low er  the proportion of
affirmative votes relative to a self-interested model.
This paper examines two hypotheses: 1) That voters are paternalistic with respect to
losses in the sense that they tend to vote “yes” for projects that provide loss reductions to others,
even if the individual voter incurs a financial loss; and 2) The Johannesson conjecture that there
will be a tendency to vote “no” on projects that impose excessive costs on others and to vote
“yes” for projects that benefits others while imposing financial losses on the individual. To do
this we employ the Random-Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM) introduced in Messer (2003) and
Messer e t  al. (2005). This mechanism extends the private good Becker-DeGroot-Marshack
(BDM) mechanism (1964) to a public good setting wherein subjects indicate the highest uniform
tax they would pay for insurance before voting “no”. The tax is then drawn randomly. If a
majority of participants indicate that they would vote “yes” at this random tax level or higher
then the insurance policy is purchased, the risk is alleviated, and taxes are collected from all
members in the group. If a majority of affirmative votes is not attained, then the policy is not
implemented and no tax is collected. Because of the voting context, this mechanism is
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theoretically incentive compatible. Using induced value experiments, Messer e t  al. (2005) 
further demonstrate that the mechanism is demand revealing in public settings, and that the 
continuous willingness to pay (WTP) values correspond to those obtained from analogous 
dichotomous choice referenda.
In the experiments described here, subjects provide the highest uniform price or tax that 
they would pay for an insurance policy that protects against a probabilistic loss in both a private 
and public good setting. In addition, expected losses are varied across players in such a way as 
to allow tests of pure or paternalistic altruism. For completeness, we utilize two experimental 
designs. The first varies the probability of a loss, while the second varies the loss. It should be 
noted that considerable support has been found for pure altruism in the recent experimental 
literature (Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, Messer e t  al, 2005). 
However, because these studies use induced values under certainty, they cannot test for 
paternalistic altruism that requires use of a commodity. In this study, either private or publicly 
provided insurance against risk of loss are the commodities of interest.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations and 
demonstrates how voting behavior can be used to test for the presence of paternalistic versus 
non-paternalistic altruism; Section 3 presents the experimental design; Section 4 provides results 
and statistical tests; and Section 5 provides a summary and discussion of the results.
2. Conceptual Framework
Messer e t  al. (2005) build upon the “social welfare” preferences model of Charness and 
Rabin (2002) to derive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria expectations appropriate for the 
RPVM framework. The conceptual foundations of this paper are similar but induced values are
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replaced by public or private insurance against loss, consistent with the framework introduced in 
Johannesson et al. (1996).
Preferences: Since these experiments are conducted in the laboratory with small stakes, 
and since there is no generally accepted theoretical model of risk aversion in the small, it is 
initially assumed that subjects are not risk averse. An approximate method for dealing with risk 
aversion is introduced later. As Rabin (2000) has pointed out, the expected utility model cannot 
explain the presence of risk aversion in the small, since observable levels of risk aversion in the 
small and large are theoretically inconsistent. It should be noted that the purpose of this study is 
to examine the nature of altruistic preferences for risk, not to explore risk aversion in the small. 
However, the potential for risk aversion in the small must be accounted for to avoid a potential 
confound. Thus, to begin, individual selfish utility is specified as expected payoff or income 
minus private expected loss,
1) U  = y  - P L , i = 1, 2, 3 , ....... , n,
where /  denotes the income of participant i, and p ,s denotes the probability of dollar loss, Lis, in 
treatment s for participant i in a group of n individuals.
If, in addition, a participant cares about the private utility of other participants, then 
purely altruistic utility, consistent both with Johannesson et al. (1996) and with the efficiency 
motive of Charness and Rabin (2002), can be specified as
2) A  = U  + 0 £ U 1,
j  * i
where a  denotes the relative weight placed on the sum of others' utilities each denoted j. This is a 
particular form of pure altruism as defined by Johannesson, et al., 1996.
Alternatively, in the case of paternalistic preferences for others' exposure to losses, 
paternalistic utility can be written as
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3) P  =  U - 0 £ p , , L } ,s  ’
where participant i loses utility at rate P in the sum of others' expected losses. Thus, paternalistic 
preferences imply that individuals care not about others' utility but only about the losses they 
face. For example, paternalists might condemn smoking as bad behavior and show interest in 
helping others quit, but they may not be interested in other aspects of smokers’ well-being.
Thus, there are three models of behavior that can be analyzed in the public good voting 
experiments on risk presented here. First, individuals may be self-interested or selfish and not 
consider the impact of their vote on others, consistent with (1). Second, individuals may show 
purely altruistic preferences as shown in (2), and consider the utilities of others. Or, as shown in 
(3), individuals may have paternalistic preferences and be interested in the risks that others face, 
but not their overall well being or utility.
Selfish Preferences: In the experiments to follow, participants are given the opportunity 
to decide whether or not to purchase private insurance for price c to eliminate a known risk of 
losing money. The risk neutral individual will purchase insurance if the individual utility of 
accepting the risk is less that or equal to the individual utility of paying c to eliminate the risk,
4) y  - p iA s  < y  - c .
The maximum price that participant i will pay to eliminate risk when equality holds in (4) is 
equal to expected value,
5) Ci,s = Pi,sLi,s .
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, both selfish and altruistic individuals will behave this 
way. However, if an individual is truly selfish and does not care about the utilities or risks facing 
others, then the individual will vote for a public program to eliminate risk to his or her voting 
group if the tax cost to each, t, is such that
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6) yl - PiA,s < yl - t .
In this case, the maximum tax that individual i would pay to eliminate risk for the group is the 
same as the private value and remains equal to expected value,
7) t = p  L  , so t  -  c = U.
/  i ,s r '  i ,s i,s> i,s i,s
Purely Altruistic Preferences: In the case of pure altruism, individual i will consider the 
utilities of other individuals j ^ i  in a vote as to whether or not to fund a public risk reduction 
which eliminates risk to all but imposes a tax cost t on each voter. Thus, individual i will vote 
yes if
8) yi -  P i A s + a L ( y j - p } ,sL j ,s )^ y  - 1 + a L ( y j  - 1 )
A  i j* i
and the maximum tax that i will pay is
a
9) c  = p A s  + ( a) , A , where(n -  l ) a  + 1
10) Zis = (n -1  X ’Z p j . s L j s  / (n  - 1)- p L . )
j
and there are n voters in a voting group. Note that the difference between the maximum uniform 
tax for reducing risks to all and own private value that i will pay to reduce risk to herself is 
determined by Zis , which compares own risk to the average of others risks:
> U f o r  Z is > U 
11) ^  - p A i s \ = U f o r Z hS = U.
.< U f o r  Z i,s < U
Thus, from (10) and (11), if her risk is greater than the average of others' risk (as measured by 
expected value), she will pay less than her private value and if her risk is less than the average of 
other's risk she will pay more than her private value.
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Paternalistic Preferences: An individual with paternalistic preferences will vote in favor 
of a public risk elimination program if
12) y - p hSLhS- p x is < y - 1,
where,
13) x ,  ^ = ' £ P ) L ) s  •
j  i
and will be willing to vote for a maximum tax of
14) t -  =P isL is  +  P X is.
This implies that a paternalist in public risk will always pay more for a successful public risk 
prevention program than for an individually identical private risk reduction since 
f= 0 f o r  X is = 0i .max t I *•' l,s
15) ti,s P i,sLi,s | r\ r v- f\1 ’ ’ [> 0 f o r  X u  > 0
Treatments and hypotheses drawn from the theory presented above are presented in Table 1.
Risk Aversion: Given the lack of accepted models of risk aversion in the small, it should 
be noted that a number of studies have documented systematic deviations from the prediction of 
expected utility which implies that risks should be valued at expected value in the laboratory 
(See for example, Holt and Laury, 2002, 2004; Harrison, 2004, Holt and Laury,). To attempt to 
capture these deviations, define a risk premium r is that biases private values such that
16) < r  = p l s + r ,s •
Alternatively, rUs can be interpreted as a systematic error with a positive mean. In either case, we 
suppose that this risk aversion or positive systematic error may be a function of the experimental 
parameters of income, probability of loss, and loss, so that
17) r,s = r (y l > Pi.s > Li,s)  ^0 •
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If (16) is used to replace p  sLi s everywhere in the analysis above except in the definition of X, 
and in the special case where it is assumed that on average across subjects that
^  rj s /(n -  1) = ris , so that the average of others’ risk premium is the same as own risk premium
j *i
over relevant treatments, the predictions of Table 1 remain unaltered in that the predicted 
difference between public and private values (that include risk aversion or systematic error under 
this special assumption), remain unaltered. However, this requires the extreme assumption that 
ris does not vary systematically with p  or L so that the average of others risk premiums is always 
equal to own risk premium. Since the random price voting mechanism used in this study obtains 
both private (n=1) and public values (n=3) the difference between these measures is the value of 
interest. We can estimate a mixed model with fixed effects to predict this difference as a function 
of Zis and Xis as competing hypotheses. However, we must use predicted values for c“ax in
calculating Zis which can be obtained by using predicted values of obtained from an
estimated second order Taylor series expansion of (16) after p  s has been substituted in from (17). 
The estimated version of (16), which also requires a mixed model with fixed coefficients, 
because we collect multiple observations from each subject, is of interest in-and-of itself for 
theorists because the second order expansion contains expected value as well as other values that 
can explain any systematic differences from expected value.
3.____ Experimental Design:
All experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Decision Research at Cornell University. 282 subjects (93 in a baseline treatment with certainty, 
and 189 in the risk treatments) volunteered for the experiments and were recruited from a variety 
of undergraduate economics courses. Subjects received written instructions (see Appendix) and
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were permitted to ask questions at the beginning of each part of the experiment. The instructions 
used language parallel to that found in surveys for referendum voting settings (Carson et al., 
2000). The instructions directed each subject to vo te  whether to fu n d  an insurance p ro g ra m  by 
submitting a b id  that represented the “highest amount that you would pay and still vote for the 
insurance program.” We subsequently refer to this as the maximum WTP value.
Each subject was seated at an individual computer with a privacy shield and was assigned 
to groups of varying size of either one or three. For the groups of three, the administrators 
announced the groups and asked each group member to raise their hand so that they could be 
identified by other members of their group. This ensured that subjects were aware of who was in 
their group for all treatments. However, individuals were not informed about which subjects 
received which payoffs -  they only new the distribution of payoffs. No communication was 
allowed and subjects in the same group size of three were not seated next to each other. Subjects 
decided how much to bid ranging from zero to the entire initial balance of $25. Using Excel 
spreadsheets programmed with Visual Basic for Applications, subjects submitted their WTP for 
insurance to the experiment administrator.
The RPVM operates in much the same way as the traditional private good BDM with a 
couple of key differences (see Messer e t al. 2005 for a complete discussion). In the RPVM a 
majority of the bids determines whether the program is funded. Consequently, in the RPVM, 
treatments with group size of one are identical to the private good BDM as each subject’s bid 
constitutes a majority. The cost of the program was determined by using a random numbers 
table with values from 0 to 2500 where the number represented the cost in pennies. For example, 
if the random number was a 1529, then the determined cost would have been $15.29.
91
Consequently, the cost was uniformly distributed between $0 and $25 with discrete intervals of 
$0.01.
Following the procedures developed by Doyle (1997) to help participants understand risk, 
the probabilistic loss was determined by having volunteer subjects draw ten chips, with 
replacement, from a bag containing a known number of red and white chips. Each red chip 
drawn meant that the subject lost a predetermined amount of money; the amount of probabilistic 
loss for each red chip drawn depended upon the experiment design as described below. After the 
random cost and loss were determined, subjects retrieved this information and their spreadsheets 
calculated the profit.
All sessions consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of ten low-incentive private 
RPVM rounds where the subjects received feedback as the cost and loss were determined at the 
end of each round, thus giving subjects an opportunity to become familiar with the computer 
interface and to experience the incentive compatible characteristics. The second part consisted 
of high-incentive private and public RPVM treatments where the one treatment that resulted in 
cash payment was determined at the end of the experiment. Thus, subjects did not receive any 
feedback in the RPVM treatments until the very end of the experiment, thereby ensuring 
independence of bids and preventing potential deterioration of other regarding behavior as 
traditionally observed in public good settings with multiple rounds (Davis and Holt 1993). The 
exchange rate for the second part of the experiment was set at forty times greater than the 
exchange rate for the first part of the experiment and subjects received an average payoff of $22 
for the one and one-half hour experiment.
The experiment is designed to test the hypotheses developed in the second section above 
by structuring groups of voters who face identical risks (homogeneous treatments) in expected
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value of loss of $2 for one group of three voters, $5 for another group of voters and $8 for the 
third group of three voters (Table 2). In the case of different risks (heterogeneous treatments) the 
groups of three voters were made up of one individual with each expected value of loss of $2, $5, 
and $8 so there was a low, medium and high-risk voter in each group. To further explore voting 
behavior three different designs were used. The "Probability Variation” treatments varied the 
probability (0.2, 0.5, 0.8) with a fixed loss of $10. The “Loss Variation” treatments varied the 
losses ($5, $12.50, $20) with a fixed probability of 0.4. The former approach is analogous to 
eliciting WTP for changes in the probability of an outcome. The latter approach varies the 
conditional loss. Finally, the “Baseline/Calibration” treatments had an initial balance of $10 and 
the losses of $2, $5, and $8 occurred with certainty.
4. Results
In the private good treatments, a risk neutral individual’s optimal strategy is to submit a 
bid equal to the expected value of their induced loss.2 In the baseline/calibration experiments 
which had the losses occur with certainty, subjects’ average bids were statistically 
indistinguishable from the induced loss ($2.10, $5.09, and $8.11, respectively; paired t-test) 
(Table 3). Such results are consistent with previous BDM research (Irwin et al., 1998), that in 
private induced value WTP experiments the BDM mechanism is demand revealing. However, in 
the designs where the loss is probabilistic and where the potential exists for experiencing a 
higher than expected loss, a subject exhibiting some form of risk aversion might submit bids 
higher than the expected loss. As seen in Table 3, subjects consistently submitted bids that were 
higher than expected loss in both the Loss Variation ($2.12, $5.45 and $8.53) and Probability 
Variation ($2.31, $5.57 and $8.78) designs. However, the mean bids were only statistically
2 Due to the discrete costs, another optimal strategy for a risk neutral person is to submit a bid which is one penny 
less than the expected value of the induced value.
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different from the expected loss for the higher expected loss treatments of $5.00 and $8.00, 
thereby suggesting that subjects showed behavior that could be interpreted as risk aversion. 
However, the relatively small magnitude of the possible loss rules out the possibility of 
measurable risk aversion from expected utility (Rabin 2000; Rabin and Thaler 2001;). Thus, 
these results support risk aversion in the small. However, another possible explanation for this 
over-bidding is bidding error, which would likely raise bids since the range of possible bids ($0 
to $25) was asymmetric around the expected losses. Note that the certainty baseline also shows 
overbidding in that bids lie above induced value. There may also be an income effect, as the 
endowment provided to subjects in the present paper was $2, and the endowment in the baseline 
study was $10.
The data are also consistent with the possibility of systematic error. As seen in Table 3, 
“trimming” the data by dropping all observations from individuals that were two standard 
deviations away from the mean in the private case, shows values that are consistent with 
expected value predictions. Similar to the pattern observed in the private treatments, subjects in 
the probabilistic public homogenous loss treatments submitted bids higher than then the expected 
loss (Table 3). Consistent with prior research on the RPVM (Messer e ta l. 2005), subjects’ bids 
in the public homogeneous loss treatments were not statistically different than the subjects’ bids 
in the private treatment consistent with the theoretical predictions of Table 1 for pure altruism, 
but not for paternalistic altruism. As with the private bids, the average bids in the homogeneous 
treatments also are statistically indistinguishable from the expected loss once the data is trimmed.
Inspection of Table 3 shows the effects of shifting from private goods to public 
homogeneous and heterogeneous voting settings are evident in the comparisons of the mean bids 
for each of the expected loss amounts. In general, as can be see in Figures 1 and 2, the WTP in
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the heterogeneous voting situation appears to shift upward for subjects with the lowest expected 
losses ($2). Such a shift would lend support for the predictions of pure altruism, that some of 
those who have the least to gain from the insurance policy are willing to incur net financial 
losses for the benefit of others in a coercive voting situation. For subjects with the highest 
induced expected losses ($8), and hence those that stand the most to gain from the insurance 
policy, in the heterogeneous voting situation, the WTP distribution shifts downward relative to 
the other treatments. Such a trend is also consistent with the Johannesson e ta l . conjecture of 
pure altruism. For the middle group ($5) in the heterogeneous voting situation, there is no 
consistent directional shift between treatments, again consistent with the predictions of Table 1 
for the case of pure altruism.
To compare the alternative hypotheses regarding the pure altruism measure Z, and the 
paternalistic altruism measure, X, as well as controlling for the potential impact of risk aversion 
or systematic error, a two-stage random effects mixed model was used. As described above, in 
the first stage, bids in the private treatments were estimated using a Taylor series expansion of 
(16) such that
18) CT = po + A y i + P p , s + A? A, s + P p , sLi, s + P ip , s + A  Ll  s + s i, s + p i .
The results show that the constant and expected loss, p*L , are the only statistically significant 
variables, suggesting that the observed overbidding may not due to systematic behavior except 
an upward shift in bids (Table 4). Furthermore, tests of the coefficientp * L  fail to reject that it is 
different than 1. If the insignificant terms are dropped from (18), so private bids are predicted by 
a constant and expected value, the constant (equal to 0.17) becomes insignificant but positive and
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the coefficient on expected value (equal to 1.04) is significant at the 1% level.3 The significant 
negative constant in Table 4 apparently offsets some of the positive net effect of the remaining 
insignificant variables. Thus it appears that a systematic upward bias exists in private values, 
which is not explainable by the probability of loss, or the loss itself. As noted in Section 2, under 
this special situation, the predictions of Table 1 should hold.
Using predicted c“axfrom (18), a second set of random effects mixed model regressions
was conducted, as shown in Table 5, to test the hypotheses outlined in Table 1. To test the 
potential relative importance of purely altruistic preferences versus paternalistic preferences, the 
last three columns in Table 5 pool all of the risk treatment data and includes both Z  and X to 
explain the difference between public and private bids. Pooling is supported by a likelihood ratio 
test statistic of 1.33, which lies far below the critical chi-square test statistic of 5.99. As 
predicted, in the public treatments with homogeneously distributed losses, we are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that the coefficient on Z  equals zero (Table 5). However, in the heterogeneous 
treatments with heterogeneously distributed losses, the coefficient on Z  is positive and significant 
at the 0.01 level as predicted. When all treatments are pooled in the last column, Z  remains 
highly significant and has the correct sign. In contrast, the coefficient on X  should be positive in 
both the homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments to be consistent with paternalistic altruism. 
The coefficient on X  is non-negative but not significantly different from zero in the all 
treatments. Thus, we do not find support for the hypotheses of paternalistic altruism but do find 
support for pure altruism.
Dropping Z  from the model yields the middle three columns of Table 5. In none of these 
models is X  significant. Dropping X  from the model yields the first three columns of Table 5.
3 This reduction can be justified given a likelihood ratio test which fails to reject that the two models are different at 
the 5% level.
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Again, Z  is not significant in the homogeneous treatment and significant in both the 
heterogeneous treatment and the pooled treatment. These observations of individual coefficient 
significance are supported statistically by likelihood ratio tests. The estimated coefficient on Z  of 
about 0.07 implies a value of a of 0.08, which supports the theoretical predictions of Table 1, 
where the worst off subjects ($8 expected loss) will lower their WTP, the best-off subjects ($2 
expected loss) will raise their WTP, and the middle subject ($5 expected loss) will not change 
their bid relative to their private WTP.
5. Conclusion
There has been a longstanding interest in welfare economics about the degree and type of 
altruism that individuals exhibit in public decision settings and how these effects should be 
accounted for in benefit cost analysis. Such concerns have also been prominent in the value of 
safety and rational voting behavior literatures. Despite these interests, there remains a lack of 
consensus over whether or not individuals account for the relative gains and losses of others in 
coercive voting situations involving risk.
In a departure from previous efforts in this field, this research used experimental 
economic techniques to investigate directly whether the distribution of expected payoffs affects 
individual decision-making in referenda. Consistent with the Johannesson e ta l . conjecture, we 
find that individuals with the most to gain from a risk reducing policy do tend to shade their 
voting decision downward. That is they express a maximum WTP in a heterogeneous public 
setting that is significantly lower than their WTP for an equal reduction in their private risk. 
Similarly, but in an alternative direction, our results suggest that those who derive the least 
benefit from a public insurance policy tend to indicate a higher WTP in a public voting setting 
than in a private decision-making setting. In a coercive tax setting this suggests that individuals
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are willing to incur costs upon themselves in the form of higher taxes so as to provide benefits or 
transferring income to others. Finally, little support can be found for paternalistic altruism with 
respect to mitigation of risk in this study. Thus, the results here support the type of social 
preferences for efficiency found in recent studies by Charness and Rabin (1998) and Englemann 
and Strobel (2004). These results obtained using induced values under certainty seem to extend 
to risky situations as well. However, these studies could not realistically examine the possibility 
of paternalistic altruism because of the use of induced values.
We recognize that the risks investigated here involve much higher probabilities and 
much smaller losses than health risk and safety decision that come before policy makers. 
Nonetheless, these results provide fodder for the continuing debate concerning altruism in 
welfare economics. Bergstrom (2004) has recently summarized the relevant theoretical literature 
specifically for risk as follows:
Bergstrom (1982) claimed that in general, when altruism takes a “purely altruistic” 
form, the appropriate way to measure benefits is to sum private valuations, 
excluding altruistic valuations. Bergstrom’s argument is based on the observation 
that with pure altruism, the marginal first-order optimality conditions are the same 
as those that apply if account is taken only of the private valuations. Jones-Lee 
(1991, 1992), who referred to Bergstrom’s result as “rather arresting,” offered a 
more thorough discussion. Jones-Lee showed that the same conclusion extends to 
an interesting case of paternalistic preferences, and showed that when concern for 
others is “safety-focussed” rather than purely altruistic, the appropriate benefit 
measures are intermediate between the private and social value. (p. 2)
To date, little additional evidence beyond that presented in Johannesson et al. has been
discovered to determine whether risks engender paternalistic or pure altruism. This paper
attempts to develop a methodology that can be utilized to distinguish between
paternalistic and pure altruism in the controlled environment of the experimental
economics laboratory and so contribute to this policy debate. This methodology can
potentially be applied to other commodities that involve or affect risk that might
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engender paternalistic preferences such as healthful as opposed to unhealthy snack foods, 
alcoholic versus non-alcoholic beverages, smoking aids such as gum containing nicotine 
versus cigarettes, condoms, etc. The goal would be to find convincing evidence of 
paternalistic preferences.
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Figure 1a. Loss Variation
Figure 1b. Loss Variation (Trimmed Data)
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Figure 2a. Probability Variation
Figure 2b. Probability Variation (Trimmed)
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Table 1: Predictions of Public - Private Values
Treatment
\
Preferences
Homogeneous Risk Heterogeneous Risk
L oss
V ariation
P ro b a b ility
V ariation
L oss
V ariation
P ro b a b ility
V ariation
$2 $5 $8 $2 $5 $8 $2 $5 $8 $2 $5 $8
Selfish 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Purely
Altruistic
Preferences
0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 - + 0 -
Paternalistic
Preferences + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Table 2. Experimental Designs
Probability 
of Loss
Loss
Amount
Expected Losses 
(out of 10 draws)
Expected
Loss
Loss Variation 0.4 $5.00 4 $2
0.4 $12.50 4 $5
0.4 $20.00 4 $8
Probability Variation 0.2 $10 2 $2
0.5 $10 5 $5
0.8 $10 8 $8
Baseline/Calibration 1.0 $2 -NA- $2
1.0 $5 -NA- $5
1.0 $8 -NA- $8
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Table 3. Mean Bids for Each Treatment
Group Size = 1 
Private
Group Size = 3
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Loss Variation (n=102)
Expected Loss: $2 $2.12 $2.10 $2.90
Expected Loss: $5 $5.45 $5.52 $5.42
Expected Loss: $8 $8.53 $8.50 $8.11
O u tliers rem o ve d  (n=93)
Expected Loss: $2 $1.99 $1.85 $2.55
Expected Loss: $5 $5.20 $5.23 $5.16
Expected Loss: $8 $8.11 $8.14 $7.80
Probability Variation (n=87) 
Expected Loss: $2 $2.31 $2.62 $3.91
Expected Loss: $5 $5.57 $5.75 $6.03
Expected Loss: $8 $8.78 $9.09 $8.10
O u tliers rem o ve d  (n=73) 
Expected Loss: $2 $1.95 $2.12 $3.14
Expected Loss: $5 $5.06 $5.12 $5.37
Expected Loss: $8 $7.95 $8.27 $7.51
Baseline/Calibration (n = 93)
Expected Loss: $2 $2.10
Expected Loss: $5 $5.09 -- --
Expected Loss: $8 $8.11 -- --
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Table 4. Random Effects Model for Taylor Series Expansion for Private Bid
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
C onstan t -1.2970 0.1739
(0.9990) (0.1441)
B aseline -1.0605
(0.5494)
P 2.5334
(2.4565)
L 0.1718
(0.1139)
p * L 0.8160** 1.0350**
(0.1029) (0.0218)
P2 0.1083
(2.0655)
L 2 -0.0029
(0.0031)
Sigma_u 1.2953 1.3023
(0.0825) (0.0830)
Sigma_e 1.5457 1.5547
(0.0460) (0.0463)
N 846 846
Log Likelihood -1728.69 -1733.51
LR Chi2 = 936.0 926.4
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* < 0.05 significance, ** < 0.01 significance
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Table 5. Random Effects Model Results for Public -  Private Bids in Public Treatments.
Homo. Hetero. Pooled Homo Hetero. Pooled Homo. Hetero. Pooled
Constant 0.1256
(0.0907)
0.2689**
(0.0967)
0.1973*
(0.0806)
0.1256
(0.1744)
-0.1891
(0.8797)
0.1110
(0.1935)
0.1257
(0.1741)
-0.1174
(0.8172)
0.1152
(0.1896)
Z -0.0408
(0.0263)
0.0733**
(0.0113)
0.0660**
(0.0095)
-0.0408
(0.0263)
0.0733**
(0.0113)
0.0660**
(0.0095)
X 0.0000
(0.0149)
0.0382
(0.0703)
0.0078
(0.0161)
0.0000
(0.0149)
0.0322
(0.0676)
0.0075
(0.0156)
Sigma_u 0.7436
(0.1183)
0.1948
(0.5694)
0.7629
(0.0853)
0.7392
(0.0149)
0.0000
(0.3545)
0.7091
(0.0887)
0.7436
(0.1183)
0.1972
(0.5624)
0.7630
(0.0853)
Sigma_e 1.7332
(0.0631)
2.2775
(0.0829)
1.9668
(0.0453)
1.7387
(0.0632)
2.3681
(0.0703)
2.0228
(0.0465)
1.7332
(0.0631)
2.2769
(0.0829)
1.9665
(0.0453)
N 567 567 1134 567 567 1134 567 567 1134
Log Likelihood -1157.9 -1273.3 -2436.9 -1159.1 -1293.3 -2460.2 -1157.9 -1273.2 -2436.8
LR Chi2 2.41 40.42 46.76 0.00 0.29 0.24 2.41 40.64 46.99
Prob > Chi2 0.120 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.587 0.625 0.299 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses
* < 0.05 significance, ** < 0.01 significance
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Appendix A: Sample Instructions
Probability Variation 
Instructions (Part A)
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the experiment, you 
will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this experiment is yours to 
keep. Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate with other participants 
during the experiment.
You will receive a starting balance of $25. At the front of the room are three bags full of one 
hundred (100) poker chips. The red bag has 20 red chips and 80 white chips. The green bag has 
40 red chips and 60 white chips. The blue bag has 80 red chips and 20 white chips. In each 
round, you will be informed of which bag will be used and ten chips are going to be drawn 
randomly, and replaced, from this bag by subjects in the experiment. For every white chip 
drawn, you will have to pay nothing. For every red chip drawn, you will have you pay your 
personal loss amount of $1.00. For example, if 4 of the 10 chips drawn are red, then you would 
have to pay $4 ($1.00 x 4) from your starting balance of $25.
Rather than taking the chance of losing of your personal loss amount for each red chip drawn, 
you have the option of purchasing an insurance program that will remain in effect for the 
duration of the round of ten chip draws. With an insurance program, you will not owe the 
personal loss amount in the event that red chips are drawn. But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your starting balance, for the insurance program before any chips are drawn 
that round.
The amount that you indicate as the highest amount that you would pay for the insurance 
program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine whether or not 
the insurance program is funded. Since you are the only voter, your vote will determine whether 
the insurance program is funded or not.
You will decide the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for this insurance program; 
we will call this your bid. You submit your bid, by typing it into spreadsheet, pressing the 
“Enter” key, and then clicking on the “Submit” button. For each insurance program, you can bid 
any amount between $0 and your initial balance of $25. Once the administrators receive 
everyone’s bid, the cost of the insurance program will be determined.
Your bid will be compared to the cost of the insurance program, as described below. The cost of 
the insurance program will be determined by reading off a random number table which has 
numbers from 0 to 2500. The cost will be determined by dropping a pen onto the random 
number table. (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest to the upper-left 
corner will be used.) In subsequent programs, the cost will be determined starting from the 
initial cost and reading from left to right. The number will represent the cost in pennies. For 
example, the number 790 would represent the cost of $7.90. Note: since these numbers have 
been generated by a random number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.
Whether or not the insurance program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and the cost 
of the program. Note that you will be informed which bag will be used in the round and then 
you submit your bid p r io r  to knowing the cost of the insurance program. It is therefore 
important that you consider all of the information given to you about the different insurance 
programs and that you make judicious decisions.
Remember, you have the option of purchasing the insurance program at the beginning of each 
round and the insurance program will remain in effect or not be in effect for the duration of the 
round of ten chip draws. There are two possible outcomes for each round:
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if your
bid is le ss  th an  the determined cost. For each red chip drawn (on average 20%, 40% or 80% of 
the time depending upon which bag is used) of the 10, you will pay your personal loss amount 
from your starting balance.
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if your bid is eq u a l 
to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the determined cost. In this case, you are protected from the loss regardless 
of the color of the chips pulled from the bag. Your cash earnings for the round would be your 
initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program. With your bid, 
you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program. Therefore, 
your bid is like a vote in favor of the insurance program if your bid turns out to be equal to or 
greater than the cost. On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if your bid 
turns out to be less than the cost.
While your bid helps determine whether the insurance program is funded or not, your earnings 
for a particular program are based on four items: your initial balance, your personal loss amount, 
the number of red chips drawn, and the determined cost of the insurance program. Consider the 
case where the insurance program is n o t fu n ded , 2 red chips are drawn (therefore, 8 white chips 
are drawn) and the determined cost is $5. In this case, your earnings would be $23 [$25 -  (2 x 
$1)]. However, if the insurance program was fu n ded , your earnings would be same regardless of 
the number of red chips pulled from the bag. In this case your balance would be $20 ($25 - $5). 
Consider another case where the insurance program is n o t fu n ded , 6 red chips are drawn 
(therefore, 4 white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5. In this case, your earnings 
would be $19 [$25 -  (6 x $1)]. However, if the insurance program was fu n d ed , your balance 
would be $20 ($25 - $5). Note that regardless of whether the program is funded or not we will 
still conduct the drawing of the ten chips.
Calculation of Your Earnings
Recall that you initially entered your bid into the computer spreadsheet. Once the cost of the 
insurance program and the number of red chips are determined, the administrator will advise you 
to click the “Update” button. The computer will automatically indicate whether or not the 
program was funded, and your earnings will be calculated. Your earnings will be listed in 
experimental dollars and the exchange ratio for this part of the experiment will be 60 
experimental dollars for 1 US dollar. For example, if you earn 30 experimental dollars your
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payoff would be $0.50 US. At the end of the experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to 
ensure accuracy.
Instructions (Part B)
For the second part of this experiment, you will now be asked to decide how much you would 
pay for separate insurance programs. The procedures are similar to those used in the first part of 
the experiment, except for four important differences.
1) For each of the insurance programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment). However, you may also be part of a group of three people whose votes will 
decide whether or not to purchase the insurance program. For programs where the group size 
is three, which bag will be used for the other voters in your group will be shown to you prior 
to determining your bid.
2) Whether the insurance program is funded or not will be determined by whether the majority 
of bids are greater than or less than the determined cost. If the majority of bids is greater 
than or equal to the cost, everyone will have to purchase the insurance program at the 
determined cost. If the majority of bids is lower than the randomly drawn cost, no one will 
purchase the insurance program.
3) Only one of the nine insurance programs will actually be selected and result in cash earnings. 
Therefore, all bids will be made prior to determination of the cost of the program or the 
drawing of the chips. After the bids are submitted, we will randomly determine which of the 
insurance programs will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing nine chips 
lettered A through I. Each letter corresponds to one of the nine programs.
4) The exchange rate has changed. You will now earn two US dollars for every three 
experimental dollars earned. Thus, if you earn 15 experimental dollars, your payoff would 
be $10 US.
For each insurance program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
You will be given a starting balance of $25 and told how much money you and the other 
members of your group could lose. Once again, the personal loss amount per each red chip 
drawn is $1.
Whether or not you lose your personal loss amount depends on the ten chips drawn. At the front 
of the room are three bags full of one hundred (100) poker chips. The red bag has 20 red chips 
and 80 white chips. The green bag has 40 red chips and 60 white chips. The blue bag has 80 red 
chips and 20 white chips. One or more bags will be selected and ten chips are going to be drawn 
randomly, and replaced, from this bag by subjects in the experiment. For every white chip 
drawn, you will have to pay nothing. For every red chip drawn you will have you pay your 
personal loss amount of $1 unless your group has purchased an insurance program.
For each program, you will be informed which bag will be used for you and for the other 
members of your group and you will be asked to decide upon your bid and enter that amount into 
the second spreadsheet on the computer. Consider all of the information for the insurance
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program before submitting your bid. For each insurance program, you can bid any amount 
between $0 and your initial balance of $25.
Once everyone has submitted his/her bid for one program, the administrators will show you the 
information for the next program. After the bids for all the insurance programs have been 
entered, we will determine which of the programs will be selected and produce cash earnings.
Next, we will determine the cost of the selected insurance program and whether it will be funded 
by your group. The cost of the insurance program will be determined in exactly the same 
manner as before, except that a new random number table with values from 0 to 2,500 will be 
used. This cost will now be the cost that each person in your group will have to pay if the 
insurance program is funded. Recall that since these numbers have been generated by a random 
number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.
Once again, there are two possible outcomes in the round:
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if a 
majority of bids from your group are le ss  th an  the determined cost. For each red chip drawn 
(on average 20%, 40% or 80% of the time depending upon which bag is selected) of the 10, you 
and everyone else in your group will pay their personal loss amount from the starting balance.
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if a majority of bids 
from your group are e q u a l to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the determined cost. In this case, you and 
everyone else in your group are protected from the loss regardless of the color of the chips pulled 
from the bag. For you and everyone else in your group, your cash earnings for the round would 
be your initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program. Note that each person in 
your group will pay the same cost even if the personal loss amounts in your group differed.
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the insurance programs you 
experienced in the first part of the experiment. Therefore, the insurance program is not funded if 
your bid is le ss  than the cost determined from the random number table, and program is funded if 
your bid is eq u a l to  o r  g rea te r  than the determined cost.
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program. With 
your bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the insurance 
program. Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if your bid turns out to be 
equal to or greater than the cost. On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if 
it turns out to be less than the cost. When a majority of bids are equal to or greater than the 
determined cost, this translates into a majority vote in favor of the insurance program. Similarly, 
a majority of bids below the cost translates into a majority vote against the program at that cost.
Calculation of Final Earnings
To calculate your earnings from Part B, the administrator will inform you which “Update” button 
to click. The computer will then calculate your earnings for Part B and add them to your 
earnings from Part A. We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy.
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Instructions (Part A)
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the experiment, you 
will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this experiment is yours to 
keep. Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate with other participants 
during the experiment.
You will receive a starting balance of $25. At the front of the room is a bag full of one hundred 
(100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones. In each round, ten chips are going to be drawn 
randomly, and replaced, from the bag by subjects in the experiment For every white chip 
drawn, you will have to pay nothing. For every red chip drawn you will have you pay your 
personal loss amount. Your personal loss amount will vary during the course of the 
experiment. The possible personal loss amounts are -$0.50, -$1.25, and -$2.00. For example, if 
your personal loss amount is -$1.25, and 4 of the 10 chips drawn are red, then you would have to 
pay $5 ($1.25 x 4) from your starting balance of $25.
Rather than taking the chance of losing of your personal loss amount for each red chip drawn, 
you have the option of purchasing an insurance program that will remain in effect for the 
duration of the round of ten chip draws. With an insurance program, you will not owe the 
personal loss amount in the event that red chips are drawn. But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your starting balance, for the insurance program before any chips are drawn 
that round.
The amount that you indicate as the highest amount that you would pay for the insurance 
program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine whether or not 
the insurance program is funded. Since you are the only voter, your vote will determine whether 
the insurance program is funded or not.
You will decide the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for this insurance program; 
we will call this your bid. You submit your bid, by typing it into spreadsheet, pressing the 
“Enter” key, and then clicking on the “Submit” button. For each insurance program, you can bid 
any amount between $0 and your initial balance of $25. Once the administrators receive 
everyone’s bid, the cost of the insurance program will be determined.
The cost of the insurance program will be determined by reading off a random number table 
which has numbers from 0 to 2500. The cost will be determined by dropping a pen onto the 
random number table. (If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest to the 
upper-left corner will be used.) In subsequent programs, the cost will be determined starting 
from the initial cost and reading from left to right. The number will represent the cost in pennies. 
For example, the number 790 would represent the cost of $7.90. Note: since these numbers have 
been generated by a random number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.
Whether or not the insurance program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and the cost 
of the program. Note that you submit your bid p r io r  to knowing the price of the insurance 
program. It is therefore important that you consider all of the information given to you about the 
different insurance programs and that you make judicious decisions.
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Remember, you have the option of purchasing the insurance program at the beginning of each 
round and the insurance program will remain in effect or not be in effect for the duration of the 
round of ten chip draws. There are two possible outcomes for each round:
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if your
bid is le ss  th an  the determined cost. For each red chip drawn (on average 40% of the time) of 
the 10, you will pay your personal loss amount from your starting balance.
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if your bid is eq u a l 
to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the determined cost. In this case, you are protected from the loss regardless 
of the color of the chips pulled from the bag. Your cash earnings for the round would be your 
initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program.
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program. With your bid, 
you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program. Therefore, 
your bid is like a vote in favor of the insurance program if your bid turns out to be equal to or 
greater than the cost. On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if your bid 
turns out to be less than the cost.
While your bid helps determine whether the insurance program is funded or not, your earnings 
for a particular program are based on four items: your initial balance, your personal loss amount, 
the number of red chips drawn, and the determined cost of the insurance program. Consider the 
case where the insurance program is n o t fu n ded , your personal loss amount is -$1.25, 2 red chips 
are drawn (therefore, 8 white chips are drawn) and the determined cost is $5. In this case, your 
earnings would be $22.50 [$25 -  (2 x $1.25)]. However, if the insurance program was fu n ded , 
your earnings would be same regardless of the number of red chips pulled from the bag. In this 
case your balance would be $20 ($25 - $5). Consider another case where the insurance program 
is n o t fu n ded , your personal loss amount is $1.25, 6 red chips are drawn (therefore, 4 white chips 
are drawn) and the determined cost is $5. In this case, your earnings would be $17.50 [$25 -  (6 
x $1.25)]. However, if the insurance program was fu n ded , your balance would be $20 ($25 - $5).
Note that regardless of whether the program is funded or not we will still conduct the drawing of 
the ten chips.
Calculation of Your Earnings
Recall that you initially entered your bid into the computer spreadsheet. Once the cost of the 
insurance program and the number of red chips are determined, the administrator will advise you 
to click the “Update” button. The computer will automatically indicate whether or not the 
program was funded, and your earnings will be calculated. Your earnings will be listed in 
experimental dollars and the exchange ratio for this part of the experiment will be 60 
experimental dollars for 1 US dollar. For example, if you earn 30 experimental dollars your 
payoff would be $0.50 US. At the end of the experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to 
ensure accuracy.
I t is  im portan t that y o u  c lea rly  u n derstan d  these instructions.
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P lea se  ra ise  y o u r  h a n d  i f  y o u  h ave an y questions. 
P lea se  d o  n o t ta lk  w ith  o th er p a r tic ip a n ts  in the experim ent.
Loss Variation Instructions: (Note the instructions refer to 15 subjects. Data for these large 
group settings were collected and are provided for completeness in Appendix B, but are not used 
in this paper).
Instructions (Part B)
For the second part of this experiment, you will now be asked to decide how much you would 
pay for separate insurance programs. The procedures are similar to those used in the first part of 
the experiment, except for four important differences.
1) For each of the insurance programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the 
experiment). However, you may also be part of a group of 3 or 15 people whose votes will 
decide whether or not to purchase the insurance program. For programs where the group size 
is 3 or 15, the personal loss amounts of the other voters in your group will be shown to you 
prior to determining your bid.
2) Whether the insurance program is funded or not will be determined by whether the majority 
of bids are greater than or less than the determined cost. If the majority of bids is greater 
than or equal to the cost, everyone will have to purchase the insurance program at the 
determined cost. If the majority of bids is lower than the randomly drawn cost, no one will 
purchase the insurance program.
3) Only one of the 15 insurance programs will actually be selected and result in cash earnings. 
Therefore, all bids will be made prior to determination of the cost of the program or the 
drawing of the chips. After the bids are submitted, we will randomly determine which of the 
insurance programs will generate cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing 15 chips 
lettered A through O. Each letter corresponds to one of the 15 programs.
4) The exchange rate has changed. You will now earn two US dollars for every three 
experimental dollars earned. Thus, if you earn 15 experimental dollars, your payoff would 
be $10 US.
For each insurance program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
You will be given a starting balance of $25 and told how much money you and the other 
members of your group could lose. Once again, the personal loss amounts per each red chip 
drawn are -$0.50, -$1.25, and -$2, and will vary from program to program.
Whether or not you lose your personal loss amount depends on the ten chips drawn. At the front 
of the room, there is a bag full of one hundred (100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones. 
Ten chips are going to be drawn randomly, and replaced, from the bag in the experiment. For 
every white chip drawn, you will have to pay nothing. For every red chip drawn you will have 
you pay your personal loss amount unless your group has purchased an insurance program.
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For each program, you will be asked to decide upon your bid and enter that amount into the 
second spreadsheet on the computer. Consider all of the information for the insurance program 
before submitting your bid. For each insurance program, you can bid any amount between $0 
and your initial balance of $25.
Once everyone has submitted his/her bid for one program, the administrators will show you the 
information for the next program. After the bids for all the insurance programs have been 
entered, we will determine which of the programs will be selected and produce cash earnings.
Next, we will determine the cost of the selected insurance program and whether it will be funded 
by your group. The cost of the insurance program will be determined in exactly the same 
manner as before, except that a new random number table with values from 0 to 2,500 will be 
used. This cost will now be the cost that each person in your group will have to pay if the 
insurance program is funded. Recall that since these numbers have been generated by a random 
number table each cost between $0 and $25 is equally likely.
Once again, there are two possible outcomes in the round:
The insurance program is NOT FUNDED: The insurance program is not funded if a 
majority of bids from your group are le ss  th an  the determined cost. For each red chip drawn 
(on average 40% of the time) of the 10, you and everyone else in your group will pay their 
personal loss amount from the starting balance.
The insurance program is FUNDED: The insurance program is funded if a majority of bids 
from your group are e q u a l to  o r  g re a te r  th an  the determined cost. In this case, you and 
everyone else in your group are protected from the loss regardless of the color of the chips pulled 
from the bag. For you and everyone else in your group, your cash earnings for the round would 
be your initial balance ($25) minus the cost of the insurance program. Note that each person in 
your group will pay the same cost even if the personal loss amounts in your group differed.
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the insurance programs you 
experienced in the first part of the experiment. Therefore, the insurance program is not funded if 
your bid is le ss  than the cost determined from the random number table, and program is funded if 
your bid is eq u a l to  o r  g rea te r  than the determined cost.
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the insurance program. With 
your bid, you are deciding the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the insurance 
program. Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if your bid turns out to be 
equal to or greater than the cost. On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the program if 
it turns out to be less than the cost. When a majority of bids are equal to or greater than the 
determined cost, this translates into a majority vote in favor of the insurance program. Similarly, 
a majority of bids below the cost translates into a majority vote against the program at that cost.
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Calculation of Final Earnings
To calculate your earnings from Part B, the administrator will inform you which “Update” button 
to click. The computer will then calculate your earnings for Part B and add them to your 
earnings from Part A. We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy.
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Appendix B: Data
Probability Loss Data:
Private Homo Hetero Private Homo Hetero - Private - Homo Hetero
sub# exp# within# -$2 -$2 -$2 -$5 -$5 $5 $8 -$8 -$8
1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 4.50 4.80 7.80 7.80 7.50
2 1 2 3.00 3.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 9.00
3 1 3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
4 1 4 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 17.00 18.00
5 1 5 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
6 1 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 1 7 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 7.00 6.00
8 1 8 1.75 1.75 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 7.50 7.75 4.25
9 1 9 10.00 4.00 9.00 7.00 7.50 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
10 1 10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 1 11 3.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.50 8.50
12 1 12 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
13 1 13 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.50
14 1 14 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 4.00
15 1 15 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
16 1 16 2.50 3.00 3.00 5.25 5.75 5.50 7.50 8.25 8.25
17 1 17 2.00 2.00 8.00 13.00 14.50 12.00 18.00 19.00 17.00
18 1 18 0.15 0.15 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
19 2 1 3.00 3.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 9.00
20 2 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
21 2 3 4.00 4.00 18.00 14.00 18.00 14.00 18.00 20.00 17.50
22 2 4 1.50 1.45 2.00 4.00 4.15 4.78 7.00 6.75 5.00
23 2 5 1.00 0.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 5.00
24 2 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
25 3 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
26 3 2 2.00 2.50 3.00 8.00 5.00 6.00 10.00 11.00 11.00
27 3 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
28 3 5 1.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 4.00
29 3 6 0.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 6.00
30 3 7 3.00 3.50 3.50 5.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
31 3 8 2.86 2.25 3.00 5.69 5.19 5.25 1.00 8.95 8.07
32 3 9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
33 3 10 0.00 0.00 10.00 5.50 5.50 7.00 9.00 8.50 6.00
34 3 11 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
35 3 12 3.29 23.00 12.25 6.99 8.83 14.79 18.53 19.99 5.83
36 3 13 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
37 3 14 3.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 6.00 5.00 9.00 8.00 8.00
38 3 15 2.05 2.00 1.87 5.00 6.00 5.04 8.50 7.50 9.00
39 3 16 4.00 8.00 10.00 7.00 10.00 12.00 15.50 15.50 14.00
40 3 17 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 7.00 10.00
41 3 18 1.75 1.50 3.25 4.50 4.00 5.00 8.00 8.50 6.50
42 3 19 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.65 5.65 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
43 3 20 3.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
44 3 21 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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45 4 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
46 4 3 8.00 8.00 14.00 12.00 12.00 10.00 15.00 15.00 13.00
47 4 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
48 4 5 7.17 6.07 8.45 12.35 11.14 12.75 20.21 17.35 14.92
49 4 6 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 5.00
50 4 7 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 2.00
51 4 8 1.50 1.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 7.50 7.50 4.50
52 4 9 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.50 5.00 4.00 6.50 6.00 6.00
53 4 10 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 9.00 9.00 8.00
54 4 11 3.00 7.00 15.00 6.50 15.00 7.50 9.00 23.00 10.00
55 4 12 2.00 3.50 2.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 0.00 8.00
56 4 13 2.00 2.02 4.42 4.33 4.35 4.40 7.69 7.70 4.41
57 4 14 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
58 4 15 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
59 4 16 4.00 4.00 5.00 6.36 6.75 6.50 8.75 9.00 8.75
60 4 17 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 5.00
61 4 18 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
62 5 1 1.99 1.99 1.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 7.99 7.99 10.00
63 5 2 1.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 7.75 7.75 7.75
64 5 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 8.00
65 5 4 2.00 2.00 13.00 7.00 10.00 12.00 15.00 12.00 11.00
66 5 5 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
67 5 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
68 5 7 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 5.00
69 5 8 1.00 0.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00
70 6 1 2.50 2.50 2.05 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 6.00
71 6 2 2.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 8.00
72 6 3 6.00 4.00 4.00 10.00 9.00 11.00 15.00 17.00 13.00
73 6 4 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 9.00
74 6 5 1.50 1.50 1.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.50 7.50 7.50
75 6 6 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 7.00
76 6 7 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 5.00
77 6 8 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 8.00
78 6 9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
79 6 10 2.00 2.00 4.75 4.25 4.25 4.75 7.25 7.50 5.00
80 6 11 2.00 3.75 12.89 6.17 7.89 16.85 11.00 13.86 12.15
81 6 12 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.90 5.00 4.90 8.00 8.00 7.00
82 7 1 2.00 1.50 2.00 7.00 5.50 6.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
83 7 2 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 8.50 8.00 8.00
84 7 3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
85 7 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
86 7 5 4.00 6.00 5.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 9.00 10.00 11.00
87 7 6 2.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 12.00 15.00 13.00
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Loss Variation Data - Private and Public N=3:
Obs Exp
Sub#
within Private Homo Hetero Private Homo Hetero Private Homo Hetero
# Session Session $-2 $-2 $-2 $-5 $-5 $-5 $-8 $-8 $-8
1 1 1 2.00 1.50 1.00 5.00 4.00 2.50 8.00 6.00 5.00
2 1 2 1.50 1.50 1.50 3.75 3.75 3.75 8.00 8.00 8.00
3 1 3 2.00 2.00 1.00 6.25 6.25 6.25 8.00 8.00 10.00
4 1 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
5 1 5 2.50 2.50 2.50 6.25 6.25 6.25 10.00 10.00 10.00
6 1 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 0.00
7 1 7 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 12.00
8 1 8 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
9 1 9 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 6.00 9.00 20.00
10 1 10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
11 1 11 3.00 3.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 7.00
12 1 12 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.00
13 1 13 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
14 1 14 3.24 2.25 3.03 8.73 8.96 7.45 10.04 12.58 9.94
15 1 15 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
16 2 1 5.00 5.50 5.00 10.00 6.50 5.95 15.00 20.00 4.00
17 2 2 1.50 1.50 1.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
18 2 3 2.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 3.50 3.75 6.00 5.50 6.00
19 2 4 1.75 1.75 1.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 7.25 7.25 7.25
20 2 5 1.50 1.50 1.50 5.05 5.00 5.05 6.98 6.98 6.98
21 2 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
22 2 7 2.50 2.50 2.00 6.75 7.00 6.60 11.20 11.50 12.00
23 2 8 1.90 1.90 1.90 4.75 4.75 4.75 7.50 7.50 7.50
24 2 9 2.00 3.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 14.00 14.00 15.00
25 2 10 0.30 0.25 0.30 5.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
26 2 11 3.00 2.00 3.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 10.00 10.00 11.00
27 2 12 1.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
28 2 13 2.50 2.50 2.50 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00
29 2 14 2.50 2.25 2.50 6.25 6.25 4.25 15.00 17.00 18.00
30 2 15 1.75 1.75 1.75 6.25 5.50 5.50 7.50 7.50 7.50
31 3 1 2.72 2.50 2.73 7.50 7.26 7.50 16.00 16.22 15.00
32 3 2 0.10 2.85 8.25 17.74 13.92 23.25 20.00 1.50 12.50
33 3 3 2.50 2.50 2.50 6.25 6.25 6.25 10.00 10.00 10.00
34 3 5 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 8.00
35 3 6 2.40 2.10 2.00 5.10 5.00 5.10 7.65 7.60 7.60
36 3 7 2.00 2.00 2.50 7.00 7.75 6.50 9.50 10.00 10.00
37 3 8 1.50 1.25 1.50 5.75 6.25 6.25 8.50 8.50 8.25
38 3 9 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.75 5.00 5.00 12.00 11.00 10.75
39 3 10 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 11.00 10.00 10.00
40 3 11 2.76 2.58 2.27 7.27 6.50 9.64 11.56 9.81 11.27
41 3 12 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
42 3 13 2.50 2.00 2.50 5.00 4.50 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00
43 3 14 2.87 2.96 2.89 7.98 7.86 7.75 11.06 10.50 10.67
44 3 15 1.50 0.50 3.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 15.00 21.00 17.00
45 4 1 2.50 2.50 2.50 6.25 10.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00
121
46 4 2 5.00 3.50 3.00 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
47 4 3 2.00 1.50 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 8.00
48 4 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 8.00
49 4 5 1.50 1.50 1.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 6.00 6.00 8.00
50 4 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 6.00 6.00 6.00
51 4 7 1.50 1.50 1.50 7.50 8.50 7.50 13.00 15.00 13.00
52 4 8 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 12.00
53 4 9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
54 4 10 1.50 1.00 0.01 3.76 4.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 7.25
55 4 11 2.50 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 7.00
56 4 12 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
57 4 13 1.21 1.67 1.50 4.00 4.13 4.00 7.00 7.00 7.50
58 4 14 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
59 4 15 3.00 0.75 0.25 5.75 1.25 0.75 7.75 2.25 1.25
60 5 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
61 5 2 3.00 2.50 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 9.50 9.50 9.00
62 5 3 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 12.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 12.00
63 5 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
64 5 5 2.00 0.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
65 5 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
66 5 7 2.00 1.50 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 6.00
67 5 8 2.00 2.00 1.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
68 5 9 1.90 1.90 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.75 7.50 7.80 7.50
69 5 10 1.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 10.00 12.50 14.00 15.00 15.00
70 5 11 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
71 5 13 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 2.00 8.00
72 5 14 2.00 1.50 5.00 5.00 3.25 6.00 9.00 8.00 4.00
73 5 15 2.50 2.00 2.50 6.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
74 6 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
75 6 2 2.00 2.00 2.50 5.60 5.60 5.60 8.00 8.00 8.60
76 6 3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
77 6 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 8.00
78 6 5 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
79 6 7 2.50 3.00 2.50 4.50 10.00 5.00 9.00 12.00 9.00
80 6 8 10.00 20.00 10.00 5.00 10.00 5.00 10.00 2.00 10.00
81 6 9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
82 6 10 1.00 0.50 1.00 2.00 1.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
83 6 11 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 10.00 8.00 4.00
84 6 12 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 7.75 7.75 7.75
85 6 13 1.50 1.50 1.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 7.50 7.00 7.00
86 6 14 3.00 3.50 3.00 6.25 6.25 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
87 6 15 1.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
88 7 1 1.75 1.90 1.70 4.44 4.75 4.30 7.75 7.50 7.00
89 7 2 1.75 1.75 2.00 3.75 6.75 5.00 7.00 7.00 8.00
90 7 3 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
91 7 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
92 7 5 3.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
93 7 6 1.75 1.75 1.75 3.50 3.75 3.50 7.50 7.50 7.50
94 7 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 3.50 8.00 10.00 8.00
95 7 8 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
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96 7 9 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
97 7 10 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
98 7 11 1.95 2.00 2.00 4.95 3.00 3.50 8.00 8.00 8.00
99 7 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
100 7 13 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
101 7 14 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
102 7 15 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Loss Variation Data - n=15:
Sub#
Obs Exp within
# Session Session Homo15 $-5 Hetero15 $-5 Homo15 $-8 Hetero15 $-8
1 1 1 2.50 2.50 10.00 10.00
2 1 2 3.75 3.75 8.00 8.00
3 1 3 7.00 8.00 5.00 8.00
4 1 4 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00
5 1 5 6.25 6.25 10.00 10.00
6 1 6 5.00 0.00 8.00 10.00
7 1 7 8.00 8.00 12.00 8.00
8 1 8 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
9 1 9 7.00 10.00 8.00 8.00
10 1 10 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
11 1 11 4.00 5.00 8.00 5.00
12 1 12 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
13 1 13 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
14 1 14 8.66 8.63 8.38 10.01
15 1 15 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
16 2 1 7.00 9.00 4.00 4.00
17 2 2 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00
18 2 3 4.50 4.00 4.00 4.50
19 2 4 4.50 4.50 4.50 7.25
20 2 5 5.05 5.05 6.98 6.98
21 2 6 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
22 2 7 7.60 6.90 10.50 10.50
23 2 8 4.75 4.75 7.00 7.50
24 2 9 9.00 7.50 11.00 11.00
25 2 10 3.00 2.75 6.50 7.00
26 2 11 7.00 5.00 12.00 13.00
27 2 12 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00
28 2 13 7.50 8.00 10.00 12.00
29 2 14 6.25 6.25 18.00 19.00
30 2 15 6.00 4.50 8.00 7.85
31 3 1 7.00 7.23 15.00 14.50
32 3 2 13.62 10.00 14.75 1.50
33 3 3 6.00 8.00 6.00 8.00
34 3 5 6.00 6.00 10.00 12.00
35 3 6 5.00 5.00 8.00 7.60
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3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7 7.00 6.50 9.50 7.00
8 5.78 6.00 8.11 8.50
9 6.50 6.00 11.00 9.00
10 6.00 6.00 12.00 10.00
11 5.92 7.27 8.81 11.81
12 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
13 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
14 7.87 7.75 10.96 11.23
15 5.00 18.00 12.00 20.00
1 8.00 7.00 10.00 10.00
2 1.50 2.25 1.00 1.50
3 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
4 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
5 4.50 4.50 6.00 8.00
6 3.75 3.75 6.00 6.00
7 4.50 7.00 5.50 10.00
8 5.00 6.00 10.00 8.00
9 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
10 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.25
11 5.00 5.00 8.00 6.00
12 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
13 4.00 4.00 4.00 7.00
14 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
15 1.00 0.50 1.50 3.00
1 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
2 7.00 7.00 9.50 9.50
3 10.00 12.00 14.00 12.00
4 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
5 5.00 5.00 12.00 20.00
6 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
7 5.00 4.50 6.00 6.75
8 5.00 6.50 8.00 8.25
9 4.80 4.90 7.50 7.80
10 12.50 12.50 15.00 8.00
11 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
13 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
14 5.00 6.00 6.00 7.00
15 5.00 7.00 8.00 9.00
1 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
2 4.00 3.00 8.00 10.00
3 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
4 6.00 5.00 6.00 8.00
5 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
7 5.00 10.00 8.00 10.00
8 10.00 7.00 10.00 5.00
9 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
10 1.25 2.00 2.00 2.00
11 2.00 1.00 12.00 12.00
12 3.75 3.75 8.00 8.00
13 3.00 4.00 7.60 7.00
124
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
14 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25
15 3.00 3.00 6.00 2.00
1 4.60 5.00 7.95 8.12
2 6.50 5.00 6.50 7.00
3 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
4 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00
5 3.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
6 3.00 3.50 7.50 7.50
7 5.00 5.00 8.00 7.00
8 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
9 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
10 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
11 7.00 3.75 6.00 8.00
12 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
13 8.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
14 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
15 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00
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CERTAINTY AND HYPOTHETICAL BIAS IN CONTINGENT
VALUATION ELICITATION METHODS
Lara E. Platt, Kent D. Messer, and Gregory L. Poe
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca NY
Abstract:
This research tests the reliability of three stated preference instruments for obtaining hypothetical 
WTP and compares the values obtained from these instruments to actual WTP behavior in a 
similar experimental setting that used the Random Price Voting Mechanism. Results suggest 
that the Yes/No payment card format provides the closest prediction of actual behavior, while the 
multiple bounded discrete choice format yields statistically similar estimates.
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insights with respect to this research. The data and analysis are drawn from research for the 
Master’s Thesis currently in progress by Lara E. Platt, graduate student in the Department of 
Applied Economics, Cornell University.
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Certainty and Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation Elicitation Methods
A fundamental issue in the increased use of non-market valuation methods to provide input into 
public good decision making is the validity of these methods for measuring the benefits of public 
goods and changes in public goods. While the examination of validity involves many 
dimensions, undoubtedly a critical component of any validity assessment of a method is criterion 
validity. Criterion validity involves comparing the values measured by the method in question 
with those obtained by practitioners of the discipline (Bishop, 2004). While most economists 
would agree that values obtained from a well-functioning market would provide a satisfactory 
criterion for assessing validity of a method, such an approach becomes problematic for non­
market goods. In lieu of such a market, simulated market experiments have been adopted as 
reasonable criterion for assessing validity.
Since the seminal field validity test conducted by Bishop and Heberlein (1979), a large 
body of criterion validity research for contingent valuation method has arisen in the 
environmental economics and broader economics literature. Contingent valuation is the leading 
stated preference method for eliciting non-market values, typically involving the elicitation of 
willingness to pay for improvement in environmental quality or other public good. Evidence 
from meta-analysis research (e.g. List and Gallet, 2001) suggests that respondents to contingent 
valuation survey do consistently overstate their preferences, and that calibration of these methods 
is needed. Importantly, from the perspective of this research, the magnitude of hypothetical bias 
increases with public goods in comparison to biases found in private goods (e.g. candy bars) and 
quasi-public goods (e.g. hunting permits).
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While a number of factors likely contribute to the increased divergence between 
hypothetical and real willingness to pay values in simulated market settings for public goods, we 
conjecture that the greater disparity observed in public good settings can be attributed, in part, to 
poor demand revelation characteristics of the mechanisms used to collect actual contributions. In 
previous NSF-funded research (NSF/EPA #R824688 and NSF #SBR9727375) we have shown 
that the standard voluntary contribution mechanisms widely used in field criterion validity tests 
of the contingent valuation method, do indeed understate demand in induced value settings 
analogous to those used in non-market valuation criterion validity tests (Rondeau, Poe and 
Schulze, 2005). Hence, reliance on such mechanisms may lead the to biased assessments of 
criterion validity.
Despite their poor performance at eliciting actual payments that are comparable to public 
good values, the continued reliance on voluntary contribution mechanisms in contingent 
valuation criterion validity and calibration research is understandable. While incentive 
compatible mechanisms for public goods, which approach demand revelation, have been 
developed over the years (e.g. Groves Ledyard, 1977; Smith, 1980, Falkinger et al. 2000) these 
mechanism often involve complex incentive and provision structures. Moreover, these 
mechanisms typically involve multiple rounds to approximate group demand revelation and, 
hence, they are not amenable to one shot field conditions of contingent valuation. In contrast, 
the Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM) developed in Messer (2004) and Messer et al. 
(2005) offers a promising demand-revealing single shot mechanism that is amenable to simulated 
market settings.
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In this research summary, we build upon this previous research to demonstrate how it 
could be applied to criterion validity testing of contingent valuation. In the process we also 
explore convergent validity across alternative contingent valuation elicitation methods.
Experimental Design
Split sample hypothetical data is elicited for both private and public insurance policies using two 
forms of the Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice (MBDC) method described by Welsh and Poe 
(1998), and the standard Payment Card (PC) method. In the standard PC format (Rowe et al. 
1996), subjects circle a value corresponding with their decision from a table of values (Figure 1). 
A second sample received an alternative Dichotomous Choice Payment Card (DC-PC), depicted 
in Figure 2, corresponding to that suggested in Boyle (2003) and employed by Bateman et al.
(2005) amongst others. For the DC-PC respondents indicate a vote of “Yes” or “No” to paying 
specified dollar amounts. As such, this elicitation method has similarities to the standard PC, but 
differs fundamentally in that respondents are asked to register a decision for each dollar value 
(rather than simply circling one value from a table). A third sample faced a MBDC version 
requiring respondents to indicate a level of certainty of WTP for each of a series of values. 
Certainty response options in the MBDC format are “Definitely Yes” (DY), “Probably Yes” 
(PY), “Unsure” (UN), “Probably No” (PN), and “Definitely No” (DN) (Figure 3). Past research 
(Vossler et al. 2004) indicates that the multiple bounded “Probably Yes” (MB-PY) model best 
predicts actual behavior in contribution settings. To the best of our knowledge, such 
comparisons have not been provided for DC-C and PC formats.
The structure of the hypothetical risk experiment is taken from Messer, Poe and Schulze
(2006) which uses the RPVM. The private market follows the standard Becker-DeGroot-
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Marshack (BDM) private goods mechanism, which has been shown to be theoretically incentive 
compatible and empirically demand revealing. In the private insurance setting, an individual 
purchases the insurance, and avoids risk of loss, at a price equal to the randomly drawn cost, if 
that cost is less than the offered bid. If the randomly drawn cost exceeds the bid amount then the 
insurance policy is not purchased and the individual faces the financial risk. The public good 
setting has a similar decision rule for groups of three subjects facing the same financial risk, 
however in this setting the decision to purchase depends on a majority rule criterion. That is, if 
the majority of offered bids exceeds the randomly drawn cost, then the insurance policy is 
purchased and each individual pays the randomly drawn cost. Hence the mechanism becomes a 
coercive, majority rules tax.
Experimental sessions for the hypothetical risk study were conducted at Cornell 
University’s Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Decision Research (LEEDR).
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate introductory level economics classes in the 
Department of Applied Economics and Management (AEM). Sessions consisted of up to 24 
subjects participating at one time. Participants were paid at a flat fee of approximately $25 per 
hour. Most sessions lasted between 35 and 45 minutes, so the payment was typically $15 per 
participant1 Participants were seated at individual computers equipped with privacy shields. 
Subject bids were collected using Excel spreadsheets programmed with Visual Basic for 
Application. These spreadsheets transmitted the subject responses to an Access database for 
storage.
A split sample approach was employed, with 95 subjects completing the PC version, 104 
subjects completing the MBDC version, and 109 participants completing the DC-PC version.
1 As an additional incentive for participation, some students were offered extra credit in their AEM course for 
participation. This incentive applied to participation in any of several experiments occurring during the same 
period, and was offered by professors of particular courses.
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Upon entering the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer workstation, and given 
time to complete consent forms and read the initial experiment instructions. The experiment 
proceeds as follows.2
Subjects are asked to imagine they have the opportunity to purchase an insurance 
program to protect them against a loss. They are shown three sets of stacked poker chips, each 
set with a different composition of red and white colored chips. Poker chips are transferred into 
three different colored bags by subject volunteers. The red bag contains 20 red chips and 80 
white chips, the green bag contains 50 red chips and 50 white chips, and the blue bag contains 80 
red chips and 20 white chips.
Subjects are instructed that for each round, they will be assigned to one of the three bags, 
and volunteer subjects will make ten draws (with replacement) from this bag. Each red chip 
drawn corresponds with a private loss of $1.00. If the insurance program is purchased, no draws 
will be made from the assigned bag, and thus any loss will be avoided. Subjects are asked to 
indicate the “highest amount they would pay and still vote for the insurance program.”3
For each round, subjects are given an account with a starting balance of $25. If an 
insurance program is purchased, the cost is deducted from this account. If an insurance program 
is not purchased, any losses resulting from red chip draws are deducted from the account. To 
familiarize subjects with the probabilistic component of their decision task, two demonstration 
rounds are conducted. Volunteers make ten draws with replacement from the green (50 red, 50 
white) bag, and the loss for the practice round is announced.
2 See Appendix for complete instructions for the DC-PC version of the Hypothetical Risk experiment.
3 This is the verbiage used in the PC and DC-PC versions. For the MBDC version, subjects are instructed to 
“indicate if you would pay the designated cost and still vote for the program.”
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Subjects are next informed that for each round they will be assigned to a group of either 
one or three members, and will be told which bag each group member must draw from.4 Group 
members are announced and identified to each other through a show of hands. In the case where 
the group size is three, each member faces the same cost for the insurance program, regardless of 
which bag has been assigned to them. Purchase of the insurance program is based on a majority 
vote rule, and is thus coercive. Finally, subjects are reminded that while their decisions are 
hypothetical and do not affect their earnings, they should make the decisions as if the losses and 
opportunity to purchase the program were real.
It is important to note that the experimental design used here departs from that used by 
Messer, et al. in two primary ways. First, decision-making in this experiment is hypothetical in 
nature. Subjects never actually face the process where losses are incurred, nor do they actually 
purchase insurance programs. Rather they indicate the highest amount they would pay “and still 
vote Yes for” the program. Second, though the RPVM process is described, the actual cost of 
the insurance program is never explicitly determined. In the Messer, et al. study, one of the 
program rounds is randomly chosen to be played through for the determination of subject 
earnings. Cost of the insurance program is determined randomly by employing the RPVM. But 
because of the hypothetical nature of this experiment, a final cost need not be specified. In 
response to questions regarding whether the cost of the program would be revealed, subjects 
were told that at this time, policy makers are uncertain about how much the program will 
actually cost. We only know that it will be somewhere between $0 and $25.
4 This aspect of the experiment was originally designed by Messer, et al. to examine altruism in a public goods 
provision situation. While this is not pertinent to the current analysis, it was retained in order to facilitate potential 
future analysis between hypothetical and real versions of the experiment.
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Nine separate rounds of insurance program are offered, each with a different variation of 
group size and bag assignment. Table 1 lists the specifications of each of the nine rounds. For 
the MBDC, PC, and DC-PC versions of the experiment, information for each round is distributed 
and collected using a program written for use with the LEEDR computer network. Subjects do 
not have access to information about subsequent rounds until they have submitted their decision 
for the current round, nor can they change a previously submitted vote. Subjects are instructed 
not to communicate with each other during the experiment.
This report focuses only on the comparison of the private $5 BDM and the homogenous 
($5,$5,$5) RPVM settings. This allows us to confine our attention to our proposed method of 
criterion validity testing, and not be diverted by the issues of paternalistic and pure altruism 
explored in Messer et al. (2005) and Messer, Poe and Schulze (2006).
Instrument Design
Following Rowe, et al. (1996), cell values for the PC table are set by using the log 
function described by Weber’s law:
1) B n =  B i*  ( 1  + k ) n-i
where B n is the bid in cell n, B 1 is the bid in the first cell, and k  is a percentage of increase in the 
scale. Use of an exponential function allows the distance between cell values to increase at 
increasing rate, providing the advantage of keeping the PC table down to a manageable size. In 
addition, a logarithmic scale takes into account evidence of log-normal distribution of 
measurement errors in past studies (such as Rowe, et al. 1996). As the quantity being estimated 
grows larger, the precision of estimates tends to decline.
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Having selected the range as between $0 and the initial account balance of $25, it is 
possible to determine k and calculate rough values for the cells. Specifically,
2) k = [( Bn/  Bj) 1/<N-1}]  -  1
where Bn is set equal to the upper limit of the range, and N  is set equal to the number of desired 
cells in the table. For the scale calculations, values greater than 1 are used for both B1s, and an N  
larger than the desired number of cells is used. This is because the incremental changes for the 
first few Bns are very small, and are meaningless in terms of the valuation task at hand.
Therefore, the first several cells are collapsed into a smaller, more efficient set of increases.
Finally, the remaining values are smoothed in order to provide a manageable choice set. 
Cell values for the PC table were chosen such that they straddle the induced values of the 
insurance program ($2, $5, and $8 for the red, green, and blue bags, respectively), but never 
exactly hit these values. The resulting PC table contains 30 cells. In the DC-PC format, subjects 
are instructed to answer “Yes” or “No” to each of the values listed in the standard PC format.
Design of the MBDC version follows directly from the format introduced by Welsh and 
Poe (1998). For each of a set of increasing values, respondents are asked to indicate their 
certainty that true quantity is greater than that value. Certainty is indicated by selecting among 
the answers “Definitely Yes,” “Probably Yes,” “Unsure,” “Probably No,” and “Definitely No.” 
Two versions of the MBDC format were developed for the experiment, each containing 18 
specified values within the range of $0 to $25. Between the two MBDC versions, each of the 
values contained in the PC table are represented. Hence the elicitation formats have the same 
range and matching points to facilitate comparison. As indicated previously, Figures 1, 2 and 3 
illustrate the three different elicitation formats described above.
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To control for potential order effects, for each of the elicitation methods, the nine 
decision rounds are presented in two different rotations, each to approximately half of the 
treatment-specific respondents. In each version, the program presented in the first round is the 
homogeneous public good case with an induced value of $5 for all group members. The 
following eight rounds are reversed in the second order variation. Table 2 exhibits the difference 
in the rotations.
Results
For reasons indicted above, our analysis here is directed toward the insurance programs 
presented in Rounds A (5,5,5) and I (5). Data are examined using nonparametric methods. In 
the nonparametric setting, subject responses are plotted in a reverse cumulative distribution 
function (1-CDF). Figures 7-9 display these distributions. Tests of equality between 
distributions is undertaken using the Smirnov Test (Conover1980). The Smirnov Test statistic is 
exactly the same as the Kolmorgorav-Smirnov D-statistic.:
D = max[F(x) -  G(x)]
Where F(x) and G(x) depict the cumulative distribution function for the two distributions being 
compared and the critical test statistic for large sample approximations is given in Conover (p. 
473). Mean estimates calculated following the Kristrom (1992) method described by Vaughn 
and Rodriguez (2001) are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
C on vergen t Validity:
Prior research indicates that the MBDC Probably Yes (MB-PY) estimates tend to coincide with 
estimates obtained through the standard PC format for the case of non-market environmental
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goods (Vossler 2003). This suggests that the two elicitation methods provide convergent validity 
in terms of valuing the provision of non-market goods. In contrast, for the case of the risk 
experiments conducted for this study, we find that the distributions of the PC and MB-PY differ 
for both the private and public goods insurance provision programs. Significance tests are 
performed using the Smirnov5 method and yield a D-statistic of 0.21, indicating that these two 
distributions are significantly different at the five percent level in the public goods case with 
induced values at $5, $5, $5. Similarly in the private goods case, with an induced value of $5, 
the K-S D-statistic is 0.23, indicating significant difference at the one percent level. (See Figures 
6 and 7 for the “Best Candidates” nonparametric distributions.)
Nonparametric means calculated using the Kristrom method are $4.95 and $5.75 for PC 
and MB-PY in the public goods case, and $5.77 and $5.95 in the private goods case (See Figures
4 and 5). Upon first inspection it appears that the difference in mean WTP estimates using the 
two different elicitation methods are greater in the public goods case than for the private good. 
However we are cautious in drawing such an interpretation. It may be the case that subjects 
exhibit learning as the rounds progress, and thus bid closer to the induced value in later rounds. 
As such we take the public goods case presented in the first round as the better indicator of 
elicitation effects.
If no cognitive methodological elicitation effects influence subject behavior, one would 
expect the standard PC and the DC-PC to display convergent validity, and exhibit closely aligned 
distributions and mean estimates. However Smirnov significance tests here again show that for 
the public goods case these two distributions are significantly different at the one percent level, 
with a D-statistic of 0.23. For the private good, the D-statistic is 0.19, indicating significant 
difference at the ten percent level. Mean estimates here also show variation, with the DC-PC
5 See Tables 5 and 6 for a matrix comparison of K-S significance tests.
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format yielding a mean of $6.40, as compared with $5.77 in the PC format. For the private good, 
the DC-PC mean value is $6.34, as compared with $4.95.
Comparison of the DC-PC and MB-DY is much closer to displaying convergent validity 
in terms of the underlying distributions. The D-statistic for the private goods case is 0.06, and 
for the public goods case is 0.14. In both cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
distributions are the same. The corresponding private mean value comparison is $5.95 vs. $6.34 
for the MB-PY and DC-PC respectively while the public mean value comparison is $5.74 vs. 
$6.40. Comparing these two elicitation methods we find that the estimates across public and 
private settings are closer than in other pair comparisons.
C riterion  Validity:
The unique opportunity of this analysis is the availability of the actual preference data 
from an identical experiment for a comparison with the hypothetical values. Thus we are able to 
examine the criterion validity of the three elicitation methods. First we compare the PC 
distribution and mean estimates with the Actual data. Smirnov D-statistics for PC vs. Actual are 
0.27 (significant at the one percent level) for the $5, $5, $5 case, and 0.23 (significant at the five 
percent level) for the $5 case. The actual mean is $6.20 (as compared with $4.95) for the public 
insurance program, and is $5.82 (as compared with $5.77) for the private insurance program.
Comparing the MB-PY with actual, we find a Smirnov D-statistic of 0.13 for in the 
public setting and 0.09 in the private setting. Neither case indicates any significant difference in 
the distribution. Mean comparisons here are $5.95 to $5.82 (MB-PY v. Actual) for the private 
good, and $5.75 to $6.20 for the public good. It thus seems reasonable to consider the MBDC 
elicitation method with a Probably Yes modeling approach as a viable proxy for actual behavior.
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Finally we compare the DC-PC elicitation estimates with the actual data. For the private 
goods case, K-S significance tests yield a D-statistic of 0.07, and in the public goods setting the 
D-statistic is 0.04. In neither case can the null hypothesis of equality be rejected. In terms of 
means comparison, we have for the private good an actual mean value of $5.82, while the DC- 
PC provides an estimated mean of $6.34. For the public good, the actual mean is $6.20 and the 
DC-PC mean is $6.40.
Conclusion
Nonparametric analysis shows that the DC-PC and the MB-PY formats provide statistically 
similar estimates of WTP and are not statistically different from each other, while the WTP 
distribution form the DC format is significantly different from the other elicitation methods and 
the actual distribution of WTP. The implication of this research is that a simple DC-PC format 
may be preferred to the MBDC format in terms of predicting actual WTP, as well as being less 
cognitively taxing on the respondent.
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Instructions (Part A) (DC-PC)
This is a hypothetical experiment in the economics of decision making. Please read the following 
instructions carefully and do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you 
have a question, please raise your hand and a lab administrator will respond.
In today’s experiment you will be asked to consider a number of situations and to make a decision in 
each one of them. In each situation you will be facing the chance of a loss and will be asked to 
indicate if you would purchase an insurance program that protects you against the possibility of this 
loss. The same procedures will be followed for each situation. However, each situation is 
independent from the others. The decision you make in one situation will not affect others. Each 
situation proceeds as follows.
Imagine that you receive a starting balance of $25. At the front of the room are three bags full of 
one hundred (100) poker chips. The red bag has 20 red chips and 80 white chips. The green bag has 
50 red chips and 50 white chips. The blue bag has 80 red chips and 20 white chips. In each situation 
you will be informed of which bag will be used and ten chips will be drawn randomly, and replaced, 
from this bag by subjects participating in the experiment. For every white chip drawn, you will have 
to pay nothing. For every red chip drawn, you will have to pay your personal loss amount of $1.00. 
For example, if 4 of the 10 chips drawn are red, then you would have to pay $4 ($1.00 x 4) from your 
starting balance of $25.
Rather than taking the chance of losing your personal loss amount for each red chip drawn, you have 
the option of purchasing an insurance program that will remain in effect for the duration of the 
round of ten chip draws. With an insurance program, you will not owe the personal loss amount in 
the event that red chips are drawn. But, you will have to pay the experimenter, out of your starting 
balance, for the insurance program before any chips are drawn that round.
We will ask you to consider a number of designated costs for the insurance program and to indicate if 
you would purchase the insurance program at each of these costs: we will call this your vote. For 
each cost, you submit your vote by clicking on the button on the spreadsheet that best corresponds 
with your voting decision. After you have finished voting on all of the designated prices, click on the 
SUBMIT button and wait for the administrator to instruct you to continue to the next round. For each 
insurance program, the costs you will be asked to consider are between $0 and your initial balance of 
$25.
Experiments like this have been conducted for real money at Cornell University. Although this 
experiment is hypothetical, please think about the questions carefully as if you really were facing this 
chance of a financial loss and offered an opportunity to purchase an insurance program.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand if  you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
Instructions (Part B) (DC-PC)
Now that you understand the basic features of this insurance program and the voting process, you will 
be asked to indicate if would vote for each of nine separate insurance programs at various designated 
costs. The procedures are similar to those discussed previously, except for three important differences.
1) For each of the insurance programs, you may be the only voter (as described in Part A of the 
instructions). However, you may also be part of a group of three people whose votes would decide 
whether or not to purchase the insurance program. For programs where the group size is three, 
information about which bags will be used for you and the other voters in your group will be shown to 
you prior to determining your vote. Although each person may be drawing their chips from a different 
bag, each person will have the same personal loss amount of $1 for every red chip that is drawn from 
their assigned bag. You do not incur any personal loss amount for red chips drawn from bags assigned 
to other members of your group.
2) For groups of three, you are in a majority rule situation in which the number of votes for the 
program would be evaluated at each designated cost. Using the procedure described in part A we will 
ask you to indicate if you would vote for the insurance program at various designated costs. If the 
insurance program is purchased, the same cost would be paid by you and all other members of the 
group. This is true even though each member of your group may be drawing from a different bag.
3) Only one of the nine insurance programs would actually be implemented. This is done by 
randomly drawing from a bag containing nine chips, lettered A through I. Each letter corresponds to 
one of the nine programs.
For each insurance program, the experiment proceeds as follows:
Imagine that you and each member of your group are given a starting  balance  of $25 and that you will 
be informed which bags will be used for you and for the other members of your group. Given this 
information, you will be asked to indicate if you would vote for the program and to enter the 
corresponding information into the spreadsheet on the computer. Once again, the personal loss 
am ount per each red chip drawn is $1. However, different people in your group may be drawing from 
different bags.
Consider all of the information for the insurance program before submitting your vote. For each 
insurance program, the costs you will be asked to consider will be between $0 and your initial balance 
of $25. Once everyone has submitted his/her votes for one insurance program, the administrators will 
instruct you to move to the next program. After the votes for all the insurance programs have been 
entered, we will determine which of the programs will be selected.
Again, experiments like this have been conducted for real money at Cornell University. Although this 
experiment is hypothetical, please think about the questions carefully, as if you really were facing this 
chance of a financial loss and offered an opportunity to purchase an insurance program.
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions.
Please raise your hand i f  you have any questions.
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment.
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Table 1: Decision Specifications by Round
Round: Group
Size:
Your Bag: 
(out of 100 chips)
Bags of the other two 
members in your group
A 3 Green (50 red chips) Green (50 red chips) & Green (50 red chips)
B 3 Blue (80 red chips) Green (50 red chips) & Red (20 red chips)
C 3 Red (20 red chips) Green (50 red chips) & Blue (80 red chips)
D 1 Blue (80 red chips) na
E 3 Green (50 red chips) Red (20 red chips) & Blue (80 red chips)
F 1 Red (20 red chips) na
G 3 Blue (80 red chips) Blue (80 red chips) & Blue (80 red chips)
H 3 Red (20 red chips) Red (20 red chips) & Red (20 red chips)
I 1 Green (50 red chips) na
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Figure 1: The Standard Payment Card (PC) Elicitation Instrument
Given the information above, what is the highest amount that you would pay and still 
vote for the insurance program?
(Use the mouse to click on the cell containing your answer. )
C $0.00 C $0.25 C $0.50 C $0.75 C $1.00 C $1.25
C $1.55 C $1.85 C $2.15 C $2.55 C $2.95 C $3.35
E  $3.85 E  $4.35 E  $4.85 C $5.35 C $5.95 C $6.55
E  $7.15 E  $7.85 E  $8.55 C $9.35 C $10.20 C $11.15
E  $12.30 E  $13.80 E  $15.65 C $18.15 C $21.40 C $25.00
Submit
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Figure 2: The Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice (MBDC) Elicitation Instrument
Given the information above, would you vote for the insurance pjease seject one 0f fjve choices for exh 0f the dollar amounts below 
program at each of the costs listed below?
(Use the mouse to click on the cell containing your answer. A circle will appear.)
0 .0 0 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes £  Defnitely Yes
0 .5 0 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 .0 0 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes £  Defnitely Yes
1 .5 5 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
2 .1 5 C  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
2 .9 5 [ ]  Definitey No £  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
3 .8 5 C  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
4 .8 5 [ ]  Definitey No £  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes £  Defnitely Yes
5 .9 5 E  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
7 .1 5 [ ]  Definitey No £  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes £  Defnitely Yes
8 .5 5 E  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 0 .2 0 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 1 .9 5 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 3 .8 0 [ ]  Definitey No C  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 5 .9 0 [ ]  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
1 8 .3 5 [ ]  Definitey No C  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
2 1 .4 0 [ ]  Definitey No C  Probably No c Unsure E  Probably Yes C  Defnitely Yes
2 5 .0 0 C  Definitey No E  Probably No c Unsure C  Probably Yes £  Defnitely Yes Submit
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Figure 3: The Discrete Choice Payment Card (DC-PC) Elicitation Instrument
Given the information above, would you vote for the insurance Rease indicate your choice for each of the do||ar amounts bebw
program at each of the costs listed below?
(Use the mouse to click on the cell containing your answer. A circle will appear.)
$0 .0 0 C  Yes C  No
$0 .2 5 C  Yes C  No
$0 .5 0 C  Yes C  No
$0 .7 5 C  Yes C No
$1 .00 C  Yes C No
$1 .25 C  Yes C No
$1 .55 C  Yes C  No
$1 .85 C  Yes C  No
$2 .1 5 C  Yes C  No
$2 .5 5 C  Yes C  No
$2 .9 5 C  Yes C  No
$3 .3 5 C  Yes C  No
$3 .8 5 C  Yes C  No
$4 .3 5 C  Yes C  No
$4 .8 5 C  Yes C  No
$5 .3 5 C  Yes C  No
$5 .9 5 C  Yes C  No
$6 .5 5 C  Yes C  No
$7 .1 5 C  Yes C  No
$7 .8 5 C  Yes C  No
$8 .5 5 C  Yes C No
$9 .3 5 C  Yes C  No
$10 .20 C  Yes C  No
$11 .15 C  Yes C  No
$12 .30 C  Yes C  No
$13 .80 C  Yes C  No
$15 .65 C  Yes C  No
$18 .15 C  Yes C  No
$2 1 .4 0 C  Yes C  No
$2 5 .0 0 C  Yes C  No
Submit
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Table 2: Risk Order Variations for the Hypothetical Risk Experiment
Order of 
Presentation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Risk Order 
Variation 1 Rd. A Rd. B Rd. C Rd. D Rd. E Rd. F Rd. G Rd. H Rd. I
Induced
Values* 5,5,5 8,5,2 2,5,8 8 5,2,8 2 8,8,8 2,2,2 5
Risk Order 
Variation 2 Rd. A Rd. I Rd. H Rd. G Rd. F Rd. E Rd. D Rd. C Rd. B
Induced
Values 5,5,5 5 2,2,2 8,8,8 2 5,2,8 8 2,5,8 8,5,2
* Subject’s own induced value is displayed first, followed by the induced values o f group members.
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Figure 4: Nonparametric Means for the Private Goods Setting
Nonparametric Means (5)
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Figure 5: Nonparametric Means for the Public Goods Setting
Nonparametric Means (5,5,5)
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Figure 6: Nonparametric Reverse CDFs (Best Candidates) for the Private Goods Setting
Nonparametric Estimation: Risk (5) 
PC, DC-PC, Actual & MB-PY
Figure 7: Nonparametric Reverse CDFs (Best Candidates) for the Public Goods Setting
Nonparametric Estimation: Risk (5,5,5) 
PC, DC-PC, Actual & MB-PY
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Table 3: Nonparametric Means for the Private Insurance Program (5)
DY
MBDC
PY UN PC DC-PC Actual
n 104 104 104 95 109 87
Mean 4.52 5.95 7.02 5.77 6.34 5.82
(se) (0.081) (0.091) (0.109) (0.122) (0 .110) (0 .378)
[95% C.I.] [4.36, 4.68] [5.77, 6.12] [6.80, 7.23] [5.53, 6.01] [6.12, 6.55] [5.08, 6.56]
Table 4: Nonparametric Means for the Public Insurance Program (5,5,5)
MBDC
DY PY UN PC DC-PC Actual
n
Mean
(se)
[95% C.I.]
104
4.03
(0 .086) 
[3.87, 4.20]
104
5.75
(0 .085) 
[5.58, 5.91]
104
7.06
(0 .119) 
[6.83, 7.29]
95
4.95
(0 .080) 
[4.79, 5.10]
109
6.40
(0 .095) 
[6.21, 6.58]
87
6.20
(0 .279) 
[5.65, 6.74]
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Table 5: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Significance Tests for the Private Good (5)
PC PC PT ACTUAL
DY ** *** ***
PY ** N N
UN *** *** ***
PC -- * **
DC-PT -- -- N
Table 6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Significance Tests for the Private Good (5,5,5)
Kolmogorov Tests (555)
PC PC PT Actual
DY *** *** ***
PY ** N N
UN *** *** ***
PC -- *** ***
DC- PT -- -- N
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P a p e r  c o p i e s  a r e  b e in g  r e p l a c e d  b y  e le c t r o n ic  P o r t a b l e  D o c u m e n t  F i l e s  ( P D F s ) .  T o  r e q u e s t  P D F s  o f  A E M  p u b lic a t io n s ,  w r i t e  to  ( b e  s j r e  to  
in c lu d e  y o u r  e -m a i l  a d d r e s s )  P u b l ic a t io n s .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  A p p l i e d  E c o n o m i c s  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t ,  W a r r e n  H a l l ,  C o r n e l l  U n iv e r s i t y .  Ith a c a . N Y  
1 4 8 5 3 -7 8 0 1  If  a  f e e  is  in d ic a t e d , p le a s e  in c lu d e  a  c h e c k  o r  m o n e y  o r d e r  m a d e  p a y a b le  t o  C o r n e l l  U n iv e r s i t y  f o r  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  y o u r  p u r c h a s e  
V is it  o u r  W e b  s ite  (h ttp :/  / a e m .C o r n e l l  e d u / r e s e a r c h / r b .h t m ) f o r  a  m o r e  c o m p le t e  lis t o f  r e c e n t  b u l le t in s
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